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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS 
Democritus, a Greek, theorized that minute particles 
or atoms, which were unchangeable and indivisible, 
composed all material things. 
M. H. Klaproth from Germany isolated a metallic 
substance from pitchblende, naming it uranium after 
the recently-discovered planet Uranus. 
John Dalton proposed all elements were composed 
of like atoms and were distinguishable from each 
other by mass. 
Eugene Peligot, a French chemist, first prepared 
uranium as a metal after obtaining uranium 
chloride and reducing it with potassium. 
Dmitri Mendeleyev of the University of St. 
Petersburg found that all elements could be arranged 
in the order of atomic weights. He created the first 
periodic table of elements. 
Henri Moissan, a French chemist, obtained a metallic 
uranium ingot from uranium oxide and sodium 
chloride. This experiment was repeated in 1942 by 
many of the scientists on the atomic bomb project 
with better success. 
W. C. Roentgen discovered x-rays. 
A. H. Becquerel presented to the Paris Academy of 
Sciences his discovery of radioactive radiation from 
uranium. 
Marie and Pierre Curie announced the discovery of 
polonium in July and radium in December. 
Albert Einstein published his special theory of 
relativity including the equation for the equivalence 
of energy and mass (E=MC2). 
F. Soddy suggested existence of atoms with different 
atomic masses but identical properties called 
isotopes. 
Ernest Rutherford proposed an atomic theory where 
a critical mass and a positive charge were located in 
nucleus of atom. 
vi 
1913 Niels Bohr suggested the existence of a central 
nucleus with electrons moving in orbits around the 
outside. 
1919 Discovery of protons by Ernest Rutherford. 
1922 J. W. Marden from the Lamp Division of 
Westinghouse obtained a patent for reducing 
uranium halides with aluminum, publishing the 
first known example of uranium preparation in the 
United States. 
1932 P. P. Alexander, a student at M. I. T., reported his 
thesis work on reduction of uranium oxide with 
calcium hydride. 
1932 H. C. Urey discovered heavy hydrogen called 
deuterium, which was used in atom smashing 
experiments. 
1932 Ernest Lawrence reported in the literature about his 
invention of the cyclotron, an instrument that 
accelerated and aimed protons and other nuclear 
particles at a target, using powerful magnets to 
control the action of those particles involved. 
1932 James Chadwick announced the discovery of the 
neutron, a neutral-charged particle of about the same 
mass as a proton. 
1932 L. S. Taylor developed an air ionization chamber to 
determine the value of a roentgen. 
1934 F. Joilet and L Joilet-Curie discovered artificial 
radioactivity by bombarding aluminum with alpha 
particles, noticing neutrons and positively charged 
particles were emitted. 
December 1938 Nuclear fission discovered by Otto Han and Fritz 
Strassmann by bombarding uranium and noticing it 
broke into two fragments. Made public in Die 
Naturzvissenschaften, January 1939. 
December 1938 Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch confirm the experiment 
and inform Niels Bohr of their findings. 
January 26,1939 Niels Bohr reports the European discoveries at a 
meeting on theoretical physics in Washington, D.C. 
August 2,1939 Einstein letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
detailing need for atomic bomb project. 
September 1,1939 Germany invaded Poland, setting off World War IL 
October 11,1939 President Roosevelt met with Alexander Sachs, a 
representative from Einstein and other immigrant 
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October 21,1939 
1940 
1940 
April 1940 
June 27, 1940 
May 1941 
May 17,1941 
June 22, 1941 
June 28, 1941 
July 2,1941 
July 11,1941 
October 9,1941 
November 9, 1941 
December 7,1941 
December 8,1941 
December 10,1941 
December 16,1941 
scientists, convincing him to create a uranium study 
group. 
First meeting of the Committee on Uranium with 
Lyman Briggs of the National Standards of Bureau 
serving as chairman. 
John R. Dunning and his research group at 
Columbia University discovered that fission is more 
readily produced in U235 than in U238. 
Two new elements created from uranium 
bombardment: neptunium (atomic number 93) and 
plutonium (atomic number 94). 
American scientists propose voluntary censorship 
plan for scientific publications. 
Organization of the National Defense Research 
Council (NDRC) organized under Vannevar Bush. 
Glenn Seaborg proved that plutonium was more 
fissionable than U235. 
A National Academy of Sciences committee headed 
by Arthur Compton released its first report 
encouraging further research in power applications 
of nuclear energy. 
Germany invaded the Soviet Union. 
Institution of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD). 
The British MAUD report is released and concluded 
that an atomic bomb was feasible. 
A second National Academy of Sciences report 
confirmed the first one in May. 
Vannevar Bush convinced President Roosevelt to 
start an all-out study of uranium, but with strict 
secrecy controls. 
The third and last National Academy of Sciences 
report like the MAUD report confirmed the 
feasibility of an atomic bomb. 
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. 
U.S. declared war on Japan as result of previous day's 
bombing of Pearl Harbor. 
Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. 
The secret Top Policy Committee became responsible 
for policy decisions in uranium research. 
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February 1942 
May 23,1942 
June 1942 
June 1942 
June 17,1942 
June 18,1942 
August 13,1942 
August/September 1942 
The S-1 Executive Committee replaced the Uranium 
Committee and gave Ernest Lawrence $400,000 for 
research on electromagnetic research. 
Roosevelt responded to Bush's report from the 
National Academy of Sciences and officially 
approved atomic bomb research. 
Metallurgical Laboratory established at the 
University of Chicago. Columbia and Princeton 
groups move to Chicago. 
Frank Howard Spedding invited by Arthur Compton 
to become leader of Chemistry Division in Chicago at 
the Metallurgical Laboratory. 
Ames Project established to back up Chicago 
metallurgical studies, with Harley Wilhelm joining 
and signing oath on February 24. 
Iowa State College signed first sub-contract for 
$30,000 with Metallurgical Laboratory to conduct 
metallurgical and chemical studies in support of the 
Chicago group. 
The S-1 Executive Committee recommended that the 
project move to the pilot stage and build one or two 
reactors or piles to produce plutonium and plants for 
the electromagnetic, centrifuge, and gaseous 
diffusion separation methods of uranium. 
Bush recommended that Roosevelt continue four 
methods of uranium separation. Also suggested that 
the Army be brought into the project. 
Designs for the pile developed at the Metallurgical 
Laboratory. 
Roosevelt approved the commercial plants 
suggesting that the Army Corps of Engineers take 
over this construction stage. 
Creation of a new district under the control of J. C. 
Marshall within the Army Corps of Engineers. 
Called the DSM Project (Development of Substitute 
Materials). 
Manhattan District formally established in New York 
City under Colonel James C. Marshall. 
At Iowa State College, Wayne Keller, with help from 
Spedding, Wilhelm, and others successfully 
produced uranium metal from a reduction 
experiment with calcium and uranium tetrafluoride 
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and then cast an 11-pound ingot of uranium, the 
largest single piece of uranium to that date. 
Iowa State signed two contracts, one for production 
and one for research, both directly with OSRD rather 
than under Metallurgical Laboratory. 
Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves appointed chief of 
the Manhattan Engineer District (MED). 
General Groves resolved the priority rating problems 
by procuring an unheard of rating of AAA for the 
Atomic Bomb Project. 
A Military Top Policy Committee named, consisting 
of Vannevar Bush, James Conant, General Styer of 
the Army, and Admiral Purcell of the Navy to direct 
Groves' activities within the Manhattan Project. 
Clinton Engineer Works site chosen in the hills of 
eastern Tennessee near the city of Knoxville. 
DuPont chosen as commercial contractor for the 
chemical separation plant at the Clinton plant. 
The centrifuge method of separation of uranium is 
dropped. 
Upon recommendation from Arthur Compton and 
other scientists. Groves decided to separate building 
of the atomic bomb from the Chicago Metallurgical 
Laboratory and place it in more isolated site. Los 
Alamos, New Mexico, selected as site for bomb 
development, code-named Project Y with J. Robert 
Oppenheimer in charge. 
The Military Policy Committee endorsed 
recommendations from Groves and Conant that the 
project move from research stage directly to the 
development of industrial-scale plants using 
electromagnetic and gaseous diffusion of uranium 
and pile production of plutonium. 
First self-sustaining chain reaction under the 
direction of Enrico Fermi at the West Stands, Stagg 
Field, University of Chicago. Iowa State provided 
two tons of uranium metal for the project. 
Hanford, Washington, selected as site for plutonium 
production rather than Clinton. 
President Roosevelt officially approved all plans for 
the production of atomic bombs. 
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March 1945 
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April 25,1945 
May 7,1945 
July 16,1945 
May 1945 
June 1945 
Construction of the electromagnetic plant (Y-12) and 
the plutonium pilot plant (X-10) begun at Clinton. 
Bomb design work began at Los Alamos. 
Manhattan Engineer District took over all research 
and development contracts from OSRD. 
Construction for the gaseous diffusion plant (K-25) 
begun at Clinton. 
The headquarters of the Manhattan Engineer District 
was moved to Oak Ridge at the Clinton Engineer 
Works. 
Surrender of Italy. 
Pile at Clinton (X-10) in operation. Iowa State 
supplied almost 90 percent of the uranium for this 
plant. 
Y-12 plant at Clinton sent first 200 grams of U235 to 
Los Alamos. 
Bomb models tested at Los Alamos. 
Allied invasion of Normandy (D-day). 
The plutonium gun bomb (Thin Man) was 
abandoned, leaving only the Little Boy (uranium 
gun device) and Fat Man (plutonium implosion 
device) for possibilities. 
First pile at Hanford operating. 
Chemical separation plants at Hanford finished. 
Battle of the Bulge. 
Los Alamos received first plutonium shipment. 
Yalta Conference. 
Tokyo was firebombed, resulted in 100,000 deaths. 
Roosevelt died and Truman became president. 
Stimson and Groves brief Truman on the 
Manhattan Project activities. 
Germany surrendered. 
First successful test of atomic bomb at Almogordo, 
New Mexico. 
Tokyo firebombed again, resulting in 83,000 deaths. 
Scientists at the Metallurgical Laboratory issue the 
Franck Report asking for a demonstration drop of 
the atomic bomb before using it in a war effort. 
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August 15,1947 
December 31,1947 
The Franck Report's plan for a demonstration was 
rejected by the U. S. government. 
Scientists successfully tested a plutonium implosion 
device in the desert near Almogordo, New Mexico, 
code-named Trinity. 
Potsdam Conference. 
Uranium bomb (Little Boy) dropped on Hiroshima. 
Russia declared war on Japan and invaded 
Manchuria. 
Plutonium bomb (Fat Man) dropped on Nagasaki. 
The Smyth Report, containing the story of the secret 
Manhattan Project activities, was released 
Japan offered allies terms of surrender. 
Japan signed surrender articles on the U.S.S. 
Missouri. 
Y-12 shut down at Clinton. 
Army-Navy E Award with four stars conferred to 
Iowa State for production efficiency. Presented by 
Groves to the College in a public ceremony, October 
12,1945. 
Institute for Atomic Energy established at Iowa State 
College. 
U.S. Atomic Energy Act signed by President Truman. 
In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 all 
atomic energy activities were transferred to civilian 
control under the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. 
The Manhattan Engineer District was abolished. 
The National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) 
and the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD) were abolished and their 
functions that remained were transferred to the 
Department of Defense. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
About 10:00 a.m. on Monday, August 6,1945—a typical summer day on 
the Iowa State College campus—a radio bulletin broke into the placid daily 
activities. President Harry S. Truman announced suddenly: 
Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on 
Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had 
more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It had more than two 
thousand times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" 
which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.^ 
According to Harley A. Wilhelm, a young metallurgist and associate 
director of a secret laboratory at Iowa State College, the word spread quickly that 
a more detailed announcement would come that afternoon from Secretary of 
War Henry A. Stimson.^ By 3:00 p.m. a small group of scientists, primarily 
chemists from a secret project headed by the soon-to-be-well-known Frank H. 
Spedding, had gathered in the Chemistry Building to listen to Henry Stimson's 
remarks. Those gathered in Room 113, drinking coffee and waiting for the 
announcement included the Fornefeldts, Jim Warf, Adrian Daane, Artie 
^Quoted in The Manhattan Project: Official History and Documents, Book I, Volume 4, 
Chapter 8, Part I, No. 1, 1, Record Group 77, National Archives, Washington, DC (microfilm, 
Robert W. Parks and Ellen Sorge Parks Library), (hereafter cited as MED History). This 
statement and the one by Stimson were made available as press releases by General Leslie 
Groves and his office, the Manhattan Engineer District, which served as the administrator 
for production of the Atomic Bomb. They were published in entirety in the official history of 
the atomic bomb, commissioned by General Grove, referred to as the Manhattan District 
History, compiled by a staff member, Gavin Hadden. The Manhattan District History, which is 
located in the National Archives, was made available in a microfilmed version in 1977 
called The Manhattan Project; Official History and Documents. That edition is the one cited in 
this paper throughout as MED History. The press releases were published in every major 
newspaper on August 7 after Truman and Stimson had initially broadcast them on the radio. 
^Harley A. Wilhelm, interview with author, Ames, Iowa, August 1990. 
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Tevebaugh, Art Kant, and Charlie Banks, all young men and women who had 
for several years of their lives worked day and night in rooms behind a 
barricade in the Chemistry Building.^ Soon Stimson's voice echoed 
throughout the room: 
The recent use of the atomic bomb over Japan, which was today 
made known by the President, is the culmination of years of 
Herculean effort on the part of science and industry working in 
cooperation with the military authorities.^ 
As the scientists listened to Stimson's recounting of the history of the 
Manhattan Project and about the importance of laboratories and facilities at 
places familiar to them but unknown to the public at large—Clinton Engineer 
Works,® Los Alamos, and Hanford—a somewhat pleasant announcement 
came over the airwaves: 
Certain other manufacturing plants much smaller in scale are 
located in the United States and Canada for essential production 
of needed materials. Laboratories at the Universities of Columbia, 
Chicago, and California, and Iowa State College and at other 
schools as well as certain industrial laboratories have contributed 
^Harry A. Svec, interview with author, Ames, Iowa, February 1991; Adrian Daane, 
telephone interview with the author," March 18, 1992. 
^Quoted from "Statement by the President of the United States, " August 6, 1945, in 
MED History Book I, Vol. 4, Chapter 8, Part I, No. 2, press release 1. Also appeared in New 
York Times, August 7,1945,7. 
^The Clinton Engineer Works was actually the laboratory facility and Oak Ridge was 
the town next to the plant The laboratory was never officially called Oak Ridge until after 
the war. In this dissertation all references to the laboratory will refer to the Clinton 
Engineer Works and references to the town will be Oak Ridge. (New York Times, August 7, 
1945, 7; "Background Information on Development of Atomic Energy Under Manhattan Project," 
December 31, 1946, in MED History, Book I, Vol. 4, Chapter 8, Part I, No. 2, press release no. 
99; P. G. Gosling, The Manhattan Project: Science in the Second World War, Energy History 
Series (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Administration and Human 
Resources Management, 1990), 20. 
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materially in carrying on research and in developing special 
equipment materials, and processes for the project.^ 
At the mention of "Iowa State College," a cheer erupted from the small 
group gathered around the radio/ The secret was finally out—Iowa State 
College had been a major player with institutions like the University of 
California, Columbia University, and the University of Chicago in a substantial 
research effort for the war. 
As the news spread, reporters came to the College, and for awhile the 
campus was a whirlwind of activity. Reports in several local newspapers 
revealed that Iowa State College discovered a method for the production of 
uranium metal and then at its own pilot plant produced over 1,000 tons of the 
metal until industry took over the process.® On Friday, October 12, 1945, 
General Leslie R. Groves, the leader of the Manhattan Engineer District, came 
to Ames to present Iowa State College the Army/Navy Flag for Excellence in 
Production with Four Stars, demonstrating excellence in industrial production 
five times for over a period of two-and-one-half years, making the College the 
only educational institution to ever receive the honor.^ 
^Quoted from "Statement of the Secretary of War," August 6, 1945, in MED History, 
Book I, Vol. 4, Chapter 8, Part I, No. 2, press release no. 2. Also appeared in New York Times, 
August 7,1945, 7. 
^Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990. 
®See "Atomic Bomb Opens New Era in Scientific History: Dr. Spedding Heads ISC 
Research on Atomic Bomb and Worries about Weeds in Victory Garden in Spare Time," Ames 
Daily Tribune (August 7, 1945): 1; "ISC Research Speeded Development of World's Most 
Destructive Weapon," Ames Daily Tribune (August 8, 1945): 1; "Intricate System of Passes for 
Bomb Project at College," Ames Daily Tribune (August 10,1945): 8; "I. S. C. Experts Speeded 
Work on Atom Bomb," The Des Moines Register (August 8, 1945): 1; and "College Does Secret 
Atomic Power Work," Iowa State Daily Student (August 8, 1945): 1 for a sampling of area 
newspaper articles that appeared on the Ames Project. 
^"The Ames Laboratory: How it Started, " n.d., 1; "The United States Army-Navy 
Production Award for Excellence to Iowa State College Men and Women of Chemistry Annex 1 
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The Significance of the Ames Project 
From 1942-1945, Iowa State College, like several other universities and 
colleges, conducted classified, war-related research, under the sponsorship 
of the National Defense Research Council (NDRC), the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development (OSRD), and the Manhattan Engineer District 
(MED), three federal government units each supervising research on the 
atomic bomb. Although some scientists participated in research during 
World War I, the United States entered that war at such a late date that 
research activity was minimal compared to that of World War II.^o 
At the beginning of World War II, few administrative structures 
existed within most academic institutions to carry on extensive weapons 
research. The federal government likewise had no single central 
organizational unit dedicated to weapons research. In general, government 
research funding agencies consisted primarily of specialized bureaus like 
the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Mines, and for awhile the Works Progress 
Administration, which supported applied research in narrow fields. The 
and 2," (October 12,1945), in the Ames Laboratory Papers Record Group 17/1, Robert W. Parks 
and Ellen Sorge Parks Library, Ames, Iowa (hereafter cited as Ames Laboratory Papers); 
"Schedule and Script", the Ames Laboratory Papers; Press Release about the Ceremony, the 
Ames Laboratory Papers. In 1906 the Navy instituted the Navy E Award for excellence, first 
awarding it in gunnery, later expanding it to include engineering and communications 
excellence in wartime activities. With the advent of World War I, the award recognized 
industrial plants that produced war machinery. In World War II, both the Army and Navy 
supported the award. 
l^Vannevar Bush, Science the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President (Washington: 
The Government Printing Office, 1945), 80. There are no really accurate estimates for 
government funded research in World War I, but the research budget of the government in 
1923 was $15,000,000. By 1940, it had grown to $69,000,000 and by 1944 the total grew to over 
$720,000,000. 
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largest research funding unit supporting scientific research, the United 
States Department of Agriculture, worked primarily with land grant schools 
through state experiment stations to subsidize research in agriculture and 
related areas. There was no central organized science policy nor one group 
in the federal government that could finance research in broad academic 
disciplines. In addition, most government funding efforts in the early 1930s 
revolved around recovery from the depression and not support for science at 
all." 
World War II though demonstrated a successful marriage between 
government and science. But before this marriage could be consummated, 
both the federal government and universities and colleges had to inaugurate 
a new administrative system in order to oversee unique war-related 
research. That same structure, in many ways distinctive to classified 
research, became the foundation for post-war federal and university 
relationships to continue. 
The new administrative structure also exhibited one of two 
administrative management styles or a combination of both in some cases: 
an academic system of committees, group research, and consensus-building 
indicative of academic institutions, or the hierarchical, control-based, 
command-laden military structure of management. Even though the 
military eventually controlled the atomic bomb project through classified 
research, this dissertation contends that the administrative apparatus 
"a. Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and 
Activities to 1940 (Cambridge; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 361. 
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which the federal agencies (NDRC, OSRD, and MED) adopted was, by and 
large, characterized by the academic style of management. 
The Ames Project then serves as a case study of a wartime classified 
laboratory—a laboratory conducting and managing research in the name of 
national security. But just as importantly, it is typical of federally-funded 
research units appearing after the war because most of the rules and 
regulations that controlled research administration in the war laboratory 
evolved into the rules and regulations that governed university-wide 
relationships with the federal government after World War II. 
An Explanation of the Format of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will examine the Ames Project in that light—as a 
precursor for the post-war research apparatus of Iowa State College. Though 
the dissertation will discuss some aspects of science and technology, it will 
concentrate primarily upon the administrative aspects of the Ames Project 
during World War II, examining the history of the Ames Project in the life of 
Iowa State at the time and its contributions to the development of the college's 
research infrastructure after the war. The author uses newly-released archival 
materials, interviews from many of the actual participants in the war-related 
research project, and some heretofore private manuscripts and unreleased 
interviews related to the project and its participants to analyze the Ames 
Project in detail. Although Part 1 will chronicle the scientific role for the Ames 
Project, it will also concentrate on the organizational structures that were 
initiated and adapted to place a security-intensive laboratory on an academic 
campus. Part 2 will concentrate primarily upon administrative issues, defining 
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the academic and military styles of management and revealing how security, 
governmental and military relationships, financial methods of operating a 
contract research facility, and health regulations contributed to the final 
research funding apparatus. 
A Review of the Sources 
The story of the Ames Project appeared for some time in bulletins from 
the College, in newspaper accounts as information was declassified, and in 
other local College reports. But the story of Frank H. Spedding and his 
contingent of graduate students and young Ph.D.s did not appear in any detail 
in the national printed accounts after the war. 
The Smyth Report,the first officially sanctioned report to surface after 
the war, traces the administrative and technical history of the Manhattan 
Project, the official name for the secret project that led to the development of 
the atomic bomb. This book-length report was published in three editions.^^ 
The first, called A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic 
Energy for Military Purposes under the Auspices of the United States Government 
1940-1945, appeared only days after the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan. 
General Leslie Groves hired Henry DeWolf Smyth, chair of the physics 
^^Henry D. Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the 
Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government 1940-1945 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948). 
^^There is a full account of the publishing activities of the Smyth Report in MED 
History, Book 1, General Volume 4: Auxiliary Activities, Chapter 13, 1-18. Also, the 
Princeton University Library Chronicle published in its Spring 1976 issue (vol. 37, 173-218) 
several articles on the publishing history of the Smyth Report. Smyth himself reprinted a 
report he had written on the history of the Smyth Report dated January 1947, a memorandum 
that had remained buried in his files until its publication in this journal. 
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department at Princeton, to write the report in April 1944. Smyth was given 
access to all security protected materials. He submitted the first draft to Conant 
and Groves in May 1945 at which time Groves appointed several scientists as 
reviewers and editors. A mimeographed version reached Conant, Groves, and 
Truman's inner circle of advisors for final review in July 1945. Because the 
group had to wait for Truman's return from overseas, the edition was not 
ready at the time of the bomb explosions. One thousand copies were printed 
though, kept by Groves' staff, and finally released after an announcement 
appeared in the Sunday newspapers on August 12,1945. The first one 
thousand copies quickly sold; another press run of two thousand copies was 
ordered and printed. Other editions were released in September 1945. The 
report provided the literate or technical-oriented public an explanation of the 
activities that took place in the various laboratories, companies, and agencies 
within the government. Later, the report was published with pictures, an 
index, and some material added from Britain and Canada. Somewhat later, a 
government document version was published with the original title displayed. 
This official history of the project mentioned the Ames laboratory in less than 
ten lines of text in over 400 pages of material. 
The release of the official manuscript history in the late 1970s, simply 
called The Manhattan District History, dispels the notion that the Manhattan 
Project did not produce a lengthy written record. General Leslie Groves, 
commander-in-chief of the project, commissioned the work, not so much a 
single book as it was a collection of reports, charts, pictures, memos, and other 
materials about the Manhattan Engineer District. The collection of materials, 
now housed in the National Archives, serves as the complete and definitive 
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work about every aspect of the massive project. Iowa State rated one single 
chapter of approximately fifty pages in this massive document, a reprint of a 
post-war report that was published in an Ames Laboratory scientific series by E. 
I. Fulmer.i4 Compiled with summary accounts from the division heads and 
project leaders, this short work is the only published account of Iowa State's 
role in the Manhattan Project. It does provide a short summary of Iowa State's 
participation and is particularly useful as a scientific guide to the various 
projects undertaken in Ames' wartime laboratory. 
Several other archival collections include documents about the 
Manhattan Project. Most of the old Argonne Laboratory's documents have 
been moved to the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and though they 
detail administrative, financial, and scientific information, Iowa State College 
information is very scant. The collections of archives that are scattered 
throughout the present U.S. Department of Energy files include scientific 
reports, fiscal information about the individual academic laboratories, and 
some general commercial contractor information. The Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory housed most of the information related to Iowa State since much of 
the Ames laboratory correspondence was sent to the Manhattan Engineer 
District, which moved its headquarters to Oak Ridge in 1943. Much of that 
documentation about the project is still classified and what information is 
housed there is also located at Iowa State or elsewhere. 
I. Fulmer, "History of the Ames Project Under the Manhattan District to 
December 31, 1946," ISC Report No. 10 (Ames: Iowa State College, 1947), typescript. 
'^Argonne Laboratory was the successor to the Metallurgical Laboratory of the 
University of Chicago. 
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Iowa State College fared no better in the secondary historical accounts 
because so many of them were taken from the "official" documents above. 
Shortly after the declassification of the countless documents on the atomic 
bomb project in the seventies. The Secret History of the Atomic Bomh^^ appeared. 
The first book to be published that relied heavily on the Manhattan District 
History, this account filled in many of the gaps that to that date had been 
unavailable to researchers. The book emphasizes the scientific and 
technological development of the project and serves as a good summary of the 
more complete history located in the National Archives. This book contains 
only a few references to contributions by Iowa State College. 
The best and probably most thoroughly researched scholarly document 
on the Manhattan Project is the Atomic Energy Commission's first volume of 
a  s e r i e s  o n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  b y  H e w l e t t  a n d  A n d e r s o n . T h e  
authors cover the development of the atomic bomb in their first volume. 
Given unlimited access to the classified and unclassified documentary and 
archival materials under the auspices of the Commission, Hewlett and 
Anderson produced a non-partisan, independent history of the time period, 
with a particular emphasis on the scientific advancements within the 
Manhattan Project. The substantial notes section of the book is an especially 
invaluable scholarly aid. Iowa State's contributions are given several scattered 
references, and almost one-half page details the Ames process for reducing 
l^Anthony C. Brown and Charles B. MacDonald, eds.. The Secret History of the Atomic 
Bomb (New York: Dial Press, 1977). 
^^Richard G. Hewlett, and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939-1946. Vol. 1 of 
A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1962). 
11 
uranium metal. A more recent, popularized Pulitzer Prize book by Richard 
Rhodes^® updates the atomic bomb story, providing a novelistic type format for 
the reader. It is well-documented for the scholar but adds little information on 
the Iowa State story. 
Vincent C. Jones,!^ with help from the Center for Military History, 
examines the Manhattan Project from the U.S. Army's viewpoint. His well-
documented volume depends heavily on the Manhattan District History and 
summarizes in great detail the Army's role in the development of the atomic 
bomb. It includes topics such as the Army take-over of the project from the 
civilian Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), the creation of 
the Manhattan District, the appointment of General Leslie Groves as head of 
the District, the administration of the production plants, laboratories, and 
other support facilities, the actual testing and employment of the bomb, and a 
chapter on the transition from the Army-controlled Manhattan Engineer 
District to the civilian-administered Atomic Energy Commission after the war. 
For the researcher, the bibliographical essay is invaluable for its detail, 
currency, and complete location information, but Iowa State is virtually 
ignored except in a chapter on laboratories that provided fuel feed materials. 
Personal accounts proliferate in the atomic energy story, but none are 
more famous than the one by Groves.20 Leslie R. Groves, the General in 
l®Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1986). 
I ^ Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United States Army in 
World War II Special Studies (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1985). 
^^Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962). 
charge of the Manhattan Engineer District, wrote his memoirs in order to tell 
the story of the Army's role in the Manhattan Project from his own unique 
perspective. A man called tyrant, czar, and other more derogatory names by 
the scientists under him. Groves was an imposing figure in the development 
of the atomic bomb. The book is certainly a reflection of the General's 
personality. It also displays his support for military action in the development 
of sensitive, secret projects but gives no insight into Iowa State contributions. 
Arthur H. Compton,2i who headed the Metallurgical Project at 
University of Chicago, wrote Atomic Quest, a personal account of his 
involvement with the Manhattan Project. The book is important because the 
Ames Project constituted a part of Compton's laboratory. The value of a study 
like this is more in its personal accounting of impressions and perceptions, but 
its major disadvantages are the lack of referenced notes and bibliography to 
prove the validity of its text. Even though Frank Spedding served under 
Compton as his chief chemistry officer for a time, Compton provides only 
scattered information about the Ames Project and Spedding. 
Today, more than forty years after the events of World War H, no book-
length history of the Ames Project exists. Only one public account of the work 
is available as a manuscript at the National Archives and also as an Ames 
Laboratory scientific report. Documents, papers, correspondence, research 
notebooks, and declassified materials remain in the Iowa State University 
Library, to date unpublished by scholars. 
Arthur H. Compton, Atomic Quest; A Personal Narrative (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1956). 
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A large portion of this dissertation will rely on interviews with 
participants from the Ames Project. Because some of the material in this 
dissertation cannot be verified by the documentary history, every effort has 
been made to use several interviews as source materials rather than to rely 
upon one person's memory of events. However, there still may be errors. In 
some cases, for example, dates cannot be substantiated for personnel becoming 
a part of the project, the role of military personnel on the Ames campus during 
the time under Manhattan District authority cannot be substantiated from 
existing sources, and sometimes it is unclear about the organizational 
relationships between Ames and other laboratories. What these interviews do 
provide though is a complement to the official records, which consist most 
often of scattered correspondence, scientific and administrative reports, and 
documentary history for events at the national and regional levels of the 
Manhattan Project. 
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PART 1. CREATION, ORGANIZATION, AND PURPOSES 
OF THE AMES PROJECT 
15 
THE GENESIS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE AMES PROJECT 
Pre-1941 Uranium Research Activities 
Niels Bohr, an imminent physicist in Copenhagen, remained late in his 
laboratory on January 3, 1939, finishing up work before he was to leave for an 
extended research visit at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New 
Jersey. Otto Frisch, another Danish physicist, rushed into the laboratory with 
incredible news from his aunt, Lise Meitner, a recently exiled Austrian 
physicist. Meitner had just received news from Germany that Otto Hahn, her 
former collaborator, and his new colleague Fritz Strassmann had bombarded 
uranium with neutrons and produced barium. "Had they split the atom?" 
Hahn asked in a letter to his former colleague, Meitner. After several long 
discussions with his aunt, Frisch contacted a biologist friend and asked him 
what term was used when a cell split. "Fission," was the term Frisch heard 
from his friend, and he was the first to apply it to what happened in the Hahn-
Strassmann experiment.22 
Hahn and Meitner had been collaborating on identifying mystery 
radioactivity materials, generally thought to be transuranic (beyond uranium) 
that Enrico Fermi, an Italian physicist, had first discovered in the mid-thirties 
when he bombarded uranium with neutrons. This problem was also being 
investigated in France by Irene and Frederic Joilet-Curie. In fact, Hahn and 
22Ruth Moore, Niels Bohr; The Man, His Science, & the World They Changed (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 222-223. 
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Meitner were replicating an experiment that the French scientists reported 
when Meitner decided to flee from the country because her homeland Austria 
had come under Nazi rule. Fritz Strassmann then teamed with Hahn, helping 
him precipitate the Joilet-Curie radioactive products with barium. Amazingly, 
the radioactive materials precipitated, leading the men to consider the 
impossible: they had split the atom. They repeated the experiment certain that 
the materials must be some form of radium (no. 88 on the periodic chart, not 
barium which was 56). The same result occurred. The men, believing that this 
was impossible, tried to separate the "radium" isotopes from the carrier 
barium. That failed proving again that they had indeed precipitated barium. 
Hahn immediately wrote to Meitner about their discovery. Shortly after this 
encounter, Bohr left for America and repeated the news of the experiment to 
the American scientific community.23 
The famous paper by Hahn and Strassmann appeared in Die 
Naturwissenschaften January 6, 1939. However, many people did not hear about 
it until the Fifth Conference on Theoretical Physics held in Washington 
January 26-28, 1939, when Bohr and Fermi announced the news to the 
audience even before a single paper had been presented.24 Papers by Frisch, 
Fermi, Szilard and Bohr followed rapidly in Nature and The Physical RevieivP-^ 
Moore, 222-223; Roger H. Stuewer, "Bringing the News of Fission to America," 
Physics Today (October 1985): 49-56; Otto R. Frisch, "How It All Began," Physics Today 
(November 1967): 272-277. See also Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 22; Rhodes, 233-275; and Anderson and Hewlett, 10-11 for 
other accounts of bringing the news to America. 
24stuewer, 54. 
^^Louis A. Turner, who published an article in the January 1940 Reviews of Modem 
Physics summarizing the research appearing only after the Hahn and Strassmann work, found 
nearly 100 articles published to that date (p. 1). 
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The Einstein letter 
Though the experiment was exciting for its energy applications, 
scientists had already predicted that a powerful weapon could be produced 
from such a release of energy. In the United States, several recently-arrived 
European immigrants were particularly concerned because the discovery had 
occurred in Germany and that added to the fear that Germany could first 
produce an atomic weapon. Enrico Fermi, a recent émigré from Italy, upon 
hearing the historic news in January 1939 "shaped his hands into a large-sized 
ball. A little bomb like that, he remarked, and it would all disappear."26 
Leo Szilard, a brilliant physicist formerly of Hungary, and another 
former European physicist colleague, Eugene Wigner, met in the summer of 
1939 to discuss the uranium research events, particularly the development of a 
uranium-graphite system to create a chain reaction, something Szilard had 
been working on as early as 1933.27 Both men, worried about the world 
situation, wondered what would happen if Germany shut off uranium 
exportation by the Belgians, who were mining in the African Congo region. 
^^Quoted in Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in 
Modern America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 324. 
^^Spencer R. Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, eds., Leo Szilard: His Version of the 
Facts: Selected Recollections and Correspondence, Vol. II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 17-
18; 80-82. As early as 1933, Szilard had the idea if an element could be found that emitted 
two neutrons and absorbed one, and if it could be obtained in large enough quantity, a self-
sustaining chain reaction could be created. In 1934, he applied for a patent that described the 
laws governing a chain reaction. Because he did not want the patent to become public at that 
time, he assigned it to the British Admiralty and went on to other experiments. The chain 
reaction idea appeared again after the discovery of fission by Hahn and Strassmann. He 
teamed up with Fermi at Princeton trying to work out a uranium-water system that might be 
capable of sustaining a chain reaction. By the summer of 1939, Szilard had decided that 
because Fermi was lukewarm to his idea and because of the world political situation he 
would take matters into his own hands and approach the United States government directly 
to warn it of the dangers of world domination by Germany. 
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They wanted to warn Belgium of the dangers but had no idea of the state 
protocols involved. A friend, Albert Einstein, another émigré living in a 
summer house on Long Island knew the Queen of Belgium, so they decided to 
solicit his assistance. On July 16, 1939, Wigner and Szilard drove to Long Island 
to visit Einstein and inform him of recent discoveries. After a lengthy 
discussion, the group decided not to contact Belgium directly with a letter but 
to somehow get the U.S. government involved.28 
Through a friend, Szilard found Alexander Sachs, an economist and 
investment banker, who had been an informal advisor of several government 
officials, including President Roosevelt himself. Szilard visited him in New 
York, and Sachs suggested that Einstein compose a letter to President Roosevelt 
on the concerns of the immigrants. Sachs volunteered to take the letter to 
Roosevelt personally and argue the scientists' case for increased research and 
the German dangers of world domination if, as they all guessed, German 
atomic research could deliver a bomb first. 29 
The letter was written, signed by Einstein on August 2, 1939, and given 
to Alexander Sachs for delivery to the President.30 Sachs did not encounter 
President Roosevelt immediately because World War II broke out in 
September 1939.31 On October 11, he finally got an audience to present the 
2®Rhodes, 303-305. This visit to Einstein is also recounted in detail in Weart and 
Szilard, 82-83; Anderson and Hewlett, 16-17; and Wyden, 32-34. 
29weart and Szilard, 84. 
^^There is some debate about who wrote the letter (see the letter in Appendix A). It 
appears to have been a collaborative effort between Szilard and Einstein. See Weart, 83-84 
and Rhodes, 305-308 for details of the collaboration. 
31Wyden, 35. Poland was invaded by Germany on September 1,1939. On September 3, 
1939, Britain and France retaliated by declaring war on Germany and on September 8 
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scientists' case. Knowing that Roosevelt was a busy man, Sachs prepared a 
reading file for the President containing the two letters, his own paraphrase of 
the letters, and a copy of a book of lectures by F. W. Aston of Cambridge, Oxford 
in honor of Lord Ernest Rutherford, an early British atomic physicist.32 
Interestingly, to open the meeting Sachs read his own paraphrase to Roosevelt 
rather than the Einstein Letter; 
Briefly, the experimentation that has been going on for half a 
dozen years on atomic disintegration has culminated this year (a) 
in the discovery by Dr. Leo Szilard and Professor Fermi that the 
element uranium could be split by neutrons and (b) in the 
opening up of the probability of chain reactions—that is that in 
this nuclear process uranium itself may emit neutrons. This new 
development in physics holds out the following prospects: 
1. The creation of a new course of energy which might be utilized 
for purposes of power production— 
2. The liberation from such chain reactions of new radio-active 
elements, so that tons rather than grams of radium could be 
made available in the medical field. 
3. The construction, as an eventual probability, of bombs of 
hitherto unenvisaged potency and scope. .. . 
In connection, then, with the practical importance of this work— 
for power, healing, and national defense purposes—it needs to be 
borne in mind that our supplies of uranium are limited and poor 
in quality compared with the large sources of excellent uranium 
in the Belgian Congo, and, next in line, Canada and former 
Czechoslovakia.^^ 
Roosevelt had proclaimed a National Emergency and was trying to get Congress to lift the 
arms embargo. 
^^Alexander Sachs, Testimony before the United States Senate, Special Committee in 
Atomic Energy on Senate Resolution 179, Tuesday, November 27, 1945, 7-8. Sachs revised his 
statement a bit and placed it as an appendix to the proceedings. He also deposited a copy for 
the MED History in the National Archives. An account of the meeting is also summarized in 
Rhodes, 313-315; Wyden, 35-38. 
^^Sachs, 7. 
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Then, Sachs quoted from a series of lectures prepared by F. W. Aston in 
honor of Lord Rutherford on the theory of atomic research. The book. Forty 
Years of Atomic Theory reviewed the progress of atomic research in England and 
other countries. Sachs read the last paragraph of that work to Roosevelt: 
There are those about us who say that such research should be 
stopped by law, alleging that man's destructive powers are already 
large enough. So, no doubt, the more elderly and ape-like of our 
prehistoric ancestors objected to the innovation of cooked food 
and pointed out the grave dangers attending the use of the newly 
discovered agency, fire. Personally, I think there is no doubt that 
subatomic energy is available all around us and that one day man 
will release and control its almost infinite power. He cannot use 
it exclusively in blowing up his next door neighbor.34 
Roosevelt evidently got the point of Sachs' presentation. 
The President remarked, "Alex, what you are after is to see that 
the Nazis don't blow us up." 
I said, "Precisely," and he then called in General Watson . .. and 
he said, "This requires action."35 
Early government support—The uranium committees 
Watson organized an informal committee, first selecting the two 
military men most concerned with science—Lt. Colonel Keith Anderson for 
the Army and Commander Gilbert Hoover for the Navy—to serve on the 
committee. He appointed Dr. Lyman J. Briggs, director of the Bureau of 
Standards, the nations' government physics laboratory as the chairman of the 
committee.36 Sachs sent a letter to Eugene Wigner, a respected physicist to help 
3'^Sachs, 9. 
^^Sachs, 9. 
^^Sachs, 9; Hewlett and Anderson, 19-20. 
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him contact interested scientists. The first Advisory Committee on Uranium 
met on October 21 with nine in attendance.^7 
Leo Szilard began the session with an overview of the possibilities of a 
chain reaction using uranium and graphite layered together. Edward Teller 
then addressed the group, and the issue of money for funding the project was 
raised. Commander Hoover insisted upon a precise amount, and Teller told 
him $6,000 would work for the first year so that the scientists could buy 
graphite. The amount was agreed upon, and a report of the meeting was sent 
to the President on November 1, 1939, claiming that a chain reaction was a 
possibility but still unproved. The group suggested that the government 
support a thorough investigation though and concentrate it in the universities 
of the country. The President noted the report, according to a memo from 
Watson on November 17, and decided to keep it on file for future reference.^s 
The government could not be pushed into any other action for several 
months mainly because there seemed to be so much debate on the feasibility of 
an atomic weapon. The scientists also tended to avoid military applications 
and concentrated their studies instead upon a chain reaction to develop 
nuclear power. The one fear—world domination by Germany—waxed and 
waned throughout those early months, and with it saw the rise and fall of 
interest in the uranium research problem. Just when government interest 
would seemingly die, Germany would cause a renewed interest in the weapon 
^^Sachs, 9-11; Hewlett and Anderson, 20. Briggs, Fred L. Mohler a physicist of the 
Bureau of Standards, Richard Roberts a physicist of the Carnegie Institution, Sachs, Szilard, 
Wigner, Edward Teller, Anderson, and Hoover were the attendees. 
3®Hewlett and Anderson, 20. 
22 
by conquering another area of Europe. The money for graphite calculations 
was not transferred from the Army and Navy until February 1940.39 Events in 
March renewed interest when The Physical Review began reporting that in order 
for a chain reaction to occur, U235, the lighter isotope of uranium, must be 
used.40 Several experiments helped close the gap on the possibility of a nuclear 
chain reaction, but no earthshaking discoveries came from the scientific 
community. Einstein, in the spring of 1940, sent yet another letter relating the 
experiments at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Germany. At a meeting of the 
Uranium Committee in April, the émigrés still could not shake the Army, 
Navy, or the government into decisive action; the bureaucrats decided to wait 
until calculations of the uranium graphite system at Columbia had been 
completed before taking decisive action. At a meeting in June 1940, a request of 
$40,000 was made for continued research on the Szilard-Fermi experiments at 
Columbia. Before the money could be awarded though, other administrative 
events affected the future of the Uranium Committee.^i 
The organization of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) 
on June 27, 1940, placed the Uranium Committee within a new organizational 
structure^z under Vannevar Bush.43 The first contract awarded was the $40,000 
39Smyth, 47-48. 
^^Hewlett and Anderson, 22. 
^^Smyth, 49. 
^^Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1948), 8-9. NDRC was to direct and coordinated scientific weapons research by 
issuing contracts to individuals, educational institutions, and industry. It was not intended to 
replace the Army or Navy and its laboratories but was supposed to expand the scientific role 
in national defense. 
^^Rhodes, 356; Kevles, 293-94. Vannevar Bush was a technical genius, an engineer 
who received a doctorate jointly from MIT and Harvard in 1916. He went on to conduct war 
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to Columbia University for continuation of the Fermi-Szilard experiments for 
a chain reaction.44 The committee continued to operate in the same form until 
the summer of 1941, when it was enlarged, renamed the Uranium Section or 
S-1 Committee, and placed under the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development with subcommittees formed on uranium isotope separation, 
theory, power production, and heavy water. 
After a year, NDRC showed some definite weaknesses since it acted 
primarily as a research organization, with little power in engineering aspects of 
the uranium problem. As a solution. Bush founded an umbrella organization 
to coordinate all scientific research related to national defense. On June 28, 
1941, an Executive Order was signed instituting the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD) within the Office for Emergency Management 
directly under the President of the United States. Bush became director of this 
new organization and took with him the Committee on Uranium. James 
Conant replaced Bush as head of NDRC, which became a division of OSRD 
delegated to make recommendations on research and development. Bush 
understood well the rearrangement of authority because he stated in an 
interview later in his life; '"I knew you couldn't get anything done in that 
damn town unless you organized under the wing of the president.""^5 
research creating a successful submarine detector and in the 1920s experimented with analog 
calculating machines. He rose to the Vice Presidency of MIT and moved to the Carnegie 
Institution as president in 1939 to become closer to the hub of government work. 
^^Weart and Szilard, 117. 
^Smyth, 51; Hewlett and Anderson, 41; Kevles, 299-301; Kevles, 301. 
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Science and National Security 
In 1941, several events cemented the link between science and national 
security. Many American scientists became convinced about the merits of the 
uranium research program, partly with help from their British colleagues. 
When the British MAUD Committee'*^ sent a report on its scientific progress to 
the U.S. scientific community, several American physicists became convinced 
about the possibilities of building a bomb. This committee was much like the 
U.S. uranium committee, except that it was made up of active working 
physicists instead of government bureaucrats. MAUD, in the spring of 1940, 
came to the conclusion that a bomb could be built.^^ 
Americans were somewhat more convinced about the feasibility of a 
bomb after Glenn Seaborg and his research group identified plutonium in E. O. 
Lawrence's laboratory in California in early 1941.48 In the spring of 1941, 
Lyman Briggs persuaded Vannevar Bush to initiate an independent review of 
the entire uranium project; Bush, in turn, asked F. B. Jewett, president of the 
National Academy of Sciences, to establish a committee. Jewett appointed a 
^^Rhodes, 340. The committee was code named MAUD after the mysterious message 
Lise Meitner had cabled to an English friend: "MET NIELS AND MARGRETHE RECENTLY 
BOTH WELL BUT UNHAPPY ABOUT EVENTS PLEASE INFORM COCKCROFT AND 
MAUD RAY KENT. The message was believed to be an anagram for "radium taken." Later 
in the war, the committee found out that Maud Ray was a governess for the Bohr children 
who lived in Kent. 
^^Moore, 276-79; Rhodes, 329-330, 340-41. The committee reported that fast neutrons 
as well as slow neutrons could cause nuclear fission. The report included an estimation that 
U235 could be reproduced in a sphere small enough to make a bomb. The best method to 
produce the bomb—gaseous diffusion—would turn uranium into a gas thus allowing for the 
collection of the U235 isotope. The committee also severely criticized American scientists 
because they were doing nothing about the German menace. 
4®Rhodes, 352-355. In March 1941, Glenn T. Seaborg, a young chemist in Lawrence's 
laboratory, discovered a new element called 94, later named "plutonium" in 1942. 
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committee chaired by Arthur H. Compton of the University of Chicago, 
charging it to study the military importance of uranium and decide upon the 
level of expenditure needed for a concentrated government-supported effort in 
uranium research.49 
Shortly after a meeting in May 1941, the committee presented its first 
report recommending an intensification of the research effort for at least six 
months.50 Later that summer, an appropriation of $267,000 was made for 
uranium research, partly because of that first report and partly because of the 
reports on British research.^i A second report produced recommendations on 
the engineering aspects of uranium research in the summer of 1941.52 
A third report was commissioned and delivered in the fall of 1941, but 
not before Bush, at a high-level presidential meeting on October 9,1941, was 
given a free hand to investigate the possibilities of making an atomic bomb. 
^^Smyth, 51. Arthur Compton was a physicist already of some renown and the 
younger brother of Karl Compton, President of MIT, who had already had some interest in 
this general field. 
®^Rhodes, 365. The committee detailed three military applications of research: 
production of radioactive materials to spread on enemy territory, a power source for 
submarines and other ships, and explosive bombs. The committee also developed a timetable: 
a year was needed to produce and test the radioactive materials, the power source would 
require three years after a chain reaction was created, and bombs could not be ready before 
1945. A priority was placed on obtaining a sustaining chain reaction. 
Smyth, 51. Briggs was still in charge of the budget recommendations for the 
Uranium Committee. He made pleas not just from the first report but based also on work that 
had been undertaken in England by MAUD. Briggs argued for continuing the first objective of 
a chain reaction. But he claimed that isotope separation was crucial for any military 
applications of uranium production and suggested that a chain reaction could occur in an 
airplane-carried bomb device. 
^^Hewlett and Anderson, 39. Compton traveled to South America that summer so 
William D. Coolidge, a physical chemist recently retired from General Electric, was given 
the charge to add some engineers to the committee and review the first report. Their review 
was sent to Bush on July 11,1941, and supported the first report's recommendations. The 
emphasis was still on creating a chain reaction rather than a bomb. 
26 
Bush conferred with Roosevelt and Vice President Henry Wallace whom he 
had already briefed on uranium progress earlier in the summer. He outlined 
British research achievements, the costs of building a production plant, what 
little was known of German research, and the time needed to produce a 
weapon. Bush was told to expedite the work in every way but not to proceed 
on building a production plant since that would need more discussion and a 
different organization to carry out. Policy considerations on these matters were 
to be restricted to Roosevelt, Wallace, Bush, Conant, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson, and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, transferring 
responsibilities from the Uranium Committee to a new, more secretive group 
around the president. The specter of German domination played a major role 
in the actions on the part of Bush and the president. By the fall of 1941, both 
men had seen the results of Hitler's campaign and coupled with reports from 
British research and reports from those escaping from Germany who insisted 
the country was progressing on atomic research, their inclinations were much 
stronger to support an ultimate weapon. Bush actually gained permission to 
finalize the bond between science and national security in that meeting.53 
Bush received the third report on November 6,1941, and the President 
was sent his copy on November 27. Compton had traveled extensively in 
October of that year to gather the information needed for this third and most 
important report.54 In that third report, he issued a clear call to build a bomb, 
^^Hewlett and Anderson, 45-46. 
^^Srnyth, 46-49; Rhodes, 373-376, 386-387; Compton, 53. It was probably the Mark 
Oliphant visit that helped Compton and several other Americans including Conant, Bush's 
right-hand man issue a clear call for a bomb. Oliphant from Britain toured the United States 
in the late summer and early fall of 1941 as an strong advocate for building a bomb. He 
relayed news of British research at a meeting of the Uranium Committee in August, using the 
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thus moving scientific research into practical, military applications tied to 
national security. The objective of the program in scientific research would 
simply be: "'to consider the possibilities of an explosive fission reaction with 
U235.'"®® A bomb with enough destructive power could be created by gathering 
together a mass of U235. How much destructive power was still unknown, but 
something on the order of a few hundred tons of TNT was possible. The 
report evaluated methods of isotope separation including gaseous diffusion 
which the British were committed to and the centrifuge system in 
development at Columbia. It estimated that bombs could be ready in three to 
four years. Costs were difficult to estimate, but the most expensive part of the 
process, the separation of the isotopes, could cost $50 to $100 million and the 
production of bombs could cost as much as $30 million. The report was just 
what Bush wanted and could have been the impetus to push America 
headlong into the uranium research project except that Bush had received 
approval to proceed a full month before this report. It did verify, after the fact, 
what Bush had convinced Roosevelt of in the October 9 meeting: science could 
word "bomb" very clearly. He solicited assistance from the United States because Britain, 
according to him, did not have the resources, an estimated $25 million, to build a bomb. Since 
he was not immediately effective with the Uranium committee, he decided to attempt to 
convince the most enthusiastic scientist he knew in America, Ernest O. Lawrence. And 
convince him he did. Lawrence contacted Arthur Compton at Chicago shortly after 
Oliphant's visit and repeated his conversation with Oliphant. A special meeting was set in 
Chicago on September 25,1941, because Lawrence was to be in town to speak on the occasion of 
an honorary degree to be bestowed upon James Conant, the chairman of the NDRC. The three 
men met and after a heated discussion agreed to push uranium research in the United States. 
Conant went back to report the meeting to Bush, and shortly thereafter the third report was 
commissioned. Compton described that meeting as the start of the wartime atomic research 
program. Conant, in his secret history of the Manhattan Project, indicated that men like 
Oliphant helped turned the tide in the American uranium research enterprise. 
^^Rhodes, 386. 
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be used in a practical, military way to protect the country's security. Roosevelt 
returned his copy to Bush two months later on January 19,1942, with a note 
attached that said: 
V. B. OK—returned—I think you had best keep this in your safe. 
FDR.56 
Bush took action long before that returned note. Lyman Briggs, at 
Bush's request, called members of the Uranium Committee to come to 
Washington on December 6,1941, to talk about reorganization of the uranium 
work. Bush sent more detailed letters, dated December 13,1941, to each of the 
primary administrative men to be involved in the expanded government-
supported project. A planning board with Eger V. Murphree, a young chemical 
engineer as head, would oversee engineering planning studies and supervise 
any pilot plant efforts. Bush appointed three program chiefs in charge of 
physics and chemistry research: Harold Urey to handle separation by diffusion 
and centrifuge methods as well as heavy water studies; Ernest Lawrence in 
charge of small-sample preparation, electromagnetic separations, and 
plutonium (element 94); and Arthur Compton with responsibility for the 
chain reaction to produce plutonium and oversee weapons theory. Two weeks 
after Pearl Harbor, the first large contract was awarded to Lawrence for $400,000 
to study electromagnetic separation techniques.57 Arthur Compton went back 
to the University of Chicago to create the Metallurgical Laboratory. The 
uranium research project had begun in earnest. 
56Rhodes, 388. 
^^Hewlett and Anderson, 49-52. 
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The Metallurgical Project and Laboratory 
The period from December 1941 to February 1942 revealed more effort 
devoted to the administration of uranium research than to research itself, as 
evidenced by the creation and organization of the Metallurgical Project under 
Arthur Compton at the University of Chicago. Compton, author of the three 
National Academy of Science reports, was already a committed and 
distinguished physicist in the field of atomic research when called upon to 
head a program coordinating theoretical studies on plutonium and building a 
reactor to confirm a sustaining chain reaction.58 In 1939, he heard about the 
discovery of uranium fission but thought his research was far afield from 
nuclear physics. When he became active in the field of cancer research though, 
his friend at the University of California in Berkeley, Ernest O. Lawrence, 
convinced him to take another look at atomic research.59 That involvement 
began when Jewett called upon him to head a review of recent atomic research 
and its military applications, a task Compton took enthusiastically. 
On the afternoon of December 6, 1941, Arthur Compton first had lunch 
with his new bosses Bush and Conant and then proceeded to his hotel room to 
make arrangements for his new assignment. According to his recollections, he 
spent that whole afternoon and evening on the telephone making contacts to 
58Riedman, 188-190. Compton, the son of a Presbyterian minister, was bom on 
September 10, 1892. He received his doctorate from Princeton in 1916 and studied under J. J. 
Thomson, the famous English physicist, at Cambridge where he also attended lectures by 
Ernest Rutherford, a Nobel-winning physicist. Upon his return to the United States in 1920, 
he became a professor at Washington University in St. Louis where he concentrated his 
research on x-rays. Three years later, the University of Chicago appointed him professor of 
physics. In 1927, he received the Nobel Prize for work on waves and light. 
^^Riedman, 190. 
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coordinate his new enterprise. He called Fermi at New York and George G. 
Pegram, a physicist friend at Princeton, to get advice and talk of plans for the 
future. On December 7,1941, he remembered going to New York to talk to 
Fermi and his colleagues about the direction of research and to get their 
assurances that the group would work with him. Out of great respect for 
Compton as scientist, they readily agreed to support the project.^o 
The S-1 Committee met in Washington on December 18, 1941, and Bush 
announced the official revamped uranium research organization. Compton 
sent Bush a memorandum on December 20,1941, detailing his plans and 
proposing a preliminary budget for the project. For the time being, the project 
research would be centered in Columbia, Chicago, Princeton, and Berkeley. His 
budget of several million was approved when it would have been 
unfathomable only a short time ago.^i 
From December to February, Compton was immersed in organizational 
plans and problems. In January, he began a series of meetings to discuss 
centralizing the efforts at one site rather than have research sites at Columbia, 
Princeton, Berkeley, and Chicago.^^ The various discussions, often heated. 
^^Compton, 72-73. Laura Fermi, 185. Laura Fermi summed up the respect for Compton 
in the following way: "Compton was a thoughtful and considerate person, who took no step 
without weighing its effects upon others. Perhaps because of this, whenever he expressed an 
opinion, it was interpreted as an order and accepted without much comment." 
^^Rhodes, 398; Hewlett and Anderson, 53-54. At Columbia and Princeton the building 
of a pile and corresponding physical measurements would require 80 men and $340,000 for six 
months; Chicago needed 150 people and $278,000; and Berkeley wanted 150 men and $650,000 
to prepare U235 and plutonium. Compton asked for another $500,000 for pile materials. 
^^Hewlett and Anderson, 53-55. The first meeting occurred at Chicago on Januaiy 3, 
1942, and the best he could accomplish was a promise to continue existing work at the various 
sites. The second meeting at Columbia on January 18 at least developed a preliminary 
program timetable: by July 1, 1942 to determine whether a chain reaction was possible, by 
January 1943 to achieve the first chain reaction, by January 1944 to extract plutonium (element 
94) from uranium, and by January 1945 to have a bomb. In the afternoon of that meeting, the 
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culminated in the now-famous and often repeated sickroom episode. 
Compton called his main scientists to Chicago and when they arrived on 
January 24,1942, they were ushered into the bedroom where Compton was 
battling the flu and a fever. He argued to move the site to Chicago to 
concentrate all the research from the various laboratories. He tried to convince 
the others at the meeting—Leo Szilard from Columbia, Ernest Lawrence from 
Berkeley, Luis Alvarez from the M. I. T. Radiation Laboratory, Richard Doan 
from Phillips Petroleum Research Laboratory, and Norman Hilberry from 
New York University—the merits of a Chicago location. Compton had already 
received enthusiastic support from the president and vice president of the 
University of Chicago; there were more men to draw from in the central part 
of the country since there were fewer involved in war-related work, and 
Chicago was centrally located between the east and west coasts. After endless 
discussion, the physically and mentally exhausted Compton, the noted 
consensus builder, made an arbitrary decision: the site would be Chicago and 
those at the meeting should join him in the research effort there.63 The only 
objection came from Lawrence, and Compton later recounted that objection: 
"You'll never get the chain reaction going here. The whole 
tempo of the University of Chicago is too slow." 
"We'll have the chain reaction going here by the end of the year," 
topic turned again to centralizing the research at one site. Compton and Lawrence dominated 
the discussion and both agreed that at least the chain reaction research should be in the same 
place, if not the whole project. They had agreed that the large cyclotrons at Berkeley could 
not be moved elsewhere, and Lawrence would remain in Berkeley to oversee that part of the 
research. However, Columbia and Princeton scientists did not want to move their operations 
either. 
^^Compton, 80-81; Rhodes, 399. 
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I predicted. 
'TU bet you a thousand dollars you won't," he challenged. 
'Til take you on that," I answered, "and these men are the 
witnesses." 
"I'll cut the stakes to a five-cent cigar," countered Lawrence. 
"Agreed." 
I won the bet, but I haven't yet received the cigar. Maybe the five-
cent variety is no longer made.^^ 
After the meeting, Compton called Fermi who somewhat reluctantly 
agreed to come to Chicago as soon as possible, and sent his assistant, Herbert 
Anderson, ahead to prepare for Fermi's arrival. Eugene Wigner at Princeton 
was also called and agreed to come. Leo Szilard, who had immediately left 
Chicago after the meeting, was telegraphed in New York to join Fermi.^5 
Compton had previously discussed the wartime research project with 
President Robert M. Hutchins and Vice President E. T. Filbey. They had already 
talked about the location of a nuclear reactor and what adjustments might 
need to be made on campus to accommodate the research. On the morning of 
January 25, Compton went to see Vice President Filbey to get clearance for the 
moves of the scientists to Chicago and to discuss their locations on campus. 
Shortly, thereafter, the mathematics department, which shared quarters with 
the physicists in Eckhart Hall, was contacted and volunteered to move its 
entire operation to the library in order to make room for the expanded research 
project and the anticipated new personnel.^^ 
^Compton, 81. 
^^Rhodes, 400. 
^Compton, 80,82. 
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By February, the centralized project had taken its code name as the 
Metallurgical Project, so called, according to Compton, because 
we had been considering for some time setting up at the 
University an institute of metals, which indeed became a reality 
after the war was over. Thus our Chicago colleagues saw nothing 
surprising in a wartime metals research program.^^ 
Compton was director of the Metallurgical Project and Norman Hilberry 
was appointed Associate Director. But now the project needed a centralized 
research facility or laboratory. Called the Metallurgical Laboratory, it was also 
organized and staffed during this period. Richard Doan, because of his 
experience in industrial organizations, was made director and scientists from 
around the country were brought to Chicago, including one from Iowa State 
College.^® 
The Ames Project 
Frank H. Spedding: Chemistry division leader and Ames Project head 
Sometime between December 1941 and February 1942,^9 Frank H. 
Spedding, a professor in charge of physical chemistry at Iowa State College in 
^^Compton, 82. 
^Compton, 83. 
69ln several interviews later in his life, Spedding claimed he was contacted by 
Compton on December 6,1941, and asked to take over the Chemistry division. Though that is 
possible, it is somewhat unlikely if Compton needed to contact others to get Spedding's name. 
Also, the Metallurgical Laboratory was not organized until sometime in January and this 
would have been a more logical time to contact Spedding. There is also evidence that 
Spedding was in Chicago in Januaiy for several weeks according to some of his later 
interviews and interviews with Wilhelm making this a more likely time to be asked to head 
up chemistry research. In other accounts, particularly from the early Ames Laboratory 
publications, Spedding claimed he was contacted sometime in February. In any event, 
Spedding was officially hired on the project on February 21, 1942. Referenced in J. C. Stems, 
"Letter to Frank H. Spedding on Hiring," March 19, 1942, the Frank H. Spedding Papers, 
Record Group 17/1/11, the Robert W. Parks and Ellen Sorge Parks Libraiy, Ames, Iowa 
(hereafter cited as Spedding Papers). A memorandum was sent to President Charles Friley on 
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Ames, Iowa, was asked to take over the Chemistry Division of the 
Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago. How a young professor of chemistry, who 
had not been directly involved in uranium research before 1942, could be asked 
to direct some of the most famous atomic chemists is puzzling at best, unless 
considerable information is provided about Spedding's background and the 
situation at Iowa State College in 1942. 
Frank Howard Spedding was actually uniquely qualified to take over the 
Chemistry Division. His academic preparation had been meticulous, and his 
breadth of chemical knowledge in rare earth chemistry exemplary. Spedding 
was born October 22,1902, in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada to American parents. 
The family moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan shortly after Spedding's birth 
where his father became a well-known, successful photographer. Spedding 
graduated from the University of Michigan in 1925 with a B.S. in Chemical 
Engineering and an M.S. in analytical chemistry the following year. Spedding 
worked under H. H. Willard and though he liked the man, he did not like the 
scientific area. Early in his studies, he received a taste of the hard work of 
experimentation. Given a 50-pound rock of pollucite or cesium ore by 
Professor Willard, Spedding was told to extract cesium from it and prepare it, 
preferably as a pure salt or chloride. By 1926, he gave his professor several 
kilograms of the salt.^o Spedding almost had his moment of glory when he 
February 24, asking for the half-time release of Spedding to work on the Metallurgical Project 
(Referenced in Charles E. Friley, "Letter to Arthur H. Compton on Frank Spedding's 
Appointment," February 28, 1942, Spedding Papers). 
''^Frank H. Spedding, interview 1 with Elizabeth Calciano, Ames, Iowa, April 21, 
1971, revised October, 1979 by Frank Spedding, transcript in possession of Edith Landin, Ames, 
Iowa, 5-6 (hereafter cited as Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano). This series of interviews 
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thought he had discovered a new element. He was set to call it Michiganium, 
but discovered that what he thought was a new element were actually 
impurity traces in the materials with which he was working.As he was 
about to finish his Master's degree, Spedding met one day with a professor he 
had in his undergraduate days, Moses Gomberg, who suggested that he go on 
to Berkeley and work under G. N. Lewis, head of physical chemistry at the best 
school in that area in the country.72 Gomberg wrote a recommendation and 
despite the fact that Spedding applied late, he was offered a teaching 
assistantship and placed in Lewis' prestigious research group.73 
The advantages to a young scientist coming to Berkeley were obvious. 
Almost every nationally known and internationally known figure in 
chemistry and physics found his/her way to lecture or present seminars at 
Berkeley. Equipment was readily available to conduct theoretical or 
experimental studies. G. N. Lewis was also the consummate scientist, and 
Spedding later estimated that clearly one-third of all physical chemistry 
department heads in the country had studied under this master chemist. 
was conducted in the late seventies and early eighties by the daughter of Frank H. Spedding. 
The author was given permission to view the transcripts of interviews that were revised by 
Spedding, those in possession of Edith Landin who served as Spedding's assistant at the Ames 
Laboratory. 
^^Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 7-8. 
^^Harry J. Svec, 'Trologue: F. H. Spedding (Oct. 22, 1902-Dec. 15, 1984)" in Handbook 
on the Physics and Chemistry of Rare Earths, edited by K. A. Gschneidner, Jr. and L. Eyring, Vol. 
2 (London: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1988), 1-2. Some of the material for this book was 
taken from a Svec interview with Spedding in 1984, that was reprinted in various forms for 
several Ames Laboratory publications for Speddin^s eightieth birthday and for a narrative 
to nominate Spedding for the J. B. Priestly medal. 
^^Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 1, 14. 
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Lewis encouraged discovery and experimentation in any field of interest. 
When asked to define physical chemistry once, G. N. Lewis was reported to 
have said it was anything that interested him.74 
Frank Spedding was put to work proving and disproving several of 
Lewis' far out theories.75 In addition to learning about experimentation, 
Spedding also developed an approach to science that would be used later in the 
organization of the Ames Project. Lewis did not teach chemical theory. 
Instead, his students were taught that scientists had to experiment and stand 
up to scrutiny by their peers through an ongoing examination that took place 
under the seminar system. Spedding later described that seminar experience 
vividly. It generally met on Tuesday night from 7:30 to 9:00 or 10:00 p. m. in a 
special room with one long table in the center where faculty sat and a eight-
inch platform surrounding the table where the students sat two rows deep. All 
senior faculty attended. Professor Lewis with his smoky cigars continuously 
filling the room often made the main speech, or a student would sometimes 
have to present a paper and stand for criticism. After about an hour, the 
moment arrived that the graduate students dreaded. Lewis would call on 
some unsuspecting student and ask him or her to present to the group a 
summary of his research in progress. Once Lewis called upon a student and 
she froze and ran from the room. Because that event somewhat disturbed 
him, Lewis began to stop students on Tuesday afternoon and tell them to be 
ready. Later, he called major professors and told them to have their students 
74"Frank Harold Spedding Turns 80," Ames Lab Changing Scene 8,10 (October 1982): 2. 
^^Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 24. 
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ready for that night/^ Spedding, cigar and all, would repeat those very scenes 
in his own organization during the war and long after the war with his 
infamous Sunday and later Thursday Speddinars (as they came to be known). 
Spedding inherited from Lewis another scientific approach that would 
be crucial to the development of the Ames Project: good scientists tackled 
tough problems whether or not they knew anything about them. Once a 
question could be formulated or what the scientists were looking for could be 
identified, the problem was practically solved. That philosophy was sorely 
tested during the war years at Ames.77 
Frank Spedding spent two years in research for Lewis without finding a 
problem to publish as a thesis topic. Finally, Simon Freed, another graduate 
student, just finishing his Ph.D. in the band spectra of rare earths, invited 
Spedding to work with him evaluating the magnetic properties of the rare 
earths at low temperatures. Lewis encouraged the experimentation but did not 
place his name on any of the publications since he was not directly involved in 
the research work.^^ Spedding finished his Ph.D. in May 1929, after writing his 
dissertation. There were numerous jobs for young Ph.D.s at that time, but 
Lewis offered Spedding an instructorship to remain at Berkeley, a common 
way for obtaining a long-term academic job at this particular institution.^^ 
^^Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 39-41. In that interview Spedding admitted 
to modeling his own seminars after those of Lewis. 
^^Frank H. Spedding, interview 2 with Elizabeth Calciano, transcript in possession of 
Edith Landin, Ames, Iowa, n.d., 76. 
''^Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 30. 
^^Calciano interview 1, 30-33. Generally, a bright student would be offered an 
instructorship whereupon he would work one year at a time under the instructorship. If 
reappointment occurred four times, usually an assistant professorship with a three-year 
contract was offered. After one or two terms of those assistant professorships, the department 
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Spedding took the offer and, of course, expected to remain at Berkeley 
permanently. Unfortunately, the Depression intervened in October 1929, and 
Spedding had to settle for a series of one and two year temporary 
appointments, each adding to his knowledge about his specialties— 
spectroscopy and rare earths—but none adding to his job security or to his 
financial situation. In 1931, he received the prestigious but not lucrative 
National Research Fellowship, awarded by the Rockefeller Foundation, for two 
years of full-time research at Berkeley. In 1932, he received his old job back 
from G. N. Lewis for two more years at the salary of $1,000 per year.®" By this 
time, it had become common for the younger men to take associateships for 
about one-half of an instructors pay.®^ 
The year 1933 was an auspicious year for the young chemist, even 
though he still had no permanent academic appointment. Early that year, 
Spedding had obtained some samples of rare earths from a professor in Illinois 
and set about to prove a theory: the fine structures of the rare earth bands 
depended upon the adjacent atoms in the crystal in which the rare earths were 
placed. For this work he was awarded the Langmuir Prize for Chemistry in 
1933.82 Spedding was invited to receive the award and make a speech at the 
examined the person's credentials and if it wanted that person as a permanent faculty 
member, an associate professorship with tenure was offered. 
®®Svec, "Prologue," 1988,4. 
Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 35. 
82"Frank Harold Spedding Turns 80," 3; Svec, 1988,4-5. Spedding was only the third 
chemist to win the award, following Oscar K. Rice and Linus Pauling. He was the last under 
31 to win it. The next year the award name was changed to the Award in Pure Chemistry of 
the American Chemical Society and awarded to young chemists under 35. 
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Chicago World's Fair. When he finished his speech and received his award, he 
noticed an older man approaching the podium. In his later years, Spedding 
remembered the old man: 
[He] was short, had a long white beard and was bald He 
blurted out "How would you like to have a pound of europium 
and two or three pounds of samarium?"®^ 
Of course, Spedding thought the man was crazy. As far as he knew, 
those rare earths were available only in milligram quantities. He answered the 
man politely and told him that would be fine; it would certainly help his work 
to receive europium and samarium. After he arrived back in California, a box 
containing fruit jars of europium and samarium oxides arrived from this odd 
man in Chicago. As it turned out, his patron was Herbert McCoy, a professor of 
chemistry from the University of Chicago. Spedding started a correspondence 
with the man that lasted until McCoy's death in 1945. McCoy befriended young 
chemists like Spedding and provided them with quantities of rare earths for 
their research, only charging them cost or nothing at all in some cases. 
In 1934-35, Spedding won the Guggenheim to work abroad in Germany 
with two physicists, James Franck, a Nobel Prize winner, and Francis Simon, 
an expert in low temperature physics. Unfortunately, before Spedding could 
finalize his trip plans. Hitler came to power and both men fled the country. 
®^Svec, "Prologue," 1988, 5. 
Svec, "Prolo^e," 1988,5-6. It was probably Herbert McCoy who later got Spedding 
the job as Chemistry Division chief and even Compton in Atomic Quest confirmed that it was 
McCoy who recommended Spedding to him (p. 93). See also Norman Hilberry, interview with 
George Tressel, 1967, Transcript of Reel 2, In possession of author, Ames, lA, 4. Hilberry also 
indicated that it was McCoy who suggested Spedding to the physicists when they met in 
early February 1942. 
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Spedding went instead to England to work at the famous Cavendish Laboratory 
with Ralph Fowler, a noted theoretical physicist. He also traveled to other 
laboratories in France and Germany and spoke in Leningrad. The Speddings, 
Frank and Ethel, also went to Copenhagen for a month where he worked with 
the eminent Niels Bohr. After this time abroad, Spedding and his wife 
returned to the United States. Still with no permanent job, Spedding took 
another temporary two year position, the George Fisher Baker Assistant 
Professorship at Cornell University for 1935-37.85 
Spedding, working with Hans Bethe a colleague at Cornell, resumed his 
previous rare earth research and continued to depend upon Herbert McCoy for 
a supply of rare earths.86 When the two year stint was over, Spedding was in 
the same situation, with no promise of a permanent job. He decided to try his 
luck again in Berkeley, so he and Ethel packed their old Chevrolet and turned 
west. Spedding had heard of an opening at Ohio State, but when he arrived, 
William Lloyd Evans, the chairman of the department, had just hired a 
chemist the day before. Evans told Spedding that his friend Buck Coover had 
an opening at Iowa State College for a physical chemist, and Evans even 
®®Svec, "Prologue," 1988, 5-7; Frank H. Spedding, interview with Harry A. Svec, 
Ames, Iowa, September 1984, transcript in Spedding Papers, 3-4. For a very detailed account 
of the trip abroad see one of the chapters in Edith Landin's possession called "Year in 
Europe—1934-35." This manuscript of several chapters was dictated to Ms. Landin, Spedding's 
assistant, hired to help him prepare a book he wanted to publish on his life. Unfortunately, 
Spedding died before he could publish the work. Dr. Spedding's daughter has given this 
author permission to use material from this book in this dissertation. It was dictated in the 
late 70s and early 80s and much of the material is duplicated in the Calciano interviews. 
The "book" is a collection of chapters with some paged, but none arranged in a definite order 
(hereafter cited as Spedding Manuscript). 
8^Spedding, Letters to Harold McCoy, June 28,1936 and January 20, 1937; Letter from 
Harold McCoy February 8,1937, Spedding Papers. McCoy's only demand for giving Spedding 
rare earths was that he continue in the field of low temperature research, a research field of 
none of the other eight to ten receivers of McCoy's largess. 
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offered to write a letter of reference. Spedding traveled on to Ames, Iowa and 
talked to Coover who offered him the job on the spot. Spedding tells the rest 
of the story; 
[Coover] was a horse trade and he said, "Now I can give you an 
appointment if you take assistant professorship." 
And I had guts enough to say, "No, I've been seven years on 
temporary appointments and I'm looking for a job with tenure, so 
I won't take anything less than associate professor." 
So he said, "I'll have to go to the Board of Regents." 
I said, "Fine. I'll go on West and you can wire me."®7 
Spedding traveled to Yellowstone National Park and after a week of not 
hearing, he decided to move on to Berkeley. They started to leave, but first 
Ethel stopped at the bathroom. Spedding remembered: 
While she was in there, I was over looking at the bulletin board. 
There were a lot of telegraph messages on it. There was a note on 
there to Dr. Spinolza, and I read it. And it said: Regents granted 
you an appointment. And I thought it sounds just like what I'm 
looking for, but the wrong name. Anyway, I got on the phone 
and called Coover, and it was his message; they just got the name 
all wrong. It was just a minute's difference of whether I'd got it or 
not.... I wouldn't normally have chosen the place. I was 
desperate; I hadn't been able to get a job except fellowships for 
seven years, and I thought, "Well I can go there and build up 
Physical Chemistry and when things redly open up, I can go to 
another school."®® 
So Spedding, the nationally known chemist from Berkeley, found his 
way to Iowa State College in 1937 to take over the physical chemistry section. 
In early 1942, Arthur Compton invited Frank Spedding to participate in the 
^^Spedding, interview with Svec 1984, 6. 
®®Spedding, interview with Svec 1984, 6. At the time, when Spedding corresponded 
with his friends or colleagues, he presented Iowa State in much better light. In a letter to 
McCoy on November 10,1937 (Spedding Papers), he said: "So far, I have liked my new 
position very much as I am able to run things just to suit myself and the research opportunities 
are very good." 
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atomic bomb project. According to Spedding, Arthur Compton decided that he 
needed expertise in chemistry and metallurgy to complete his project 
satisfactorily. At this time very little about the chemical qualities of uranium 
and its byproducts was known. Spedding was chosen as head of the Chemistry 
Division, but because there was little room for the number of scientists needed, 
Spedding volunteered to start chemical and metallurgical research on the 
Ames campus. Spedding later related: 
They had vastly underestimated the amount of chemistry that 
had to be done. So that when I arrived at Chicago, they were 
allowing two rooms for the chemists to do all the chemical work 
and I informed [Compton] that two rooms would be woefully 
inadequate.... So I told Dr. Compton that they had to have a lot 
of chemical and metallurgical work done immediately, and we 
couldn't do it at Chicago until we built a building and till we got 
some staff together.... But it takes time for people to pick up and 
move, and I told him that we had a metallograph and we had a 
furnace here at Ames and that we could get some of this work 
going. And so after he deliberated a week or two they decided ... 
that I would spend half a week in Ames .. . testing out various 
things that might be used in a reactor.89 
The only other professor in the section was Harley A. Wilhelm, an 
instructor who had graduated from Iowa State in 1931. Wilhelm had held the 
area together and was the College's only spectrochemist. When Spedding came 
in, that was his area too, so he took an old spectrograph that had been ordered 
in the 1920s by Anson Hayes, a physical chemist of some renown that Iowa 
State had lost to industry. Spedding gave Wilhelm the area of metallurgy.^o 
Spedding soon found his teaching load heavy; he served on a large number of 
®®Interview with Frank H. Spedding, Harley Wilhelm, and Adrian Daane, May 1967. 
^^Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990. 
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Ph.D. committees; and the equipment to do the type of research he wanted to 
conduct could not be ordered because of the lack of funds He even had to 
temporarily change his emphasis from the rare earths to topics of an 
agricultural emphasis, an area of research in which he could find College 
funds.92 
Iowa State University: The location of the science laboratory 
It is surprising that Iowa State College became the center for this 
uranium research, considering the state of research and science at the 
institution at the time. Spedding recalled Iowa State as typical of many 
mid western schools. The student body numbered around 5,000 and was 
dominated by agriculture, engineering, home economics, and other applied 
several letters to McCoy, Spedding tells of the deteriorating situation. On 
February 27, 1939 he tells McCoy: "I have been extremely busy getting this division 
organization and getting my teaching under way so that my research has suffered. However, 
I have finally assembled my equipment and expect to be producing at the same old rate 
shortly." On January 28, 1941, he again tells McCoy, "It has taken longer than I anticipated 
to get my research program functioning here at Ames but I expect to have it go full blast from 
now on." He tells McCoy about building a spectrograph and wood grating, but he does not tell 
him the frustrations of writing over two hundred companies to get the pieces necessary to 
build that equipment (Spedding Papers notation on a miscellaneous file). 
^2"industrial Science Research Institute Progress Reports on Projects," Iowa State 
College^ Division of Industrial Science, Office of the Dean, May 8, 1939, Ames Laboratory 
Papers, 5; Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, Announcement of the Graduate 
Division, Ames, Iowa, 1945-46, 126-130. Spedding's first funded project involved his area of 
absorption spectra at low temperatures, but was for vitamins and organic materials rather 
than rare earth metals. Spedding's department was part of the Division of Industrial 
Science, a service division that included most of the non-engineering and agricultural 
departments on campus. The funds came from the Industrial Science Research Institute, the 
administering unit that oversaw research for those same departments. Spedding also told 
McCoy about this new approach in a letter as early as Februaiy 27, 1939 (Spedding Papers): 
"I have become interested in the possibility of quantitatively determining the amount of 
vitamins, hormones, etc., present in complex organic mixtures by means of adsorption spectra at 
low temperatures." In 1940 with R. M. Hixon another faculty member in Chemistry, he 
examined spectra of sugars and starches (F, H. Spedding and R. M. Hixon, "Ramen spectra of 
sugars, dextrins and starches, Iowa Com Research Institute Report of Agricultural Research 5 
(1940): 62-63). Spedding also had five Ph.D. students before the war, all working with 
adsorption spectra. 
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subjects.93 In fact, every Graduate Catalog from 1920-21 until 1946-47 made the 
following announcement about the purpose of graduate study at Iowa State: 
Iowa State is a technical institution. Its Graduate College offers to 
qualified students the opportunity to pursue advanced courses 
and to undertake research in technology and those branches of 
science that find their application in industry.^^ 
In 1937 when Spedding was hired, some basic scientific research was 
being conducted, although it tended to be primarily in agricultural areas. As 
far as equipment and research facilities were concerned, Spedding later 
recounted his version of Iowa State's condition: 
When I arrived in 1937, only a fraction of the building was 
reasonably and adequately equipped, and many rooms did not 
have standard laboratory equipment. Instead they had sawhorses 
with planks on top and a shelf underneath to hold glassware. The 
glassware was protected by a chintz curtain hanging down from 
the planks. These rooms were under-wired and the lighting was 
one cord from the ceiling with a bare electric light bulb. There 
was [sic] almost no wall plugs. As far as equipment was 
concerned, there was little of it. As far as I could tell when I 
arrived in 1937, the building had never been repainted since 
1912.95 
^^Frank H. Spedding, interview 3 with Elizabeth Calciano, Ames, Iowa, July 1979, 
transcript in possession of Edith Landin, 1. 
9^Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, Announcement of the Graduate 
Division, Ames, Iowa, 1920-21,11. Each year the bulletin explained that no major advanced 
degree offerings were made in the liberal arts areas. According to a gentlemen's agreement, 
the University of Iowa in Iowa City was to handle those areas; Iowa State was supposed to 
offer only applied courses in its chemical and physical sciences also. The head of the Iowa 
State chemistry department though resisted that ruling and managed to attract men of the 
caliber of Henry Oilman, an internationally known organic chemist, as well as Spedding by 
disregarding that gentlemen's agreement. 
^^Spedding, interview 3 with Calciano, 3; Svec, interview with author, 1991. The 
chemistry building had burned in 1912, and Coo ver as chair of the department had built a 
beautiful new building, but he put all the funding into the building; there was not enough 
money to furnish it adequately. 
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Organization of the chemical division of the Metallurgical Laboratory 
Spedding's expertise with the rare earths garnered him the division job 
under Compton. Because there was not enough room at Chicago to conduct 
the needed chemical and metallurgical research, Spedding volunteered Ames 
as an additonal laboratory site. Thus, he had two projects to begin—one in 
Chicago and one in Ames. He spent Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday at the 
University of Chicago and Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday in Ames, 
making an arrangement with the station master at the Ames depot to reserve a 
sleeper car every Sunday night into Chicago and one on its return on 
Wednesday night.^^ 
At Chicago, Spedding attempted to gather the best chemists he could 
find from around the country. He and Arthur Compton visited Glenn Seaborg 
at Berkeley and convinced him to head up plutonium studies at the University 
of Chicago. The young, ambitious chemist and some of his research group 
arrived on April 19, 1942.^7 while in California on the same visit in late 
^^Frank H. Spedding, interview 5 with Elizabeth Calciano, May 5, 1980, transcript in 
possession of Edith Landin, Ames, Iowa, 2. Train travel was the preferred mode of travel 
during the war years. There had been a regular daily train to and from Chicago for several 
years. Ames was a side station for Des Moines, and the Northwestern Railroad dropped off a 
sleeper car from Des Moines about 9 p.m. daily ; it sat on the side track in Ames until the City 
of San Francisco came about midnight on it way to Chicago and picked it up. The same train 
returned with a sleeper car the next morning leaving Chicago about 11 p.m., and arriving in 
Ames around 5 a.m. It sat until 8 a.m. when it was taken to Des Moines. Spedding always 
reserved lower berth 5, in car 194 each week. 
^^Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 16-17; Glenn Seaborg, "Letter to Frank 
Spedding," March 2, 1942, Spedding Papers; Frank Spedding, "Letter to Glenn Seaborg," 
March 11, 1942, Spedding Papers; Glenn Seaborg, "Letter to Frank Spedding," April 9, 1942, 
Spedding Papers; Hewlett and Anderson, 90. Seaborg, partly due to his youth and lack of 
experience in administration, had been one of the scientists overlooked when Spedding was 
chosen as the head of the Chemistry Division, and according to Spedding, he gave him 
several headaches during his tenure as division head. Spedding had to deal with complaints 
from those working under Seaborg that he did not give due credit for work. When Spedding 
stepped down from the job eighteen months later, Seaborg was again overlooked and gave the 
next director, James Franck, problems too. Eventually, his colleagues, including Spedding, 
46 
March, Spedding met an inorganic chemist at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, Charles Coryell, who specialized in radioactive fission products on 
cyclotrons and offered him the division of fission products. Milton Burton, 
from New York University took over the radiation damage section. The 
fourth group, analytical chemistry, was headed by George Boyd who was 
already at the University of Chicago. Later, Compton added John Chipman 
from MIT to head up the metallurgical studies at Chicago.^® 
Summary 
From 1939 to February 1942, strides were made in scientific studies of 
uranium, even though there had been no chain reaction, uranium in only 
gram quantities was available for experimentation, and knowledge of the 
chemistry of uranium and its byproducts was virtually nonexistent. But some 
subtle changes in uranium research and funded research in general had 
occurred. Scientists arguing from 1939 until early 1941 could not convince the 
government to fund scientific research. By the end of 1941 though. Vannevar 
Bush, the engineer/scientist, had convinced President Roosevelt that it was 
came to respect him as a great scientist. They felt that it was his youth and ambition that 
caused the early problems of not crediting his staff with discoveries or not being the necessary 
team player (Hewlett and Anderson, 90; "James Franck," Spedding manuscript, 2-3). 
®®Frank H. Spedding, "Charles D. Coryell," Spedding Manuscript, [1]; Charles 
Coryell, "Letter to Frank H. Spedding on Employment," April 7,1942, Spedding Papers; Frank 
H. Spedding, "Letter to Charles Coryell on Employment," April 10,1942, Spedding Papers; 
Charles Coryell, "Letter to Frank H. Spedding on Employment," April 24, 1942, Spedding 
Papers; Spedding, interview 8 with Calciano, 10-11; Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 16; 
Spedding, interview 8 with Calciano, 11; Milton Burton, "Letter from to Frank Spedding," 
May 13, 1942, Spedding Papers; Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, pp. 16-17; Milton 
Burton, "Letter to Frank Spedding on Employment," May 30, 1942, Spedding Papers; Spedding, 
interview 8 with Calciano, 11.; Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 16-17; Compton, 185. 
imperative to the survival of the free world to invest in building atomic 
bombs. The original requests by the immigrants were ignored, partly because 
they were not U.S. citizens, but partly because the government was not ready to 
accept the idea that scientific research was necessary to protect national security. 
The turning point came partly because of the British who convinced many 
American scientists that science could be used in the development of a 
weapon, and, in turn, those American scientists convinced the American 
government bureaucrats that science had a practical goal, in this instance at 
least. However, in February 1942, many other problems awaited the scientists 
at Chicago and the newly organized Ames Project, problems challenging both 
scientific research and the administration of that scientific research. 
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE AMES PROJECT, 1942-45 
Organizing Research and Technology Development 
When Frank Spedding indicated to Arthur Compton that he had 
personnel in Ames who could examine chemical and metallurgical problems 
for Chicago, he must have been thinking of the only other faculty member in 
physical chemistry—Harley A. Wilhelm. Spedding's job as chemistry division 
leader was dated February 21,^9 and by February 24,1942, he had signed up his 
colleague as the associate director on the Ames Project.ioo Wilhelm was not an 
internationally known scholar like Spedding, and his academic credentials, 
though sound, were not as impressive as those of his more famous colleague. 
Harley A. Wilhelm, whose parents were tenant farmers, was co-valedictorian 
of his small Iowa high school, but it was athletics that allowed him to 
financially afford college at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa. A 
basketball scholarship paid his tuition, but in order to earn enough money to 
remain in school, in the summers he worked construction gangs and played 
semi-pro baseball, another passion. He graduated from Drake in 1923 in 
mathematics, having taken only two courses in chemistry. He applied for a 
C. Sterns, "Letter to F. H. Spedding on Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory 
Employment," March 19, 1942, Ames Laboratory Papers. On March 19,1942, Spedding 
received this letter from the University of Chicago acknowledging that he had been on their 
payroll since February 21, 1942. 
^^''Oath of Secrecy signed by Harley A. Wilhelm, Spedding Papers; Spedding, 
interview with Svec, 1984, 14. 
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fellowship at Iowa State University but lacked the number of courses in 
chemistry to enroll. Turning to his other love, athletics, and to support a new 
wife, he took consecutive high school positions teaching science and coaching. 
Later, he held a less than successful college coaching position in Helena, 
Montana. He returned to Drake in the summer of 1927 and took enough 
chemistry courses to qualify for an assistantship at Iowa State. The family 
stayed in Des Moines while he went to Ames alone, since the assistantship 
could not support a wife and baby daughter. In 1928, he was awarded an 
instructorship that enabled the entire family to move to Ames.^o^ 
Wilhelm initially worked for Anson Hayes, the head of physical 
chemistry and a well-known metallurgist in iron and steel technologies. Hayes 
left Iowa State College in January 1928, for industry, leaving one of his former 
graduate students, W. H. Jennings, in charge of physical chemistry. Because 
Wilhelm showed an interest in spectrochemistry, he inherited the newly 
ordered spectrograph that was to have gone to Hayes. He earned his Ph.D. 
degree in December 1931, after writing his thesis on band spectra of magnesium 
sulfide and lead sulfide.Wilhelm remained at Iowa State as an instructor, 
turning down a job in Nebraska because it left him no time for research.^os 
Wilhelm remained as an instructor for several years because as a graduate of 
Iowa State, the president of the College refused to promote him or give him 
101 "Wilhelm Recalls the Early Days," Ames Laboratory Changing Times (August, 
1980): 4-5. 
102wilheim, interview with author, 1990; R. M. Hughes, Graduates with the Doctorate, 
Studies of the Graduate College, No. 1 (Ames, lA.: Iowa State College, 1939), 20. 
103wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 5; Harley A. Wilhelm, interview with 
Laura Kline, 1987, transcript in Robert W. Parks and Ellen Sorge Parks Library, Ames, Iowa, 
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tenure. Finally, in 1940, Wilhelm was offered a higher salaried job in 
industry and to keep him, Coover obtained for him an assistant professorship 
and a salary of $3,200.^05 1937, Spedding, replacing Jennings as head of 
physical chemistry, took the spectrograph for his own research work and left 
the metallurgical area of the department completely to Wilhelm, a fortunate 
circumstance in the long run for Wilhelm since he became Spedding's expert 
in that area for the Ames Project.^o^ 
After hiring Wilhelm for metallurgical studies, Spedding attempted to 
find other personnel to staff his Ames operation. He appointed I. B. Johns, a 
researcher with a physical chemistry background, to oversee plutonium 
research, even though at the time he was a faculty member in plant 
chemistry.107 Graduate students who were working with or had previously 
worked under Spedding, Wilhelm, and Johns were the next most obvious 
people to work into the project. Spedding and Wilhelm contributed one 
student each in February—Adrian Daane for metallography and casting studies 
104wiihelm and Spedding both recounted in various interviews that Hughes as 
president of Iowa State wanted to bring in outside talent for positions rather than hire inbred 
faculty members. If Coover raised Wilhelm to an assistant professor, he would receive tenure 
in three years and remain as a permanent faculty member. So it seemed to be common that 
people in Wilhelm's position would remain instructors or leave. (Wilhelm, interview with 
Kline, 1987, 12; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 5; Spedding, interview with Svec, 
1984, 7). 
105Wilhelm, interview with Kline, 1987, 12; Wilhelm, interview with the author, 
1990, 14; "Wilhelm Recalls the Early Days," 6. According to Wilhelm, Friley who had 
replaced Hughes as president kept the same rule on inbreeding, so Wilhelm must have been 
an important asset in the department for Coover to get the professorship for him. He had 
graduate students working under him, had taught all the metallurgical courses for engineering 
students as well as a ceramic engineering course. He was also the only other faculty member 
in physical chemistry. 
106wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 4-6; Spedding, interview with Svec, 1984, 7-
8. 
^O^Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 1-2; Spedding, interview with Svec, 1984, 15. 
51 
because he was already working with oxides and carbines and Ray Hoxeng for 
uranium coatings studies.io® In April, C F Gray finished his Ph.D. under 
Wilhelm and joined the small group to work in castings. In June 1942, Wayne 
Keller, a former student of Spedding's at Cornell, joined the project to work 
with uranium metal reduction.io^ Rounding out the early group were Amos 
Newton from Eastman Kodak, W. H. Sullivan from the New England Zinc 
Company in Pennsylvania, and Adolph Voigt of Smith College, all men 
originally from a research group that had been using the cyclotron to produce 
radioactive materials at the University of Michigan. At Ames, they 
contributed their expertise as group leaders in the various non-metallurgical 
chemical research areas, particularly in studies of plutonium and radiation.^^o 
In early February 1942, Spedding contacted President Charles Friley at 
Iowa State College for clearance to establish the Ames Project. He had 
previously received permission from him to spend several weeks in Chicago 
in January. In late February, Friley released Spedding from half his duties at 
^''^Fulmer, Appendix C: List of Scientific Personnel of the Ames Project under the 
Manhattan District; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 6-7. 
lO^Fuimer, Appendix C; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 6-7; Spedding, 
interview with Svec, 1984, 15; Wilhelm, interview with Kline, 1987, 15. 
^^^These three men, all recent Ph.D.s, were students of Kasmir Fajans, a renown 
radiation chemist at the University of Michigan, whom Spedding was trying to get into the 
project, either on a subcontract at Michigan or at Chicago where he could set up a group there. 
His students came to Ames only temporarily while Fajans was in the process of getting 
security clearance. Unfortunately, because of his Polish descent, he was never cleared and 
Spedding kept his students, incorporating them as group leaders at Ames. (Adolph Voigt, 
interview with author, July 1990, Ames, Iowa, 1; "Adolph Voigt Looks Back," Ames 
Laboratory Changing Scene December 1981,5; Correspondence between Kasmir Fajans and Frank 
Spedding, May 11, 1942, May 12,1942, May 14,1942, May 23, 1942, May 29, 1942, June 24, 1942, 
and August 10,1942, Spedding Papers; Correspondence with Dr. Amos Newton, May 23, 1942, 
June 3, 1942, and June 10, 1942, Spedding Papers; Correspondence with Dr. William H. 
Sullivan, May 23, 1942, May 26, 1942, and June 3, 1942, Spedding Papers). Also see Frank H. 
Spedding, "Auditing," Spedding Manuscript, [5]. 
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Iowa State in order to work on the secret project at the Chicago Metallurgical 
Laboratory.Ill The government gave Friley security clearance in late February 
or early March so that Spedding could release information on the nature of the 
research work at Chicago and Ames. The other top-level administrator 
allowed access to classified information was Dean Harold V. Gaskill, dean of 
the Industrial Sciences Division, under whose jurisdiction rested all war-time 
research projects at Iowa State College.112 
The original agreement with Compton guaranteed that any personnel 
hired in Ames would work there for three months and move to Chicago when 
space was available. Since it took longer than anticipated to hire men, find 
space at Chicago, and build the buildings to house the Ames and Chicago 
chemical staffs and because the Ames group was progressing well at the end of 
the three months, Compton agreed to allow the supporting laboratory to 
continue at Ames under contract for six additional months.^^^ Spedding also 
had difficulty convincing scientific staff to work on the project at Chicago 
because many of the chemical scientists were suspicious of atomic research. 
The project, locally called "Compton's Folly," did not immediately attract large 
^Charles E. Friley, "Letter to Arthur Compton on Releasing Spedding for Duties 
with the Metallurgical Laboratory," February 28, 1942, Ames Laboratory Papers. 
ll^Frank H. Spedding, interview 6 with Elizabeth Calciano, May 7, 1980, transcript in 
possession of Edith Landin, Ames, Iowa, 3. Gaskill's title was Director of Special Research 
for Iowa State College. (H. V. Gaskill, Letter to Major A. V. Peterson Listing all Personnel 
who can Sign Forms," August 7, 1943, MED Files, Record Group 77, National Archives, 
Washington, DC.) 
^Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 13; A. H. Compton, "Letter to S. K. Allison on 
Reorganization of the Metallurgical Chemistry Section," June 5, 1942, the Ames Laboratory 
Papers, 1. 
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numbers of chemists because they thought research on submarine detection, 
radar, and gas research were much more important to the war effort.^i^ 
Metallurgical work conducted at Ames began with three 1920-vintage 
pieces of metallurgical equipment: a small induction furnace that needed a 
few parts, a photo-micrograph that had been missing a mirror for several years, 
and the old Hayes-purchased Helger E-1 quartz spectrograph. Luckily, Ames 
had good analytical equipment available. Eventually, the Manhattan Engineer 
District replaced the reliable, but old, equipment with government purchased 
instrumentation from funding especially allocated for the project."^ 
Organizationally, Spedding thought he needed the scientists in Ames in 
order to supplement the Chicago laboratory in case that larger group failed in 
its primary tasks. Therefore, he instituted a parallel organization, assigning the 
scientists at Ames the same problems as those given to scientists in Chicago, 
but from different perspectives. For example, Johns and his group worked on 
plutonium chemistry, and Amos Newton and William Sullivan had small 
groups backing up the fission products research at Chicago. Harley Wilhelm 
and Wayne Keller each headed small groups dealing with metallurgical 
problems. James Warf took charge of the group trying to find analytical 
methods to detect trace elements in pile materials even though there was also 
an analytical group in Chicago.^i^ According to Spedding, there was little 
ll^Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 14. 
^^^Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 13; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 7-
8.; Spedding, Wilhelm, Daane interview, 1967, 1-2. 
ll^spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 15. This organizational concept was used 
repeatedly throughout the war. Success was so desperately needed that often there was this 
parallel effort. For example, four methods of producing a bomb (three separation techniques 
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duplication since, after all, he was in charge of both groups and kept each 
informed of the other's work.^i^ 
In late 1943, Spedding delivered a report on the organizational structure 
of the Ames Project. He acknowledged that the main chemical research group 
resided in Chicago. Ames served as the "supplementing pioneer research 
group to the main chemical program.''^!® The men in group leader positions 
even at this date—Spedding, Johns, Wilhelm, Rundle, Sullivan, Newton, and 
Keller—were all young men, most barely in their thirties; the younger men 
and the few women under them were equivalent to graduate students working 
on their doctorates.^* 
Because of the youth and scientific inexperience of the scientists at 
Ames, Spedding indicated that most of the research needed to be completed "as 
a result of group discussions and teamwork between the various groups."^20 
Twice a week, his group leaders and section leaders met to discuss the previous 
week's work and plan for the next week's tasks. In addition, each group met 
once a week with its own section chief or group leader. Spedding later 
remembered the organization: 
with uranium and the plutonium process) were maintained throughout the war because no one 
knew which way was ultimately to be successful. 
117gpedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 19. 
^^®Frank H. Spedding, "Report of the Ames Chemical and Metallurgical Groups from 
February 20, 1942 to Dec. 22,1943," the Ames Laboratory Papers, 1. 
ll^Frank H. Spedding, "Report of the Ames Chemical and Metallurgical Groups from 
February 20, 1942 to Dec. 23,1943," the Ames Laboratory Papers, 1. 
^^®Frank H. Spedding, "Report of the Ames Chemical and Metallurgical Croups from 
February 20, 1942 to Dec. 23, 1943," 1-2. 
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At these meetings there is a free-for-all discussion and it is very 
difficult to state just who has the various ideas as one man 
stimulates another. The net result is that most of our 
contributions have been the result of teamwork and should not 
be attributed to any one group or any one individual.^^i 
This team approach seemed to be the key to the Ames organization. 
Spedding often pointed to its role in pressing the research forward. He 
believed in this approach so much that even the shop personnel gave advice 
on how pieces of equipment could be modified or built.122 this instance, 
Spedding was actually following the lead of the other academics at the national 
level in charge of the entire project (as will be noted in a later chapter on the 
academic organization) and his own experiences as a member of G. N. Lewis' 
academic laboratory at Berkeley. Spedding's methods—the seminars, research 
groups, and project-oriented research—may have been novel at Iowa State, but 
this academic style was already characteristic of research organization 
throughout the atomic bomb project. 
Many of the administrative problems for Spedding throughout the war 
revolved around getting staff, both scientific and support personnel. To obtain 
his personnel, Spedding relied on his academic network of contacts, potential 
scientists and others who contacted him directly, and even the military to 
provide him with workers. For example, after Leslie Groves and the 
Manhattan District took over the project in late 1942 and early 1943, Spedding 
^^^Frank H. Spedding, "Report of the Ames Chemical and Metallurgical Groups from 
February 20, 1942 to Dec. 23, 1943," 2. Also, several of the people this author interviewed 
indicated they attended and directed these seminars and meetings. See the author's 
interviews with Voigt, 1990, 4; Carlson, 1990, 5; and Wilhelm, 1990, 15. 
^^^Frank H. Spedding, interview 6 with Elizabeth Calciano, Ames, Iowa, dictated 
May 7,1980, transcript in possession of Edith Landin, Ames, Iowa, 30. 
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was allowed to pick out any military men and women who had bachelor's 
degrees in chemistry, as long as they did not have orders to leave for the war's 
European front. At one time, he went through military records with Groves' 
permission and chose forty chemists from the wartime list—twenty to go to 
Chicago and twenty for Ames J ^ 3 
Spedding also recruited juniors and seniors, primarily at Iowa State, 
who were chemistry majors and put them to work on production lines. 
Sometimes these men were drafted, but Spedding often managed to get them 
reassigned back at Iowa State or in Chicago.^24 Local area people were often 
hired on the project at Ames. One of the chief jewelers in Ames at the time 
made small instrumentation; a retired bank president became a store room 
clerk and later a security guard at Little Ankeny; a gas station owner was head 
of security; and a small tool shop along with its owner was moved to the 
campus.1^5 
Spedding's support staff was meager at the start of the war. A business 
manager and two secretaries kept records, made out purchase orders, and 
handled whatever non-scientific duties were needed. As the red tape grew 
throughout the war, so did the staff. At the end of the war, the Ames Project 
was employing almost one non-scientist support person for every scientist. 
The laboratory had its own janitorial staff. There was a large contingent of 
security guards hired from the local Ames community that had replaced the 
123spedding, interview 6 with Calciano, 6; Frank H. Spedding, "Security Foul Up," 
Spedding Manuscript, 1-2. 
^^^Spedding, interview 6 with Calciano, 9-10. 
125spedding, interview 6 with Calciano, 13; Svec, interview with author, April 1992. 
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campus police who had handled security before the war. However, the College 
still provided some services, particularly in the area of purchasing. Since the 
guards and the support staff were not unionized at Iowa State during the war 
period, they also participated actively in Spedding's organizational team 
concept. Guards often doubled as chauffeurs to pick up visitors who came to 
examine the Ames Project facilities and sometimes even turned off the 
scientific equipment at night so the scientists did not have to go back to 
campus.126 
The Raw Materials Crisis in 1942 
Introduction 
Shortly after the organizational structure was in place, the Ames Project 
became involved in both the metallurgical and chemical problems of initiating 
a chain reaction. Metallurgically, Ames investigated producing sizable 
amounts of uranium as well as casting it on a large-scale, particularly for the 
upcoming Chicago experiment to demonstrate the feasibility of a chain 
reaction. Chemically, in the early years, the project was concerned with the 
basic chemistry of the relatively unknown uranium, its melting point, 
viscosity, and its reaction with other compounds. The laboratory also 
experimented with protective coatings for uranium, preparation of special 
compounds, and reactivity of uranium and its by-products. After many of 
these early problems were solved and a nuclear chain reaction had been 
successfully demonstrated, Ames often engaged in consultant studies and 
126spedding, interview 6 with Calciano, 27-28. 
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services for other laboratories, producing thorium, cerium, and other rare 
elements. Ames discovered uses of and recast metallic uranium turnings from 
scrap pieces shipped from around the country. And probably the best known 
contribution of the Ames Project—the establishment of a pilot plant to produce 
metallic uranium, using two of its own methods to both reduce and cast the 
metal in an old remodeled one-story house near the current-day journalism 
building—continued until industry could take over the process by late July 
1943.127 
Uranium metal 
In February 1942, several research objectives confronted the 
Metallurgical Laboratory before it could produce a bomb—first, how to find a 
way to produce a chain reaction using the U238 isotope of uranium; second, 
how to chemically separate plutonium from the uranium isotope in order to 
produce an explosive chain reaction; and, finally, how to establish a plant to 
move the processes to a large-scale production of materials necessary to create a 
bomb.128 Spedding's chemical division was officially responsible for the second 
127Fuln\er, 12-13. See also various monthly and weekly reports produced from the 
Ames Project from February 1942 to December 1945 for technical details of research activities. 
A samplii^ of these include: CC-176, July 2, 1942 for a discussion of casting uranium in 
graphite; CC-177, July 9, 1942 for a report on reduction of oxides with aluminum and 
magnesium as well as the production of crucibles of different materials; CC-238, August 15, 
1942 when coatings on uranium were studied; CC-298, October 15,1942 a report that included 
studies of recovery of metal from casting wastes; CT-542, March 27,1943 for a study and 
review of methods in casting of uranium ingots; CC-587, April 19, 1943 when a complete write-
up of uranium hydride studies was included; CT-751, June 24,1943 a study of the moisture in 
lime liner materials; CC-1524, March 10,1944 a report on the rare gases; CT-1784, August 10, 
1944 a report on the production of cerium; and CC-2398, March 17,1945 a preliminary report on 
thorium nitrate extraction from uranyl nitrate, all in the Ames Laboratory Papers. For a 
complete listing of research projects, see Fulmer, Appendix I: List of Reports for the Ames 
Project. 
128smyth, 89; Compton, Atomic Quest, 86-87. 
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objective, but it soon became apparent that chemical concerns were imbedded 
in every aspect of the project. 
Materials procurement became one of the most critical concerns of the 
Metallurgical Laboratory. Uranium in its metallic form or in a salt form of 
great purity as well as graphite, beryllium, deuterium, and calcium were crucial 
for the chain reaction.^29 Purity of the uranium presented a particularly 
difficult problem. Virtually no uranium metal in its most pure form, or even 
a pure enough salt or oxide, was available in early 1942. In late 1941, Leo 
Szilard, reported to Arthur Compton that three processes existed to make 
uranium metal, each producing only gram quantities: the photochemical 
process developed at Westinghouse Lamp Division, the uranium-chloride 
reduction method discovered by J. J. Rodden who was presently at the National 
Bureau of Standards, and the calcium hydride method developed by P. P. 
Alexander of Metal Hydrides at Beverly, Massachusetts.i^o Most of these 
methods had neither scaled up their processes to make enough uranium at a 
reasonable cost, nor had they eliminated the impurities that so plagued most 
early production of uranium. 
Harvey C. Rentschler, director of the research laboratory, and John W. 
Marden, a deputy researcher, of the lamp division of Westinghouse, located in 
^^^Smyth, 91; Hewlett and Anderson, 65. 
^^^Leo Szilard, "Memorandum for Professor A. H. Compton Summarizing My Contacts 
with Firms in Connection with the Supply of Uranium Metal, Graphite, Calcium Metal, 
Uranium Oxide, Uranium Carbide and Beryllium," Report No. R-7 of the Chicago 
Metallurgical Reports, [1941], in Ames Laboratory Papers. For a summary of the technical 
characteristics of these early processes, see also J. C. Warner, "Early Methods for Producing 
Uranium Metal," Chapter 6 in Uranium Technology: General Survey, by J. E. Verne and J. C. 
Warner, National Nuclear Energy Series, Division VII, vol. 2A (Washington, DC: Atomic 
Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 142-150. 
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Bloomfield, New Jersey, as early as 1919 had experimented with using metallic 
uranium as a substitute for tungsten in incandescent filaments. In 1927, they 
took out a patent on the process.^^i Knowing that uranium was close to 
tungsten on the periodic chart, it seemed natural that it could be used as 
filament material. Since its melting point was lower than tungsten though, it 
did not prove satisfactory. Nevertheless, the laboratory continued research on 
uranium and other rare earths and even produced very small quantities of the 
metal for college and university research experiments.^^^ 
In 1929, two other researchers at Westinghouse, Frank Driggs and 
William Lilliendahl, refined the process to obtain pure uranium metal by an 
electrolysis of the fused salts. Essentially, the electrolytic process involved 
producing a "green salt," potassium uranium fluoride, which had been 
photochemically created on the roof of one of the buildings at Bloomfield, 
using sunlight to initiate the photochemical reaction. The resulting product, 
KUFs, was mixed with calcium chloride and sodium chloride and heated. 
When the salts melted, the uranium ions that had deposited on a 
molybdenum electrode were removed and crushed into particles. After being 
washed in barrels, the uranium was dried in vacuum ovens and pressed into 
^31 "Westinghouse Lamp Division Marks 50 Years of Progress in Bloomfield," Press 
Release from Westinghouse in Harley A. Wilhelm Papers, Ames Laboratory, Ames, Iowa, 4 
(hereafter Wilhelm Papers). For an in depth discussion of these three processes, see Harley 
A. Wilhelm, "Development of Uranium Metal Production in America," Journal of Chemical 
Education 37 (February 1960): 56-68. Most of the material the author has used in the 
descriptions above and those to follow comes from the letters and other written material sent 
to Wilhelm as he was preparing this article. Although the material is also summarized by 
Wilhelm, the author cites the background documents since they are often in more detail than 
Wilhelm's account. 
^32john Walsh, "A Manhattan Project Postscript," Science 212 (June 19, 1981): 1370. 
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small pieces called buttons.^^^ Up until 1941, the process, according to 
Lilliendahl, had produced only a few kilograms of pure metal, hardly enough 
for commercial large-scale users. It was for sale in the open market for about 
$1,000 a pound.134 in 1941, both the British and U.S. governments approached 
the company about the possibility of scaling up the process to produce ton 
quantities of the metal. 
In December 1941, the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD) signed a contract with Westinghouse to produce metallic uranium.^^s 
By the Spring of 1942, little metal had been produced, primarily because of the 
lack of sunshine in the New Jersey climate. Westinghouse investigated, with 
little success, the possibility of using ultraviolet lamps and even considered 
moving the operation to Arizona where the sun would shine more often. 
Though producing the required quantities of uranium metal remained a 
problem for the duration of the contract, the Westinghouse Process never 
encountered an impurity problem because of the high purity of its raw 
materials and because of its excellent analytical procedures to detect impurities 
all along the process. Later, after substituting uranium tetrafluoride, UFe, 
instead of KUFg, Westinghouse found that this process did not need the sun, 
and by November 1942, just a month before the Stagg Field chain reaction 
experiment, the company had sent 6,000 pounds of the metal to Chicago at a 
133patent No. 1,961,625 issued June 7, 1932; Walsh, 1370; W. C. Lilliendahl, "Letter to 
Harley A. Wilhelm on his Article on Uranium," August 5, 1958, Wilhelm Papers; Smyth, 92. 
^^^Smyth, 93; Compton, Atomic Quest, 91 say the cost of producing uranium by this 
method was around $1,000 per pound while Lilliendahl in his letter to Wilhelm on August 5, 
1958 quoted the amount at $500. This author finds no evidence to refute the figure given by 
Compton and Smyth whose accounts were much closer to the time period. 
^^^Lilliendahl to Wilhelm, 2-3. 
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cost of approximately $22 a pound.^^^ Its operations were mostly discontinued 
in late 1943, when the Ames Process supplanted all other methods because that 
process produced enough metal of the required purity at a much cheaper cost 
than others.^37 
In 1932, Peter P. Alexander, who was later president of Metal Hydrides, 
wrote a Ph.D. thesis on his process to reduce uranium. Assisted by L. W. Davis 
and Frederick Archibald, he published information about the process in Metals 
and Alloys in 1937. His method first reduced uranium oxide with calcium 
hydride. The resulting product was leached with a diluted acid, dried, pressed 
into cubes and sintered in a vacuum. The National Bureau of Standards first 
contracted with Metal Hydrides in 1941 for 7,000 pounds of the Alexander 
metal to be delivered to its headquarters. However, the delivery was stopped 
mid-stream when analytical analysis showed boron had contaminated the 
uranium. The culprit was the calcium used by Metal Hydrides, so the Bureau 
decided to establish a calcium distillation unit at Beverly, Massachusetts, where 
Metal Hydrides was located, a fortuitous coincidence for Alexander's company 
since it was essentially ready for large-scale production of uranium when three 
men from the Metallurgical Laboratory came to visit in early 1942.1^8 
On January 14, 1942, Lyman Briggs from the National Bureau of 
Standards, Arthur Compton from the University of Chicago, and Ernest 
^^^Smyth, 93; Lilliendahl to Wilhelm, 3-4. 
137v\^alsh, 1371; Wilhelm, "Development of Uranium Metal," 67. 
138peter P. Alexander, "Letter to Harley A. Wilhelm on Uranium Production," January 
28, 1959, the Wilhelm Papers; Peter P. Alexander, "The Hydride Process—IV," Reprinted 
from Metab and Alloys (October 1938): [l]-[5]; Szilard, "Memorandum for Professor A. H. 
Compton," 1-2; C. J. Rodden, "Letter to Harley A. Wilhelm on Uranium Production," January 
21, 1959, Wilhelm Papers. 
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Lawrence from the University of California personally contacted Alexander at 
his company. Shortly thereafter, they signed a contract and the company 
reorganized to produce large quantities of metals for the Metallurgical Project. 
Because the company had little equipment such as furnaces and also because its 
metal was extremely pyrophoric, no appreciable amount of metallic uranium 
was available from them until almost November 1942.139 
C. J. Rodden at the National Bureau of Standards experimented with 
uranium reduction methods involving calcium. He had been working with 
the 'James Process," a method reported in 1926 in a scientific journal, which 
had been developed at the University of New Hampshire while he was there. 
It used calcium to reduce uranium oxide and uranium tetrachloride. Late in 
August 1942, Rodden independently discovered the same process that the 
Ames Project scientists had developed earlier that month.^^o 
Uranium oxide 
Uranium generally came in the form of a oxide, and it was well known 
that a purer oxide would produce, in turn, an end product of greater purity. 
Uranium oxide had been difficult to obtain since 1939 when Alexander Sachs 
warned President Roosevelt that the German occupation of Belgium might 
ruin chances to procure Belgian uranium oxide from the Congo. By the time 
Sachs was authorized to approach Belgium by Dr. Brigg's Uranium Committee, 
Germany had invaded Belgium and taken over 500 tons of uranium into its 
l^^Smyth, 94; Peter P. Alexander to Harley A. Wilhelm, August 2, 1968, Wilhelm 
Papers. 
140wiihelin, "Development of Uranium Metal," 58-63. 
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possession. The shipment of ore from the Congo by then had ceased because of 
the war hostilities.^^! 
By January 1942, the quantity of uranium oxide needed to produce a 
chain reaction was no problem. Over 1,200 tons of the oxide were stored in a 
port in New York; additional tonnage quantities were available at the Eldorado 
Gold Mine in Toronto and at a chemical plant in Colorado. A total of 2,000 
tons was actually available, and predictions estimated that only 150 tons of the 
oxide would be necessary through 1944. Compton thought he needed only 45 
tons for his early experiments in Chicago.^42 
However, the National Bureau of Standards had earlier ordered several 
tons of uranium oxide from Canada for experimental purposes and found that 
though quantity was not a problem, purity certainly was. J. J. Hoffman had 
earlier discovered an ether extraction method to remove all impurities from 
uranyl nitrate.^43 The Metallurgical Laboratory repeated those experiments 
successfully, but found that companies in North America had neither the 
necessary equipment nor the desire to purify the uranium oxide using the 
ether extraction method; ether was known to be very explosive and erra tic. ^ 44 
When Herbert McCoy and Herbert Anderson visited the Port Hope Refineries 
of the Eldorado Mine in Canada in April 1942, they posed the question of ether 
extraction to them. The company claimed they could extract the metal but only 
^^^Szilard "Memorandum for Professor A. H. Compton," [61. 
^^^Hewlett and Anderson, 65. 
143Smyth, 93. 
^^^Compton, Atomic Quest, 93. 
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if the proper equipment could be procured for them to scale up their present 
laboratory method.^^s 
Compton, at this point, decided he would contact his old friend Edward 
Mallinckrodt who ran a chemical plant in St. Louis that specialized in the 
production of ether and other chemicals. In May 1942, Compton and Frank 
Spedding in his capacity as head of chemistry traveled to St. Louis. Compton 
explained the ether extraction project to Mallinckrodt while Spedding worked 
out the details with the engineers Henry Farr and John Ruhoff. Within two 
hours Mallinckrodt agreed to tackle the job. At best, Compton had no real idea 
how much the process would cost, so he approved a letter of intent from the 
OSRD to Mallinckrodt with a promise to negotiate a contract later for the actual 
costs. The first quantities were shipped in July 1942, and continued at the rate 
of 30 tons per month, accomplishing the remarkable feat of producing on a 
commercial scale pure uranium oxide that was attainable only on a laboratory 
scale mere months before. The actual contract was not signed until the day 
that the last of the 60 tons left the Mallinckrodt plant, an example of the 
flexibility of the government policies toward contracting management on the 
one hand and the remarkable faith in the project by the company on the other 
hand.1^6 Making pure uranium oxide became crucial in several processes 
throughout the war, including adding to the pile at Chicago, making uranium 
^^^Herbert Anderson and Herbert McCoy, "Memorandum to A. H. Compton on visit to 
Port Hope Refineries of the Eldorado Gold Mines, Ltd.," April 16, 1942, Ames Laboratory 
Papers, 4. 
^^^Smyth, 93; Compton, Atomic Quest, 93-95; Spedding, interview with Calciano 5,18; 
F. H. Spedding, "Patent Letter to Lt. Colonel H. E. Metcalf Describing the Mallinckrodt 
Process," May 11,1945, 1-2. 
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compounds like uranium tetrafluoride, and using the material for research 
experiments to produce a purer metal. 
The Discovery and Development of the Ames Process 
The discovery of the Ames Process to develop metallic uranium gave 
credence to both the administrative apparatus of the Ames Project and the 
research and development expertise of the Ames scientists. The laboratory 
worked as a team on the many problems that Spedding brought from his 
meetings in Chicago. One of the interesting things about uranium at the time 
was the incorrect assumption that uranium could be reduced by the same 
processes as those used for the elements around it on the periodic chart. Early 
in 1942, the Ames Project as well as other laboratories thought that the oxides 
of uranium would reduce to form a salt slag and clean metal. Unfortunately, 
uranium did not behave in a predictable way. First, the Ames group 
experimented with the oxide derivatives of uranium in order to produce 
metallic uranium through a hydrogen reduction, but without tremendous 
success.^47 The oxides presented temperature-melting problems, casting 
difficulties, and tended to corrode the normal crucibles made from beryllium, 
magnesia, and graphite.^^S gy June 1942, attempts to reduce the uranium oxide 
with carbon in a hydrogen atmosphere also only partially succeeded.^^^ Other 
H. Spedding, "Report on Chemical Project at Ames, March 6-12, 1942," Spedding 
Papers; Adrian Daane, "Research Notebook," March 31, 1942, Ames Laboratory Papers. 
H. Spedding, "Report of the Chemical Work Done at Ames up to April 13, 1942," 
Spedding Papers. 
^^^Daane, "Research Notebook," June 2, 1942. 
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reduction experiments with aluminum, magnesium, and calcium, resulted in 
little success.iso During the early weeks of July 1942, the problem of the 
crucibles was finally solved when several successful uranium castings were 
made with graphite crucibles, resulting in no uranium sticking to the 
graphite.^51 The biggest problem remaining then was the lack of uranium 
metal to cast in the new crucibles. No process had been developed to supplant 
the processes in existence, methods that were expensive, unpredictable, and 
still producing only gram quantities. 
The situation was so bad that the idea began to circulate around Chicago 
that perhaps some pure metal could be used in the core of the experimental 
pile and compounds—oxides, chlorides or fluorides—could be placed on the 
perimeter. Coincidentally, in the summer of 1942, someone working on the 
calutron electromagnetic separation processes at Berkeley brought some 
uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) to an administrative meeting at Chicago to 
discuss the possibilities of using this fluoride or an oxide of uranium on the 
outside of the pile core at Chicago, Spedding looked at the two-inch cube that 
probably had been produced at Harshaw Chemical Company in Cleveland and 
wondered if using a salt that produced no oxygen could produce metallic 
uranium. In the normal reduction experiments oxygen had been the greatest 
ISOQaane, "Research Notebook, "July 2, 1942, July 6, 1942, July 27 1942; Wayne Keller, 
"Research Notebook," July 8, 1942, July 10, 1942, July 12-18, 1942, Ames Laboratoiy Papers, 46-
48. 
H. Spedding, "Report of the Ames Chemical and Metallurgical Group for the 
Week of July 2, 1942," Ames Laboratory Papers. 
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barrier in reducing the uranium to large pieces of pure metal. He took the 
block back to Ames in late July and gave it to the metallurgical group to test.i^z 
Wayne Keller, one of the men under Wilhelm, took the block and began 
the historic experiments to reduce the tetrafluoride with calcium or some 
other salt to uranium metal. On August 3, 1942, he recounted the first 
reduction attempt in his research notebook: 
The fluoride and calcium were ground together in a mortar and 
placed in an iron pipe as a crucible. The crucible and charge were 
placed with proper packing in a quartz tube and the whole 
evacuated. A thermocouple was placed between the quartz tube 
and the furnace coil. The furnace was heated by 110 volts at 12 
ampe. 
The temperature increased from 30°C at 4:00 p.m. to 370°C at 
4:38 p.m. At that time the pressure rose to about one-half an 
atmosphere suddenly, then began to drop again in a few 
moments. .. . The temperature was read and was found to have 
risen from 370°C to 540°C in four minutes.... At 600°C heating 
was discontinued. 
When the furnace was almost at room temperature argon was 
introduced, the furnace opened, and the crucible removed. 
The material in the crucible was found to have fused, and a 
lump of quite compact, but low density metallic material was 
found in the bottom of the crucible.. .. The large block on the 
bottom was sawed in two, and inside was found one large button 
of very pure looking metallic uranium. . . . This button weighed 
about 20 grams.153 
^52f. H. Spedding, "Interview with Barton C. Hacker," October 21, 1980, Ames, Iowa, 
transcript in possession of Edith Landin, Ames, Iowa, 10; Hewlett and Anderson, 87-88; 
Spedding, interview with Svec, 1984, 15; Spedding to Metcalf, May 11, 1945, 2. 
153yYayne Keller, "Research Notebook," August 3,1942,58-60. On subsequent days 
more experiments were run aiming at a greater yield and more compact single ingot. By 
August 7, with several adjustments, an ingot of 82 grams was discovered on the bottom of the 
crucible, the largest single ingot to date. (Keller, "Research Notebook," August 7, 1942, 69). 
See also A.H. Compton, "Metallurgical Project Report for the Month ending August 15, 1942," 
Report No. CC-238, in Ames Laboratory Papers, 5-8. Spedding reviewed the work also in a 
report called "Metal Production," Metallurgical Laboratory Report No. R-414, November 25, 
1942 in Ames Laboratory Papers. For a review of the experiments see Wilhelm, Keller, 
From the initial success, it was a simple matter to run a series of 
experiments to refine the process and produce even larger ingots of pure 
uranium. Other compounds in combination with uranium tetrafluoride were 
tried in the reduction method, including sodium and uranium chloride, but 
the process for reduction with calcium improved so much that by the end of 
August, most of the attention turned to producing a large cast of uranium 
metal.154 in September 1942, large quantities of the uranium-calcium charge 
were prepared in crucibles that were made of 4-inch black steel pipes 15-18 
inches long, capped on one end and welded with a solid sheet on the other 
end. A spark plug for ignition was also welded on the bottom or placed 
internally. Lime was generally used as a liner to prevent the charge coming in 
contact with the steel sides.^^^ 
Several experiments with these new crucibles, or bombs as they became 
known, continued using up to 2,000 grams of the uranium tetrafluoride. After 
several modifications, a few large ingots weighing over 1,500 grams (3-4 
pounds) were produced. On September 21,1942, several more reduction 
experiments were tried, with close to 3,000 grams of uranium tetrafluoride and 
Butler, "Production of Uranium Metal by the Reduction of Uranium Tetrafluoride by Metallic 
Calcium," Report for August 5, 1942, in Report CC-238, "Report of the Metallurgical Project for 
the Month Ending August 15,1942," in the Ames Laboratory Papers, 1-8. According to Harry 
A. Svec (interview, April 1992), Richard Thompson, a former undergraduate, actually 
conducted the first experiment under Keller's direction. 
^^'^Keller, "Research Notebook," entries for the rest of August, 91-103. 
IS^Keller, "Research Notebook," September 2, 1942, 106. See also "Comparison of 
Refractories as Bomb Lining Materials in Production," and F. H. Spedding, "Summary of Work 
at Ames," March 10-April 10, 1944, the Ames Laboratory Papers, 8-9 for a description of the 
different materials used for liners. 
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calcium in each experiment. From these experiments, several ingots were cast 
and recast by C F Gray, producing a final billet of pure metallic uranium 
weighing approximately 4,980 grams (eleven pounds).^56 
On September 24,1942, Harley Wilhelm took the 5-inch by 2-inch 11-
pound ingot from the casting furnace, placed it carefully in a traveling bag 
some students had given him from his coaching stint in Helena, Montana, and 
caught the night train that traveled to Chicago from the Ames Depot.^57 
Getting off the train in Chicago, Wilhelm had to catch the "L" to the 
University of Chicago campus. In transit, the handle of his case broke, so by 
the time he reached Spedding's office in Eckhart Hall, he was carrying the 
precious cargo in its case under his arm. Spedding and Wilhelm took the billet 
to Compton who had never seen one piece of uranium this big before. His 
immediate reaction was, "I bet there's a pipe [hole] inside." Wilhelm took the 
ingot to the basement of the biology building and instructed a shop man to cut 
it open. After a small fire in the cutting process, a cropping from the ingot 
finally appeared; there was no pipe.^^S Spedding evidently took a cropping to 
an administrative meeting soon thereafter. R. L. Doan the laboratory director 
later recalled that momentous day: 
^®%eller, "Research Notebook," various September entries, including 9/21/42, 107-137. 
A. H. Compton, "Metallurgical Project Report for Month Ending October 15, 1942," Report No. 
CC-298, Ames Laboratory Papers. This latter report gives a summary of the metallurgical 
work for August and September 1942. 
^S^Harley Wilhelm, "Interview with Laura Kline, Iowa State Archivist" November 
14, 1988, Incomplete transcript in Parks Library, Ames, Iowa, 1. Harley Wilhelm, "Telephone 
Conversation with author," July 1989, Amos, Iowa; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 12. 
15®Wilhelm, telephone conversation with author, 1989; Wilhelm, interview with 
Kline, 1988, 2. Wilhelm, interview with author 1990, 12. 
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I don't believe anyone took the work there [at Ames] very seriously 
until Spedding came to a technical council meeting one fine 
autumn day and smugly laid an "egg,"—an almost perfect cylinder 
of uranium metal, on the table for inspection. Even then, while 
admiring the accomplishment, everyone I am sure felt that it would 
be futile to look to a couple of college professors for the production 
of any significant quantity of metal.^59 
The Building of a Pilot Plant 
But futile it was not. Within a week, R. L. Doan, the Metallurgical 
Laboratory director, had arrived on the Iowa State campus to write an OSRD 
contract for the Ames Project to produce 100 pounds of uranium per day, using 
its simple and cheap process.^^^) The intention was that Iowa State would 
demonstrate the process to companies like DuPont, Electromet, and Mallinckrodt 
but continue to make uranium until the companies could integrate the processes 
into their own plants.^^^ The Ames Project at this point became two 
complementary projects—one aimed at conducting chemistry studies on 
uranium and plutonium and the other incorporating the Ames Process to 
produce uranium in a pilot plant. 
Most of the research and chemical studies to date had occurred in the 
Chemistry Building, but with the need to add a full-scale pilot plant more space 
was needed for furnaces and other machinery as well as for the increased staff to 
scale up the uranium-producing process. Wilhelm and Spedding started a 
L. Doan, "Letter to Harley A. Wilhelm about Recollections for Paper on Uranium 
Production," August 21,1958, in Wilhelm Papers, 2. 
IfiOpoan, 2. 
^61Spedding, interview with Barton C. Hacker, 11. 
search for an adequate site or building. On the east side of Ames, there was an 
old gas generation plant made of brick. Though sturdy, that building would 
take too much work to renovate, so it was discarded as a practical possibility for 
the plant. After a lengthy search, Wilhelm and Spedding discovered an 
appropriate building on campus, a small World War I temporary wooden 
house behind the Dairy Industries building, near the power plant on the 
southeastern edge of campus. It had been used years before as a women's 
gymnasium. In 1942, it was used primarily for storage; there was evidently a 
popcorn laboratory in one part of the building, and in a kind of garage the 
psychology department had stored some trucks with educational, 
demonstration equipment.^^2 The College gave the building to the project, and 
immediately the chemists had the dirt floor in the garage area replaced with 
concrete so that casting could take place in this area. The chemists set up the 
reduction laboratory in the original part of the building where the popcorn lab 
had been located. The building shortly began to expand in a most curious 
pattern. The porch was used for the especially dirty work, the least secret of the 
process. However, when it became too cold to work on the porch, a canvas 
would be added followed by a crude set of walls and finally a new roof. A new 
porch appeared and the process repeated itself. The odd expansion of the 
house took place as soon as more space became necessary to expand operations 
^^^originally called the Home Economics Annex, the building was built west of the 
Home Economics Building in 1920. In 1926, when the new Home Economics Building was 
constructed, it was physically moved to a new site south of the Press Building where it served 
as the girls' gymnasium, called the Field House. In 1941, it was no longer needed because the 
new Women's Gymnasium was constructed. It was being used as a storage facility when 
Spedding and Wilhelm discovered it. H. Summerfield Day, The Iowa State University Campus 
and Its Buildings 1859-1979 (Ames, lA: Iowa State University, 1980), 254. 
73 
and continued much to the chagrin of the local university architect who had 
been trying to get this old building torn down for several years prior to its 
occupancy by the Ames Project people.^^^ 
After the building became available, a machine shop at the production 
site became the second necessity. Wilhelm heard of a small machine shop, 
owned and managed by Bill Maitland, for sale in Ames west of Grand Avenue 
near the railroad. Maitland made garden tools normally, but he could no 
longer obtain the metal he needed because of war-time restrictions on material 
priorities. Wilhelm examined the shop contents and discovered that Maitland 
would sell all his tools and equipment for $8,000. After consulting with 
Spedding, both men contacted Maitland and bought the entire shop, moving 
the equipment along with Bill Maitland to the campus production building, 
officially called the Physical Chemistry Annex, later nicknamed by the local 
workmen as "Little Ankeny," after a war munitions plant in Ankeny, lowa.^^^ 
Production equipment, unlike lathes, motors, and small tools from 
Maitland, was much harder to procure. For example, reduction furnaces were 
especially hard to obtain. The small reduction furnace in the Chemistry 
Department used to produce most of the metal earlier was not big enough for a 
163wiihelm, interview with Kline 1988, 4.; Spedding, Wilhelm, and Daane, 
interview. May 1967, 10; Spedding, interview with Barton C. Hacker, 1980, 12. For 
photographs of the building and a floor plan of the operation see Appendix B, Figures 1-2. 
164wiihelm, interview with Kline, 1988, 5. It is not known how the building received 
its name, but it was quite apt as a name for the project (Esther Poli to to Bert Merrill, Letter 
on the Name Little Ankeny, September 21, 1945 in the Ames Laboratory Papers). Adrian 
Daane, one of the scientists in the project thought that it was named by some of the local 
townspeople who worked on the project and the name just stuck. These people knew of the 
munitions factory in Ankeny and just named it after that factory since the work on the Ames 
Project was somewhat dangerous, particularly with the number of explosions occurring on a 
routine basis (Daane, telephone interview with author, March 18, 1992). 
large-scale production plant. Luckily for the Ames operation, the Metallurgical 
Laboratory had ordered two 40,000 watt reduction furnaces for what they called 
"Site B," but when the Ames pilot plant needed to be established as a 
production facility, those furnaces were diverted to Ames. Mixers and grinders 
for processing metals like calcium and later magnesium and vacuum casting 
apparatus were also purchased from various producers using contract money 
from the Manhattan Engineer District, an Army Corps of Engineers operation, 
which took over this part of the Ames Project in late 1942.^65 
The Chicago Pile-1 (CP-1)—December 2,1942 
While these arrangements were still being worked out in the fall of 1942, 
the Ames group continued to reduce metal in the Chemistry Building, 
beginning a uranium shipping program to Chicago. The University of Chicago 
received two tons of the metal from Ames for the Stagg Field experiment that 
occurred on December 2,1942. Westinghouse and Metal Hydrides also each 
shipped two tons to Chicago. 
Most of the research and production work that Iowa State undertook to 
this point supported the critical chain reaction or pile experiment at the 
University of Chicago. Spedding, in his capacity as head of the chemistry 
section, was present as one of the few invited guests to witness the historic 
event. Enrico Fermi, a physicist at Chicago, designed the experiment 
originally, making all the necessary calculations including everything from 
165wiihelm, interview with Kline, 1988, 7; Wilhelm, telephone conversation with 
author, 1989. 
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how much uranium and graphite was needed to how long it would take to 
initiate and sustain the reaction. The event took place under the West Stands 
of Stagg Field in a room in the squash court. Arthur Compton had chosen the 
University of Chicago site in November without any prior notification of the 
university president Robert Hutchins or without prior governmental 
approvals from Vannevar Bush or James Conant. He had concluded that the 
site under construction outside Chicago in the Argonne Woods could not be 
ready in time because of delays caused by construction strikes. After a lengthy 
discussion session, the governmental leaders finally acceded to his wishes 
because the project was under so many deadlines to push ahead and 
everything depended upon the feasibility of a chain reaction.^^^ 
Construction on the pile began in November 1942. Constructed in a 
thirty by sixty foot room, the large stack or pile of black graphite bricks and 
wooden timbers dominated the room.^67 Over the top of the stack was a 
Actually, it was later revealed by Compton himself and Hewlett and Anderson as 
well as other authors that Compton was so concerned about the continuance of the bomb and 
plutonium projects at Chicago that he wanted to impress a governmental review team, the 
Lewis Committee, that just happened to be in Chicago in early December investigating the 
processes used to obtain a bomb. There was still no decision as to which of the three methods 
for separation of uranium—electromagnetic, centrifuge, or gaseous diffusion—or the one 
method for separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium would win out in the four-way 
race for a weapon. Since Compton counted on plutonium, this chain reaction experiment was 
crucial. But the experiment did not take place until the team was on its way back across the 
country. As important as the event was as a technological accomplishment, the Lewis team 
had already made its recommendations in draft form that gaseous diffusion would have the 
best possible chance of success. However, they recommended to continue to support Lawrence's 
work in electromagnetic separation and to support pile production. The experiment was 
another anticlimax in the policy-making arena, but it did help confirm the committee's 
recommendations, just like Compton's third review report a little more than one year earlier. 
Additionally, on December 1, 1942, Groves issued the command to DuPont to build production 
plants using both plutonium and uranium (Compton, Atomic Quest, 139-145; Hewlett and 
Anderson, 100-115; Groves, 53-54; Conant, My Several Lives, 289; Wyden, 51-52; Smyth, 90; 
Hewlett and Anderson, 112-113; Gosling, 15-16). 
^^^Corbin Allardice and Edward R. Trapnell "The First Pile," 1961 reprint of AEC 
Report TID-292, March 1955, located in Spedding Papers, 2. This booklet was originally 
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balloon cloth bag constructed by Goodyear. The bag had one side open 
exposing a circular layer of graphite bricks with machined holes to insert 
cadmium/wooden strips for absorbing neutrons. Uranium was placed in the 
middle holes and uranium oxide in the holes on the outside of the pile. The 
pile contained over 400 tons of graphite (over 40,000 bricks), 6 tons of uranium 
and 58 tons of uranium oxide (over 22,000 slugs) and cost approximately $1 
million to construct. Each layer was braced with a wooden frame. One hand-
controlled rod was used to stop the reaction if needed. A set of motor-driven 
rods was controlled from the balcony and one emergency rod ran through the 
middle of the pile, a rod attached with a rope and heavy weight for the 
unthinkable emergency. The pile was completely uncooled, unshielded, and 
constructed primarily by physics undergraduate students from the University 
of Chicago^^® 
Enrico Fermi concluded from the constant tests he had been conducting 
throughout the fall that the pile reached its critical size on the afternoon of 
December 1. On Wednesday morning, December 2,1942, those invited, on this 
cold wintry day, gathered on a balcony to watch the experiment (see the 
written in 1946 and reproduced several times as the definitive history of the Chicago 
experiment. Most of the material in the booklet had been prepared for a press release to be 
issued from the War Department on the fourth anniversaiy of the Chicago experiment to be 
released Sunday December 1, 1946 (Record No. 95 from the MED History, Book I, Vol. IV, 
Chapter 8, Press Releases). 
^^®Allardice and Trapnell, 9. Hewlett and Anderson, 112-113. H. L.. Anderson, "The 
First Chain Reaction," in The Nuclear Chain Reaction—Forty Years Later, ed. by Robert Sachs, A 
Symposium at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 1984 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 32-33. Rhodes, 430-436. George W. Tressel, CP-1 25th Anniversary Film, 
Transcript of a film produced by the Argonne National Laboratory, August 10,1967, Ames 
Laboratoiy Papers, 13-14. 
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photographie interpretation of the day of the experiment in Appendix B). 
Frank Spedding was on the balcony with men like Arthur Compton, Crawford 
Greenewalt from DuPont, Eugene Wigner from the theoretical section of the 
Metallurgical Laboratory, perhaps twenty more men, and one woman. 
Spedding remembered the day: 
Sitting on a stool. . . watching the galvanometer was Fermi, and 
he had a slide rule in his hand.... What we saw was a beam of 
light hitting a small mirror and reflecting on a scale on the 
wall.... When they pulled the control rod, this beam went up 
little ways and then went back as it was dying out.^^® 
The room was tense and quiet as the preliminary testing and calculating 
continued all morning. Then as his custom, Fermi called for a lunch break at 
about 11:30 a.m. After lunch, Fermi began the experiment itself. He called for 
a cadmium strip to be pulled a certain distance, usually one foot at a time. 
Herbert Anderson, of the Metallurgical Laboratory and one of the observers, 
later recalled: 
The rod was pulled out a specific amount and you could hear the 
counters clicking away—dickety-clack, clickety-click. They went 
faster and faster and then at a certain point there was silence. The 
rate had become too great for the counters to follow. ... Attention 
turned to the chart recorder. It was silent but could record much 
higher levels of intensity. You watched a pen moving across the 
scde as the chart advanced.... 
The intensity kept rising and soon the pen was off-scale. So 
the scale was changed.... It was understandable that some of the 
onlookers might become a little nervous. They didn't hear 
anything, they didn't feel anything, but they knew that a 
dangerous activity was mounting rapidly. Everyone's eyes were 
on Fermi. It was up to him to call a halt. But he was very 
confident and very calm. He wanted the intensity to rise high 
^^^Frank H. Spedding, "Interview with George Tressel," July 12, 1967, Ames, Iowa, 
transcript in Ames Laboratory Papers, 18-19. 
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enough to remove all possible doubt that the pile was critical. He 
kept it going until it seemed too much to bear. "Zip in," he called, 
and Zinn released his rope. The control rod he held went in with 
a bang and the intensity dropped abruptly to comfortable levels. 
Everyone sighed with relief. Then there was a small cheer.^^o 
Spedding reinforced some of the above feelings in his memories of the 
moment. Quiet, intensity, tension, relief were all words in the vocabulary of 
those who were there. Leona Libby Marshall, another observer of the occasion, 
and the only woman in attendance, summed up the mood as the famous bottle 
of Chianti was passed around afterward: 
There was absolute dead silence. Nobody said anything. Then 
somewhat later, after the control rods were all put to bed and the 
charts were pulled out and clipped off and so on, Eugene Wigner 
showed up with the famous flask of Chianti.. . and he poured 
into a paper cup and everyone drank it very quietly. There was no 
toast... nothing ... no remarks ... very dramatic. The most 
effective kind of drama at that point.^^i 
This experiment had just demonstrated the harnessing of an awesome 
power, though most of the people there were thinking of the immediate days 
ahead—how to take this power and win a war. However, Leo Szilard, one of 
the men who had originally pushed the United States into this research effort, 
later remembered the doubts he had about the day: 
There was a crowd there and then Fermi and I stayed there alone. 
I shook hands with Fermi and I said I thought this day would go 
down as a black day in the history of mankind.^^^ 
L. Anderson, in Allardice and Trapnell, 35-36. 
17lTressel, "CP-1 25th Anniversary," 18. 
^^^Szilard and Weart, 146. 
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After the success of the experiment, more uranium was needed to create 
a working pile. The new site for the larger pile would be the Clinton Engineer 
Works in a small little community nestled in the hills of Eastern Tennessee. 
The Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory thought it would be in charge of this site, 
but they had to eventually turn over their expertise to an industrial concern 
that would run the actual pile—DuPont. The small Ames production group, 
which was in the process of moving to its new production facility, would 
produce over ninety per cent of the uranium that went into that first reactor at 
the Clinton Engineer Works. 
The Production Project at the Ames Laboratory 1943-45 
During the months of November and December, the Ames metal 
manufacturing unit began to set up in its new building, the Physical Chemistry 
Annex. 174 The supporting chemical and metallurgical research continued, but 
because of the critical need for the production of metallic uranium, Spedding 
quit as head of the Chemistry Division in early 1943 and devoted his full efforts 
to work in Ames, especially since there were really two projects on campus to 
oversee. 
Uranium production 
By January 1943, several changes had occurred in the production area. 
Most of the equipment like cutters and mills that had been ordered were in 
173Frank H. Spedding, interview 8 with Elizabeth Calciano, transcript in possession of 
Edith Landin, Ames, Iowa, n.d., 13. 
l^^Frank H. Spedding, "Report for the Month Ending December 15, 1942: Ames Metal 
Manufacturing Department," Ames Laboratory Papers, 1. 
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place. Also new experiments using magnesium as a reductant rather than 
calcium proved successful, lowering the production costs considerably. By 
early January, uranium tetrafluoride came to Ames from three sources— 
Mallinckrodt, DuPont, and Harshaw. Production in general was stepped up, 
rising from an average of 3,600 pounds a week during the early part of January 
to about 5,600 pounds during the last week of the month. There was a 
temporary reduction in early February because of the lack of tetrafluoride, but 
overall production levels using magnesium had risen from about 100 pounds 
a day in December to an average of 550 pounds in the middle of January with a 
high of 971 pounds on January 24.175 
Reduction of uranium tetrafluoride with magnesium became the choice 
of the project by March since by then this more complicated method had been 
successfully demonstrated. Magnesium was more attractive because it was 
readily available, purer than calcium, could be used in smaller quantities than 
calcium, and was much cheaper to obtain. It did present some more difficult 
problems than calcium reduction though, which is why it was not used in 
earlier production runs. Magnesium needed a booster to initiate the reaction 
with uranium tetrafluoride, unlike calcium which could fuse with uranium 
tetrafluoride without additional ingredients. Additional heat or preheating 
also had to be employed, which led to investigating new types of bomb liner 
materials. Casting presented problems, but most were solved by replacing the 
l^^Wayne Keller, "Production of Crude Uranium, Period Ending February 15,1943," the 
Ames Laboratory Papers, 12. 
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old drip casting method with a crucible and valve apparatus for pouring the 
metal.176 
By March 1943, the essential methods that industrial companies could 
use were in place in the new production facility at the Annex. The steps in the 
process were essentially the same as those earlier with a few modifications for 
the magnesium. The uranium tetrafluoride, also called green salt because of 
its color, came in barrels from either Mallinckrodt, DuPont, or Harshaw and 
needed to be ground into smaller pieces. A metals preparation crew which 
worked only in the daytime handled that job. They also took samples for 
analysis by scientists to make sure the quality was that required by project 
leaders. They also ground or chopped the magnesium metal as it arrived. The 
refractory or liner that was used to line the retort or bomb to prevent it from 
coming into contact with the steel vessel came from various sources. At first, a 
very hardened lime called "dead burnt" lime was used, but late in 1943 
Electromet produced an electrically-fused dolomitic oxide which became the 
standard refractory material. It was pre-ground and needed no further 
preparation. The reduction materials then moved to the reduction crew where 
l^^Fulmer, 10-11. Wilhelm, "A Histoiy of Uranium Metal Production in America," 43-
44. See also C F Gray, "Early Methods for Casting Uranium at Iowa State College," Report 
CT-2958, Ames Laboratory Papers for a discussion of casting methods. Also see "Report of W. 
H. Keller on Uranium Metal Production" in Report CC-298, Report of the Metallurgical Project 
for the Month Ending October 15, 1942, the Ames Laboratory Papers, 2-4 for some preliminary 
results with magnesium; "Experimental Production of Crude Metal," Report CT-393, Report of 
the Metallurgical Project for the Month Ending December 15, 1942, the Ames Laboratory 
Papers, 38-39. In Report CT-686, May 22, 1943, the magnesium method of metal production is 
described further (Information from "Abstracts of Reports from the Ames Project, April 1942 to 
November 1944," from the National Archives Great Lakes Regional Center Records on the 
Metallurgical Laboratory, Chicago, Illinois). 
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the apparatus for reduction was put together with the charge and refractory 
materials.177 
Reduction of uranium tetrafluoride required a steel pipe, usually 6 
inches by 36 inches long (sometimes the pipes could measure 10-inches by 3.5 
feet in order to produce a 125-pound ingot). Production workers then welded a 
bottom to this pipe to create a bomb or reduction retort. The refractory liner 
consisted of approximately one-half inches of lime or dolomitic oxide, which 
was a granulated substance placed between a form, or mandrel, that was one-
half inch smaller in diameter than the vessel. The vessel and mandrel were 
placed on a pneumatic table and jolted to join the refractory to the sides. After 
the jolting or shaking process, a worker removed the mandrel and carefully 
placed a measured charge of uranium tetrafluoride and magnesium in the 
bomb. He placed more refractory liner material on top of the charge, and closed 
the top of the container by bolting a flange on the outside. A hoist and transfer 
system raised the pipe bomb and placed it in a heat soaking pit for preheating 
to the point where ignition would take place. Later, a gas furnace replaced the 
^^^David Peterson, "Interview with the author," July 10, 1990, Transcript in the 
possession of the author, 4. Peterson was an assistant foreman at the Physical Chemistry 
Annex from late December 1942 till the end of the production part of the project. The author 
asked him to describe the entire process from beginning to end and so much of the above and 
following material is attributed to him. Several other sources give portions of the process 
including Wilhelm, "A History of Uranium Metal Production in America," Hewlett and 
Anderson, 293-294, and several of the interviews various people conducted with Frank H. 
Spedding. For a pictorial view of the Ames Process see the photographs in Appendix B. For 
more technical information on the process, see Warner, "Early Methods," 152-161; J. C. 
Warner, "Methods for Production of Uranium Metal," Chapter 7 in Uranium Technology: 
General Survey, by J. E. Verne and J. C. Warner, National Nuclear Energy Series, Division VII, 
vol. 2A (Washington, DC: Atomic Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, 
International, 1977, microfilm), 164-174; J. C. Warner, "Large-Scale Melting and Casting of 
Uranium Metal," Chapter 8 in Uranium Technology: General Survey, by J. E. Verne and J. C. 
Warner, National Nuclear Energy Series, Division VII, vol. 2A (Washington, DC: Atomic 
Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 175-186 as 
well as several research reports produced by the Ames Project principals. 
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heat soaking pit, and the charge and bomb heated at about 650°C for 40-60 
minutes. After a period of time, the reaction mixture inside spontaneously 
reacted and ignited. The internal temperature would reach 1,600°C to 2,000°C 
and since steel melted at 1,500°C, it was critical that the refractory liner did not 
allow the heated charge to come into contact with the metal. A rod that was 
placed in one of the holes of the flange with a microphone attached to a 
speaker system detected the actual firing or ignition. A rumbling noise 
resulted when the reaction ignited and alerted the furnace worker. As soon as 
it fired, he pulled out the vessel and placed it in a spray chamber to cool the 
retort or bomb. If a successful reaction occurred, the uranium tetrafluoride 
reduced to uranium metal and a slag of magnesium fluoride, splitting into two 
layers with the slag on top and the metal on the bottom. As the vessel cooled, 
both layers hardened. When completely cooled, a worker opened the bomb, 
turned it upside down, and hammered until the slag and metal separated. He 
placed the slag and used liner in drums for recovery and the 42-pound (a 
typical size) cleaned biscuit was stamped and sent to casting.^^s 
In the casting process, a vacuum induction furnace heated the biscuit to 
produce fuel elements. Casting produced a different shape from the biscuit and 
further removed impurities from the reduced uranium metal. A graphite 
crucible machined from an electrode held the metal. The crucible had a hole 
in it that could be closed with a stopper which held the metal until the liquid 
needed to be poured into a collector bowl. At the point that the stopper was 
17®Peterson, interview with the author, 1990, 4-5. Wilhelm, "A History of Uranium 
Metal Production in America," 44; W. H. Keller, "Production of Crude Uranium, Period Ending 
February 15,1943," Ames Laboratory Papers, 1-9. 
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dislodged by a short graphite rod, the molten metal poured into the graphite 
mold to harden, resulting most often in a 1.5 inch to 5-inch diameter rod, 20-30 
inches long. An egg or cropping was cut from one end of the rod for further 
analysis; the rod was stamped with a number; and it was placed in a small 
wooden box-^^Q 
These boxes, made of three-fourth-inch wood, with the ingot most often 
weighed 100 pounds or more depending on the size of the rod. The boxes were 
banded, nailed, and small cleats were placed beneath each box so a man's hands 
could slip under to pick them up. They were usually shipped to Chicago where 
they were transferred on to Hanford or other sites like Clinton.^80 
By July 1,1943, Iowa State College was producing 130,000 pounds of 
uranium per month, a peak in the program. When industrial plants began to 
take over the process in late summer, Ames gradually cut its output of virgin 
metal.^81 Electromet began its reduction and casting operations in July 1943, 
and Mallinckrodt followed suit only a few days later. DuPont was the third 
company to take over the commercial production of uranium. Westinghouse, 
which had been producing metal by its electrolytic process, also scaled down 
and closed its operations in the fall of 1943 when the three other companies 
took over the Ames Process.^82 
^79peterson, interview with author, 1990, 6.; Wilhelm, "A History of Uranium Metal 
Production in America," 44. Several reports for early 1943 also review the casting processes 
for working with metal production. See for example: C F Gray to F. H. Spedding, "Report on 
Casting Contributions from February 42 to December 1943," Ames Laboratory Papers. 
ISOpeterson, interview with author, 1990, 7. 
181 Wilhelm, "A History of Uranium Metal Production in America," 46; Fulmer, 11-12. 
182wiihelm, "A History of Uranium Metal Production in America," 46. 
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After the virgin metal program diminished in 1943, Ames started 
uranium recovery from scrap metal turnings from Ames and other places. 
Ames constructed a brick one-story building in 1944, called the Physical 
Chemistry Annex 2, for running this simple recovery process.^^s Turnings, 
first dumped into barrels, were pulled apart and examined by hand for 
uranium. Passing over a magnetic separator to remove iron and other 
metallic impurities, the turnings proceeded to a cutter where they were in turn 
cut, washed, rinsed, dried, sorted and passed again over a magnetic separator. 
They were pressed into briquettes about 1-inch by 4.25 inches in diameter and 
sent to the casting room to be melted into regular sized ingots. Ames 
recovered and shipped over 600,000 pounds of scrap uranium using this 
process. In December 1945, the method was taken over by Metal Hydrides in 
Massachusetts and by a recovery plant that had been recently constructed at the 
Hanford Reactor in Washington.^8^ 
Iowa State College discontinued most uranium operations on August 5, 
1945, coinciding with the end of the war. In the later phases of the war though, 
the Iowa State group was already more actively involved in metal recovery 
and research investigations with castings and rod development than with the 
actual production of virgin metal. Iowa State produced over one thousand 
^®^This building was constructed by contract from the federal government in 1943 and 
completed in 1944. It was a U-shaped building constructed near the power plant and generally 
referred to as Chemistry Annex #2. In 1953, the College purchased the building from the 
Atomic Energy Commission. It became known as the Plumbing Shop and housed Iowa State's 
Credit Union until that organization erected a new building. The Plumbing Shop was torn 
down in 1972. Day, 1980, 384; Minutes of the Board of Education, March 23, 1944, 298. 
^®^Fulmer, 13-14. For treatment of this topic in more detail, see Warner, "Large-Scale 
Casting," 183-186. 
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tons of uranium from 1942 to 1945, keeping the pilot plant in operation 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week during the peak months. The 
Electromet and DuPont metal production facilities were terminated at the end 
of the war also, leaving only Mallinckrodt producing virgin metal and Metal 
Hydrides overseeing the turnings recovery program. ^  85 
Thorium production 
The largest quantity of metal produced at Ames after uranium 
production declined was thorium. Thorium had been considered an alternate 
to plutonium in an earlier experiment in 1942, when Glenn Seaborg 
successfully bombarded its nucleus. Thorium decayed to V233, a highly 
fissionable isotope of uranium. But it was not pursued in earnest at that time 
because the scientists would have to modify the reactors at Hanford to handle 
the separation. By 1944 though, the Chicago people believed that starting a pile 
with uranium and adding only more thorium as a blanket would keep a chain 
reaction sustained. That made thorium a most important metal for the rest of 
the war years.^®^ 
Iowa State had started to work on thorium production as early as 1943, 
trying to reduce it using the uranium process. However, those early attempts 
at reduction were unsuccessful, primarily because of the high melting point of 
thorium.i®7 Finally in 1944, the scientists found that if they used zinc chloride 
185wilhelm, "A History of Uranium Metal Production in America," 48. 
ISôHewlett and Anderson, 296-287. 
187see, for example, the weekly reports of Norman Carlson for July 5-12, July 19, July 
24, July 31, August 7, and August 14 for results of his work on trying to produce pure thorium 
from thorium tetrafluoride and thorium oxide without much success. The high melting point 
created a problem with each of his experiments. See also Spedding, Wilhelm, Daane 
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as a booster they could get a zinc thorium alloy. When the alloy was heated, 
zinc was driven off and thorium remained. The success of this reduction 
process depended in part upon the vastly-improved high-vacuum process 
recently instituted by scientists on the project.^88 The metal was cast into up to 
150 pound ingots with beryllia crucibles. By December 1946, Ames had 
produced and shipped over 4,500 pounds of thorium metal to various sites. 
Before the war, the price had been about $3 per gram. By 1946, Ames had made 
a purer metal and reduced the cost to about 5tf a pound.^89 
interview, 1967, 22-23. Other reports explaining the extraction process include research 
reports by Ward Lyon (Report No. CT-891, Technological Research—Metallography Part II of 
Report For the Month Ending August 23, 1943) who worked with Carlson and a review of 
thorium successes and failures in "Thorium Studies," Report No. CT-1985, Technological 
Research—Metallography Report For the Period October 10-November 10, 1944, 3-15. 
ISSpulmer, 17; Svec, "Interview with the author," 7. Svec was hired and placed in 
the Physical Chemistry Annex because of his undergraduate experience with high vacuum and 
gas flow technologies. He improved the vacuum systems so that thorium could te produced 
more easily. For more technical studies on thorium reduction and production see H. A. 
Wilhelm, A. S. Newton, A. H. Daane, and C. Neher, "Thorium Metallurgy," Chapter 8 in 
Production and Separation of Survey, edited by Glen T. Seaborg and Leonard Katz, 
National Nuclear Energy Series, Division IV, vol. 17A (Washington, DC: Atomic Energy 
Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 186-218; F. H. 
Spedding, et al., "Production of Thorium Metal by Metallothermic Reduction of Thorium 
Fluoride," Paper 8.4 in Production and Separation of Collected Papers, edited by Glen T. 
Seaborg and Leonard Katz, Nuclear Energy Series, Division IV, vol. 17B (Washington, DC: 
Atomic Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 428-
445; W. H. Keller, Ward L. Lyon, Harry J. Svec, and Richard Thompson, "Casting of Thorium 
Metal and Some Properties of the Cast Metal," Paper 8.5 in Production and Separation of 1/^33; 
Collected Papers, edited by Glen T. Seaborg and Leonard Katz, Nuclear Energy Series, Division 
IV, vol. 17B (Washington, DC: Atomic Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, 
International, 1977, microfilm), 428-445; A. S. Newton et al., "A Pilot Plant for Purification of 
Thorium Nitrate by Countercurrent Extraction," Papers 8.6 in Production and Separation of 1/233; 
Collected Papers, edited by Glen T. Seaborg and Leonard Katz, Nuclear Energy Series, Division 
rv, vol. 17B (Washington, DC: Atomic Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, 
International, 1977, microfilm), 486-507. 
^®^Fulmer, 19. Several research reports were turned in to Chicago on thorium metal 
reduction and are today located in the Oak Ridge Laboratory under the Department of Energy, 
Oak Ridge, Termessee. For a listing of the complete list of reports on thorium, see Fulmer, 
Appendix I. One report is located in the Ames Laboratory Papers: A. Newton, et al., "The 
88 
Other materials supplied by the Ames Project 
The Ames scientists experimented with more than uranium, especially 
as the demand for its production began to wane in late 1943. In 1944, several 
sites working with plutonium, needed crucibles made from a cerous sulfide. 
Ames discovered a way to reduce anhydrous cerous chloride with calcium to 
get a ninety-nine per cent pure metal. After problems with the casting 
procedures were solved, the first pure metal was shipped from Ames in 
August 1944. Over 425 pounds of this product was produced at Ames until 
August 1945, at which time that operation was also discontinued.^^° 
Ames also received requests from several sites during the war to 
produce small quantities of pure rare earth metals discovered in the reduction 
processes. Ames started a small program during the war, continuing to 
produce pure quantities of these rare metals well after the war. In fact, this 
Preparation of Anhydrous Thorium Fluoride for Metal Production," Report CC-2713, Physical 
and Inorganic Section Report for April 25,1945. 
^^®Fulmer, 15-16. See also C. Banks, et al., "Notes on Miscellaneous Reactions and 
Properties of Cerium, Thorium, and Uranium Compounds," Report CC-2942, Analytical Section 
Report, July 15,1945. For more technical studies see W. H. Keller, Robert P. Ericson, and 
Clifford Hach, "The Production of Cerium in the Massive Metallic State," Paper 4 in The 
Chemistry and Metallurgy of Miscellaneous Materials: Papers, edited by Lawrence L. Quill, 
National Nuclear Energy Series, Division IV, vol. 19C, (Washington, DC: Atomic Energy 
Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 32-36; David 
Peterson, Ward Lyon, and W. H. Keller, "The Casting of Cerium and Some Properties of the 
Cast Metal," Paper 5 in The Chemistry and Metallurgy of Miscellaneous Materials: Papers, edited 
by Lawrence L. Quill, National Nuclear Energy Series, Division FV, vol. 19C, (Washington, 
DC: Atomic Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 
37-40; J. E. Powell, Clifford Hach, and R. W. Nottorf, "Recoveiy of Iodine from Cerium Slag," 
Paper 6 in The Chemistry and Metallurgy of Miscellaneous Materials: Papers, edited by Lawrence 
L. Quill, National Nuclear Energy Series, Division IV, vol. 19C, (Washington, DC: Atomic 
Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 41-42. 
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program, though small during the war, became the mainstay of the Ames 
Laboratory after the war.^^^ 
Chemical and Metallurgical Research at Ames Project 1943-45 
Chemical and metallurgical research, though completed in the 
Chemistry Building, was tied very directly to the production process in the 
Physical Chemistry Annexes 1 and 2. When discoveries were made in the 
laboratory, they were, in a sense, tested with the production line. 
Improvements that were made in production were based upon research 
accomplishments, and failures with runs, in turn, gave the research teams 
additional problems to study. As noted earlier, there were several research 
groups established in Ames to complement the research studies at the 
Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago. 
The Ames scientists examined hundreds of problems, adding 
significantly to the existing knowledge about the chemistry of materials used in 
the atomic bomb project. These scientists at Ames discovered new melting 
points of various compounds and rewrote the existing textbooks on other 
physical properties like viscosities, reduction characteristics, and isotope 
separation techniques. Diffusion studies of fission products became a new field 
of science during the war, and studies undertaken at Ames greatly added to the 
knowledge of what happened when uranium split into its various forms. The 
^^^Fulmer, 16-17. For the beginnings of rare earth chemistry using the adsorption 
column, see Spedding et ai., "Preliminary Report on a Rapid Method for Separating Rare 
Earths," Report CC-2720, May 9, 1945. For a later more comprehensive report see Spedding, et 
al., "Progress Report on the Adsorption Process for Separating the Rare Earths," Report CC-
3248, February 26, 1946. 
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basic studies of uranium included in depth studies of its hydrides, chlorides 
and other salts. Plutonium chemistry, a small research effort at Ames, became 
an important part of the project when research on the element as well as the 
personnel involved were removed to Los Alamos. Elements like thorium, 
cerium, and beryllium were examined as their reduction methods were 
worked out at Ames. Rare earth chemistry was studied in great detail, and the 
beginnings of the separation of very pure materials began during the war.^^^ 
Summary 
The development of the atomic bomb depended upon the kind of 
research and development work at the Ames Project. Even though production 
became an important activity, the Ames Project functioned primarily as a 
research and scientific laboratory. Spedding created the organization as a 
supplement to the Chicago research efforts with teams of scientists working on 
and solving problems related to the chemical and metallurgical aspects of 
producing an atomic weapon. 
192see the various chemical and metallographical reports produced from the Ames 
Project 1942-1945. Some of them have already been discussed in a previous footnote. See also, 
"Review of Metallography of Uranium and Some of its Binary Alloys," Report CT-1062, 
November 15, 1943 for a review of uranium, including its melting point, other physical 
properties, and alloy systems with magnesium, aluminum, copper, etc. See also, for example, 
Wayne Keller, "Research Studies on Uranium-Magnesium," CT-609, Technological Research-
Metallurgy, Part II of Report for the Month Ending April 24, 1943, 15-22 for research studies 
on conditions affecting the union of the two elements, such as liner materials, the effects of 
temperature, and purity of materials. For the entire list of research-related reports, see 
Fulmer, Appendix I. Also see F. H. Spedding et al., "The Production of Beryllium by the 
Metallothermic Reduction of Beryllium Fluoride," Paper 7 in The Chemistry and Metallurgy of 
Miscellaneous Materials: Papers, edited by Lawrence L. Quill, National Nuclear Energy Series, 
Division IV, vol. 19C, (Washington, DC: Atomic Energy Commission; Elmsford, NY: 
Microforms, International, 1977, microfilm), 43-48. 
91 
The Ames Project was additionally a pilot plant, developing the bench 
work on the assembly line. Though there were some factory and clerical 
workers with non-scientific backgrounds, the vast majority of those involved 
at Ames were academics—professors, graduate students in chemistry, and 
undergraduate students with backgrounds in the sciences. The assembly line 
activity was a complement to the research just as the research problems often 
occurred because of failures in the assembly line. 
92 
PART 2. ISSUES OF ADMINISTRATION 
93 
INTRODUCTION: THE ACADEMIC VS. THE MILITARY STYLE OF 
MANAGING RESEARCH 
Background 
Since scientific research and development were major parts of the 
laboratory at Ames, the administration reflected that of a typical university 
research laboratory in most respects, However, there were some new issues of 
administration that greatly affected this essentially academic laboratory, and in 
subtle ways changed it from a typical research laboratory located on a college 
campus. This war introduced the scientist to the military and other 
government agencies. In turn, the government, and, particularly the military, 
found it necessary to deal with the academic scientist in order for the atomic 
bomb to be built. 
The Academic Management Style 
The Ames Project was first and foremost an academic laboratory, 
developed partly out of the experiences and expertise of its founder and 
director Frank H. Spedding. Spedding studied at Berkeley in the late 1920s 
where many of the ideas about organizational structures that were eventually 
incorporated into the Manhattan Project already existed. A typical graduate 
student at Berkeley worked with a research director and a group of students 
examining critical chemical problems as determined by that group leader. 
Spedding's experience with the particular type of academic activity at 
Berkeley—seminars, group meetings and work with sophisticated 
equipment—probably inspired him to institute that mode in his Ames 
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laboratory. Daniel J. Kevles, in his study of physicists, labeled the Berkeley style 
of academic management group research. Developed in part because of the ratio 
of students and faculty, and, in part, because of the sophisticated nature of 
scientific apparatus like the cyclotron at Berkeley, physics, and to a great extent 
some fields of chemistry, gradually grew into big project disciplines with a 
complicated array of technicians, students, theorists, and experimentalists.^^^ 
By the time of the Manhattan Project, run scientifically in most part by the 
physicists, group research was a well-established part of the academic research 
structure at most larger institutions. 
While it is true that Iowa State before World War n had no sophisticated 
equipment, and though Spedding and his small group of graduate students 
could hardly be characterized as group research in the Berkeley tradition, he, 
nevertheless, was familiar with the concepts of large academic research and 
adopted that model for his laboratory, following closely the one already in 
existence at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago. 
Spedding stated in 1943 that he organized his group at Ames with this team 
approach because of the youth of his scientists, but it is just as likely that he saw 
an opportunity to establish a research structure with which he had become 
familiar at Berkeley. 
In fact, the structural organization of the atomic bomb project from top 
to bottom included the management apparatus of a typical large academic 
organization, complete with committee meetings, ad-hoc review studies, and 
countless group leaders who had wide latitude in choosing research problems 
ï93Kevles, 283-284. 
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to study. Vannevar Bush, who created the National Defense Research 
Committee (NDRC), which was discussed in a previous chapter, used these 
tools to set up the governmental unit that originally oversaw atomic research. 
He chose good research directors and allowed them the flexibility to develop 
their own laboratories with little interference from his office. He also used the 
review committee approach to continually study the progress of research on 
the atomic bomb.^^4 
NDRC, as an organization, oversaw weapons research that eventually 
could be turned over to the military to develop into war devices. NDRC took 
as its organizational model the Council of National Defense, a World War I 
advisory unit under the Executive Branch that was constituted from the 
cabinet members of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. 
The Council of National Defense coordinated industries and other resources 
for national security.^®® Since the law constituting that body had never been 
repealed. Bush hoped that his new agency could work directly under the 
Executive Branch receiveing its funds. Roosevelt indeed approved that plan. 
NDRC, a loosely-based 10-person committee outside the normal channels of 
government, included only four predetermined members (the President of the 
National Academy of Sciences, the Commissioner of Patents, a representative 
of the Navy, and an officer from the Army).^^^ 
a more complete discussion of the academic styles of Bush and Conant who ran 
the project at the national level, see Montgomery Cunningham Meigs, "Managing Uncertainty: 
Vannevar, James B. Conant and the Development of the Atomic Bomb: 1940-1945" (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Wisconsin, 1982). 
^^^Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York: William Morrow, 1970), 36; 
Dupree, 305. 
^^^Bush, Pieces of the Action, 36-37; Dupree, 370 
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Even though Bush later called this organization pyramidal (a military-
type according to his own definition of organizations),^®'' he certainly described 
a characteristically academic management style: 
[an] organization, with broad delegation downward, and full 
facility for programs to move up. Each [member] then built under 
him a system of sections to deal with explicit problems, and each 
recruited his personnel for the purpose.*^® 
The NDRC had not been as broad-based in its coverage as Bush wanted, 
so the Office of Scientific Research and Development took its place in 1941. 
The NDRC became one of its branches as did the uranium committee. 
Abandoning the committee management structure at the top, OSRD placed 
Bush directly responsible to the President, but sub-committees and research 
directors still held independent control over their own laboratories. 
The Establishment of the Manhattan Engineer District 
In early 1942 under OSRD, the scientific program proceeded sporadically. 
By summer, many of the problems in procuring raw materials were solved, but 
no single uranium separation process seemed to be the winner in what became 
known as the four-horse atomic bomb race.^^® The Top Policy Group, which 
consisted of Vice President Wallace, Secretary of War Stimson, Army Chief of 
Staff George C. Marshall, James Conant, and Vannevar Bush, began to consider 
Pieces of the Action (27-31), Bush discusses the traits of a military style and one of 
them is pyramidal or hierarchical control. 
^®®Bush, Pieces of the Action, 37. 
l^^For a complete description of the four separation processes (the gaseous diffusion, 
electromagnetic, and centrifuge methods for uranium and the plutonium separation from 
irradiated uranium method), see Smyth, 154-205. 
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when to bring in the Army to build the full-scale construction plants, and by 
June 13, 1942, Bush and Conant recommended that the separation and power 
plant construction be turned over to the Army, specifically to an officer 
designated by the Army Chief of Engineers, by the end of the summer of 
1942.200 The Top Policy Group sent the recommendation to the President who 
signed it on June 17,1942. On June 18,1942, the Army chose Colonel James C. 
Marshall to organize a new district within the Corps of Engineers to oversee 
construction of the atomic bomb's full-scale separation and power plants. That 
district, called the Manhattan District, because of its headquarters in New York 
came into existence on August 13,1942. Though it was officially designated the 
DSM Project (Development of Substitute Materials), the Manhattan Project 
became its popularly known name.201 
Marshall, as the new district engineer, began to form his staff and open 
his offices. His organization was by and large pyramidal, more rigid than the 
OSRD structure, and certainly by Bush's definition a militari/ organization.202 
Most district engineers were responsible to a geographically-placed division 
engineer, but because of the special nature of the atomic bomb district, 
Marshall was directly responsible to the Chief of Engineers, Major General 
Eugene Reybold. More often though, Marshall's contacts were with Brigadier 
General Thomas M. Robins, who was in charge of construction, and his 
^OOjones 38-39; Smyth, 82. 
^Oljones 43-44; Smyth, 83. 
202Bush, Pieces of the Action, 27. Bush defined a military organization as "pyramidal, 
with lines of authority explicitly clear and positively enforced. The object is to ensure that 
every need for a decision promptly finds an individual who can and must decide, but no 
commander shall thus become burdened with more than he can handle." 
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assistant. Colonel Leslie R. Groves. Marshall opened a liaison office in 
Washington, D.C., depending there on Colonel Kenneth Nichols, an officer 
who had previously served under him. At the headquarters in New York, he 
received assistance from the North Atlantic Division and also the New York 
office of Stone and Webster, a large engineering firm that Marshall designated 
as the main contractor for the new district.^o^ 
In the late summer of 1942, this split administration of the atomic 
energy program caused a great deal of confusion. The Army men, for example, 
had little experience with atomic energy; they had few good personnel since 
most military personnel were in demand for more critical assignments; and 
the new organization had little respect or power within the Army, despite the 
promises of support from the War Department. Additionally, Marshall was 
ineffective as a leader, displaying his lack of leadership in two areas that caused 
particular concern—the selection of the site for a production plant in 
Tennessee and the problem of obtaining a high priority for the raw materials 
needed for the atomic bomb project.204 
The selection of the Tennessee site dragged throughout the summer, 
and in August, Marshall finally delayed the selection of a site altogether. The 
OSRD and the Army came to a standstill with no organization to coordinate 
the two groups or solve the site problems. Obtaining priority ratings also 
affected the relationships between OSRD and Army negatively. It became an 
impossible situation when both the OSRD and the Army fought for high 
203Hewlett and Anderson, 74-76. 
^^^Hewlett and Anderson, 75-76. 
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priority ratings. The rating system covered AA-1 to AA-4 in descending order 
for major programs with a special emergency priority rating of AAA assigned 
to projects that had short-term delivery demands in critical situations. 
Unfortunately, Roosevelt had not been specific in determining what priority 
levels he wanted for the new program; he implied it should be given a 
relatively high rating, though balancing its needs against other projects.205 In 
July, the atomic research project received a AA-3 rating from the Army and 
Navy Munitions Board, the governing agencies. The rating came as a great 
disappointment to OSRD and the Army, but the AA-1 and AA-2 ratings were 
reserved for very critical projects that needed materials, those like weapons, 
airplanes, and tanks. This unproved project with its estimate of producing a 
weapon as late as 1945 probably fared much better than could be expected.206 
By the end of August, Bush realized he needed to rethink his June 
reorganization scheme; he began to doubt that the project could become a 
reality under the present circumstances. The Army was also aware of the 
ineffectiveness of the new organization and in September, Lieutenant General 
Brehon Sumervell, the chief of the Services of Supply (the construction wing 
of the Army Corps), decided to meet with Colonel Leslie Groves and offer him 
command of the entire atomic bomb operation, though evidently without 
Bush's knowledge. Bush and Sumervell had discussed the idea of a Military 
Policy Committee to put some clear-cut authority into the Army's part of the 
2^®Jones, 57. 
2°^Jones, 58; Hewlett and Anderson, 79; K. D. Nichols, "Memo on Preference Rating for 
D.S.M. Project in MED History Book I, Vol. 9, A-3. 
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project, but Bush had assumed that this committee would select the person to 
be in charge only after it had been organized.207 
On September 17,1942, Colonel Leslie Groves thought he was going 
overseas to direct a wartime unit, but his supervisor, Sumervell, told him that 
he had been assigned to a new position, one that might, in fact, win the war. 
Since he had been involved in the early organization with Marshall, Groves 
knew a bit about the work. He accepted the new post and even received a new 
commission of Brigadier General just before the official announcement was 
made. 208 
Groves met with Bush, and even though an initial first meeting did not 
go well at all. Groves was later given the blessing of the OSRD head. Groves 
proved to be a man of immediate action. On September 19, he called upon 
Donald Nelson, head of the War Production Board, about the priority rating 
situation. At first Nelson told him he would not raise the rating, but after 
Groves threatened to go to the President and abandon the entire project 
because the War Production Board would not cooperate, he quickly reversed 
himself. Groves left with the following letter in his pocket: 
I am in full accord with the prompt delegation of power by the 
Army and Navy Munitions Board, through you, to the District 
Engineer, Manhattan District, to assign an AAA rating, or 
whatever lesser rating will be sufficient. . .20* 
207Hewlett and Anderson, 81. 
208Groves, 3-5; Smyth, 83. 
209Qyoted in Groves, 22. The letter was also quoted in a September 26, 1942 memo 
from Theron D. Weaver to Groves located in the MED History, Book I General, Volume 9 
Priorities Program, Appendix A-6. 
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Groves also contacted Nichols on September 17, and commanded him to 
procure the supply of uranium ore so desperately needed by the scientists. 
Nichols luckily found a Belgian company ready to sell some 1,250 tons of the 
ore valued at more than $2 million stored in a Staten Island warehouse. The 
fast-acting General had won another victory.210 
The governing group, the Top Military Policy Committee, finalized on 
September 23, 1942, consisted of Vannevar Bush as Chairman, James Conant as 
an alternate chair, Lt. Gen. William D. Styer from the Army, and Rear Admiral 
William R. Purnell of the Navy. Another example of the academic controlling 
management style, the committee served as a governing board of directors for 
Groves. It met frequently, but had no staff or support personnel; it kept no 
formal records, but followed and discussed every important event in the 
atomic bomb development.211 
On September 23, after hurriedly leaving that initial meeting of the 
Military Policy Committee, Groves caught a train to Knoxville, Tennessee, 
hoping to procure land for the Tennessee site. The next morning after an 
inspection of the site, he telephoned the Corps of Engineer's real estate branch 
requesting them to start the land acquisition. It was an auspicious beginning 
for the new commander, who had been in charge for only seven days.212 
However, Groves met his first real bottleneck when he left Washington, 
his personal choice of headquarters, for a tour of the research facilities in 
210wyden, 57-58. 
211 Bush, Pieces of the Action, 61-62, 
212jones, 78. 
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Chicago and California on October 5. At the Metallurgical Laboratory, he had 
the first look at the insurmountable task before him when he, in engineering 
fashion, asked the physicists for an estimate on the amount of material needed 
for a bomb. The scientists replied that their estimates were accurate to at least a 
factor of ten. Later, Groves recalled his reaction: 
While I had known that we were proceeding in the dark, this 
conversation brought it home to me with the impact of a pile 
driver. There was simply no ready solution to the problem that 
we faced, except to hope that the factor of error would prove to be 
not quite so fantastic.2i3 
Iowa State College and the Manhattan District 
Although the Manhattan Engineer District was originally formed to 
oversee engineering plant construction, by August 1943, the entire project fell 
under Groves' jurisdiction. Iowa State's production unit had initially come 
under District control in late 1942, but by July 1943, its research contract was 
under District control also. Iowa State was a part of the Madison Square 
District (see two organization charts in Appendix C) under the Feed Materials 
Program.214 Essentially, the program was divided into seven areas as seen in 
the chart to supply critical materials like uranium, uranium oxide, uranium 
tetrafluoride, and thorium products to the rest of the atomic bomb project, all 
under the direction of Captain John R. Ruhoff, the chemical engineer who had 
earlier helped work out the ether separation of uranium at Mallinckrodt 
^l^Groves, 40. 
214xhe entire organization is described in MED History, Book 7, Vol. 1 Feed Materials 
and Special Procurement. I have used Jones' summary (307-318) because that portion of the 
MED History in the microfilm edition was still classified when the microfilm was released. 
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(visited by Compton and Spedding in early 1942). Two of the areas, Murray 
Hill and Colorado, controlled the procurement of materials while the other 
five, including Iowa State, processed the ores into fuel elements. Three steps 
in the processing stage included the conversion of black oxides into brown or 
orange oxides, the conversion of brown or orange oxides into green salts, and 
the conversion of green salts into uranium compounds or metallic uranium. 
Mallinckrodt, DuPont, and Linde composed the brown and orange oxide parts 
of the network while four chemical firms, Harshaw, Mallinckrodt, Linde, and 
DuPont formed the green salt link. Four commercial firms, Mallinckrodt, 
DuPont, Electro Metallurgical, Metal Hydrides, and Iowa State College 
constituted the uranium metal portion of the network. By late 1943, the 
delivery of nearly 3,500 tons of metal had come from the contractors, 900 tons 
from Iowa State alone, second to the 1,000 tons from Electro Metallurgical.2i5 
Organizationally, the Iowa Area controlled the Manhattan District side 
of the Ames Project. Though little contact existed between the Ames scientists 
and the District employees, there was a group of men and women stationed at 
Iowa State College to oversee security, financial concerns, and shipments of 
uranium in and out of the College. These Manhattan District personnel were 
housed in the Collegiate Press Building across the street from the Physical 
Chemistry Annex I. Most of the personnel were lawyers, business persons, and 
other non-scientists with little experience in academic management.2i6 
^^Sjones, 309-316. 
^l^There is little direct documentation on what this organization actually 
accomplished at Iowa State College. Most of the scientists interviewed remembered that 
these people were on campus, but they thought they were responsible for activities like 
obtaining hard-to-acquire equipment, controlling the train movement in and out of campus, and 
conducting periodic security inspections. (Carlson, interview with author, 1990; Peterson 
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At Iowa State, as at other installations, the Manhattan District set in 
place a parallel military structure. The scientists still ran the site's scientific 
research for the atomic bomb, but the Manhattan District added staff in the 
three areas it considered under military control—security, finances, and worker 
health and safety. Although the laboratory remained an academic laboratory 
by and large, basic differences in the administration of the atomic bomb project 
and the administration of a typical academic research project did arise. Those 
differences are detailed in the next sections of the dissertation, including the 
effect of compartmentalization on academic research, how contracting changed 
the financial management of research, and, finally, how the attitude toward 
the special hazard, radiation, contributed to the standardization of health and 
safety regulations. 
interview with author, 1990; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990; Frank Spedding, "Safety 
Inspections," Spedding Manuscript, 102; Frank Spedding, "My Personal Contacts with General 
Groves," Spedding Manuscript, 1-2.) Evidently, the Iowa Area at one time encompassed St. 
Louis as well as Iowa and even some of the Manhattan District personnel themselves were not 
so sure of its status. Frank Huke, one of the earliest of the Manhattan District employees 
located at Iowa State wrote in 1943, "I would like a little clarification of the set up out here. 
We hear variously that Ames is an Area, is not an Area; I'm being transferred to St. Louis and 
then I'm not, etc." (Frank Huke, "Memo to Major G. W. Russell at Madison Square Area," 
September 15, 1943, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Oak Ridge, TN, 
Miscellaneous Papers on Iowa State College, hereafter known as the Oak Ridge Papers.) The 
District Office assured him, "Although formal notification to the effect that Iowa has been 
designated as a an area has not yet been received from the District Office, for all intents and 
purposes Iowa is considered by this office to be an Area. You are accordingly considered 
assigned to the Iowa Area." G. W. Russell, "Letter to Frank Huke from the Madison Square 
Office," September 22, 1943, in the Oak Ridge Papers. Some of the financial duties, at least, 
were detailed in J. King, "Letter to Frank Huke from Madison Square Area on Purchase Orders 
and Vouchers," February 29, 1944, in the Oak Ridge Papers. 
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SECURITY REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Introduction 
Security measures among scientists developed before either Vannevar 
Bush's OSRD or the Manhattan Engineer District, even though these agencies 
contributed important security regulations that helped solidify governmental 
control of research during the war. As early as 1939, Leo Szilard, Enrico Fermi, 
and several other émigré scientists debated publishing the results of their 
atomic research, Szilard, the most vociferous of the group, urged his fellow 
scientists to withhold publication of any mention of a chain reaction or the 
development of atomic weapons. He was particularly upset that Henri Joilet in 
France, who was working with radioactive fissionable elements, periodically 
published his research findings. Spurred by his fear of a world war that might 
conclude with domination by the Nazi regime, Szilard had been a proponent 
of restrictions on publication since he assigned his own chain reaction patent 
to a secret British governmental agency in the early 1930s. Szilard also 
admitted to influence from authors like H. G. Wells, a popular science fiction 
writer, who had predicted destruction of the world by atomic bomb as early as 
1913.217 By 1939, Szilard was a vocal proponent for security and non-disclosure 
of atomic research results. 
217The book was H. G. Wells, The World Set Free (New York: Dutton, 1913), 40-149. 
Szilard supposedly read the book in 1932, before he was involved in nuclear physics. He 
claims it was one of the things that influenced his beliefs about security of this type for 
atomic energy. Wells tells the tale, according to Szilard, that the war was fought by an 
106 
Szilard's initial efforts brought him no success, but at a meeting of the 
National Research Council in 1940, Gregory Breit proposed controls on the 
publication of articles on atomic energy in American scientific journals 
through a censorship committee. The Reference Committee, established later 
that year, controlled publications in all fields of military interest. Gregory Breit 
chaired a subcommittee on uranium fission publications, which reviewed 
journal articles submitted to it from editors of scientific journals. This 
censorship process was voluntary and completely in control of the scientists 
and journal editors. However, by the time the war was well underway, 
virtually no articles received review, since the Manhattan Project oversaw all 
uranium work and security rules permitted no publications of any kind in 
commercial journals.2i8 
The OSRD and NDRC Security Policies: A Summary 
It was Vannevar Bush, however, who had more influence on the 
policies of security for atomic research than Szilard or the Reference 
Committee. Vannevar Bush, in setting up the NDRC and OSRD, added 
security and the concept of compartmentalization to the agency, a policy that 
even Szilard later argued against. 
alliance of England, France, and America against Germany and Austria. In this war set in 
1956 the major cities of the world are destroyed by atomic bombs. (Paraphrase by Szilard in 
Weart and Szilard, 16.) 
^^%myth, 45-46; Spencer R. Weart, "Scientists with a Secret," Physics Today 
(February 1976): 30. 
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In June 1940, when Bush established the National Defense Research 
Committee, he placed the Committee on Uranium as one of its 
subcommittees. By becoming a part of that federal agency, NDRC became 
subject to federal security regulations. The Committee, knowing that its 
projects would be involved in areas of interest to the Navy and Army, adopted 
regulations that conformed with military ideas about security.2i9 
After Bush began to reorganize research on the atomic bomb under the 
aegis of his new agency, the OSRD, secrecy became one of the chief tenants of 
management policy. In October 1941, the meeting at which Bush briefed the 
President and the Vice President on the developments of atomic research. 
Bush had asked for reorganization; the President, in turn, insisted upon the 
utmost secrecy for continuation of the project. Roosevelt and Bush established 
a Top Policy Group headed by Vice President Henry A. Wallace, with Secretary 
of War Henry L. Stimson, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, James 
Conant and Vannevar Bush who would develop policies for the reorganized 
research efforts in secret.220 That meeting actually secured the atomic bomb 
project as a practical reality and officially brought the Army into the project. 
The policy group also incorporated Bush's ideas for secrecy and 
compartmentalization. Since OSRD left so much of the security arrangements 
to the individual sites, it actually instituted a modest security system that 
219jones, 254; Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative 
History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Boston; Little, Brown, 1948): 27-31; 
James Conant, My Several Lives (New York: Harper and Row, 1970): 245. 
220Meigs, 41; Jones, 31. 
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worked well enough until the expansion of the uranium production program 
began to tax OSRD's very existence as a secret organization. 
The Manhattan Engineer District immediately remedied the somewhat 
complacent attitude towards security under OSRD. Colonel James Marshall in 
June 1942, installed the Protective Security Section for a personnel security 
program, a plant security system, and a program for protecting information of 
military importance.221 When the District headquarters moved from New 
York to the Clinton Engineer Works in August 1943, the Protective Security 
Section combined with the Intelligence Section, and security became 
centralized into one unit called the Intelligence and Security Division. At that 
point, many of the security measures once administered by laboratories and 
companies were standardized, and the Manhattan District eventually assigned 
security officers to every installation.222 
Specific Security Procedures: An Overview 
The Ames Project came into existence in February 1942, so OSRD 
originally directed its security. With the establishment of its production plant 
though, that unit received a contract directly from the Manhattan Engineer 
District while scientific research continued under OSRD until mid-1943, when 
those contracts as well were transferred to Groves' operation. Under the 
Manhattan District, Iowa State's security was the responsibility of the Chicago 
Branch Office of the Intelligence and Security Division with Captain J. Murray 
History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 7-1. 
222jones, 256-259. 
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in charge.223 The Manhattan Engineer District did not dismantle the OSRD 
scientific organization, although an extra layer of administration paralleled the 
scientific structure. Security regulations covered personnel clearance, 
document protection, materials shipping security, plant security, and 
compartmentalization of information. Although scientific research reporting 
remained under the command of the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, these 
security procedures changed the nature of the academic administration, if not 
the research itself. 
Personnel and Security Clearances 
Procedures at the federal level 
Under the NDRC rules, each member of the Committee as well as any 
division or section worker, including clerical staff appointed to work for the 
committee, was required to take an oath of allegiance and secrecy not to release 
any information about the special work undertaken. To impress upon 
academic laboratories the importance of secrecy, official investigators in charge 
of projects with contracts from the committee were sworn to secrecy, never to 
discuss the results of research with any persons but those in the contracting 
research groups or with the NDRC Committee.224 
Personnel clearance background checks of official investigators began to 
present the Committee with problems almost immediately, since there was no 
internal NDRC staff to conduct the background checks. Originally, a 
223MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, Appendix A-7 
Organization Chart, Intelligence and Security Division. 
224stewart, 27-28. 
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biographical sketch of an individual seeking clearance had to be sent to the 
Army or Navy. The receiving agency sent back a clearance report, but as more 
and more people were added to the project, the branches of the services became 
overloaded. By late 1940, there were calls for special investigators to be 
assigned to the work, and in early 1941, the Secret Service and some other 
agencies were beginning to be brought into the security clearance process. 
Delays in the process sometimes kept people from attending important 
meetings or conducting research for several months.225 
Under OSRD, the above rules and regulation continued. Each 
contracting unit signed a standard contract which set forward the exact 
personnel security provisions: no disclosure of information obtained as a 
result of a contract with OSRD unless prior approval given; reporting to OSRD 
any acts of espionage; prior permission from OSRD for hiring aliens; reporting 
citizenship of all employees on contract to OSRD; and hiring no one on the list 
of undesirables retained by the agency.226 
OSRD investigated the lead researcher but left the clearance of other 
employees up to the individual contractor. OSRD did admit that all classified 
workers should be checked, but since it never developed consistent procedures 
for implementation, clearance procedures varied widely from contractor to 
contractor. Originally, OSRD used both the Army and Navy for its 
investigations, but after June 1942, when the Army came into the project, they 
alone were in charge. By the next year, OSRD turned all atomic research 
225stewart 30-31. 
226stewart, 247. 
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contracts, including security regulations, over to the Army's Manhattan 
Engineer District.227 
The Manhattan Project security system for personnel differed in several 
respects from the old OSRD system. Under OSRD there were no agencies 
outside the military involved in the clearance of personnel. Groves instituted 
a program of clearance for all personnel, with the FBI and Office of Naval 
Intelligence assisting in personnel backgrounds clearances.228 Starting in the 
fall of 1942, all personnel were either classified or unclassified workers. The 
classified employee, underwent different procedures according to 
modifications over time, but all had to undergo an identification process by 
filling out a personnel security questionnaire or personal history statement; 
each person was finger printed and had to provide proof of citizenship; each 
employee had to read and sign a copy of the Espionage Act or a secret 
agreement oath; and no one had access to any information until clearance was 
received. Over 400,000 employees participated in this process from July 1942 
until August 1945.229 
Personnel clearance at Iowa State College 
Iowa State College followed these same procedures in the clearance of its 
personnel. Workers on the project remember clearly that they signed oaths of 
allegiance and later filled out personnel questionnaires. No man or woman 
was allowed to work on the actual project until clearance was received, 
227stewart, 248-249. 
228^ED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, S2. 
229mED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, S3-S4. 
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sometimes taking as long as three to six months. In this limbo position, an 
uncleared employee typically sat in the library reading literature on the 
chemistry of certain alloys or elements that might become useful later; or, 
sometimes he or she conducted simple measurements, cleaned apparatus, or 
ran miscellaneous errands. When clearance was received, the scientist was 
brought before Spedding and told about the secret war-related project. It did 
not take much knowledge of chemistry, according to some of the young 
scientists, to understand very early on that uranium was being worked with. 
Each man or woman was told as much as needed to conduct experiments or 
work on the production line. Though there was not much interaction between 
the production plant and the chemistry research areas, personnel had some 
knowledge of each installation.230 
There were only a few instances in the written documentation when 
potential employees for the Ames Project were rejected based on the clearance 
procedures. Early in the project, the most notable example was Kasmir Fajans 
from the University of Michigan, who was supposed to come to either Chicago 
or Ames and head a research group along with three of his former graduate 
students—Amos Newton, Adolf Voigt, and William Sullivan. Unfortunately, 
because he had relatives in Poland under Nazi domination, he was never 
cleared to become a part of the project.23^ His former graduate students did 
230peterson, interview with author, 1990, 1-2; Frank H. Spedding, "Security," 
Spedding Manuscript, 1-2; Frank H. Spedding, "Problems Encountered with Setting and 
Maintaining a Security System," Spedding Manuscript, 1-2. 
231 Correspondence between Kasmir Fajans and Frank Spedding, May 11, 1942, May 12, 
1942, May 14, 1942, May 23,1942, May 29,1942, June 24,1942, and August 10,1942, Spedding 
Papers. 
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corne to Ames and each headed a scientific research group. Although the 
investigators asked questions about any liberal leanings or Russian 
connections of the individuals to be hired on projects, they were most 
concerned with those who had German connections. Occasionally, Spedding 
had to go to bat for one or more of the people he wanted to hire, but generally 
they were cleared with few complications.232 
Few security breaches occurred in the personnel area, but one incident 
certainly proved embarrassing to the Army. Since chemists were desperately 
needed on the Ames Project, it was sometimes faster to obtain military men 
who had already received clearances and have them transferred to work on the 
project, but in civilian clothes. In 1943, Spedding traveled to Washington to 
select twenty scientists from the Army pool, who were also military men, to 
transfer to the Ames Project. The Army told the men to report to a Chicago 
hotel where they would receive their civilian clothes before secretly coming to 
Ames to work on a classified, sensitive project. 
Unfortunately, the Army personnel in Chicago forgot to purchase 
suitcases for the men, so the military men showed up in Ames in civilian 
clothes, but carrying large blue bags with U. S. ARMY in 4-inch white letters 
^^^Spedding tells the story in his manuscript history about one young man, who while 
intelligent and very necessary to the Project, was almost kicked off the project because of his 
considered liberal leanings. He and his wife, for example, had belonged to several left-
winged organizations, and he had written letters to newspaper editors about his own political 
opinions that were someone left of center. He had never professed that he was a communist, 
but he often made light of the serious questions of his investigators and tended to take the 
process of clearance lightly. He also got into trouble when he purposely evaded the FBI on a 
visit to a Chicago meeting before he was completely cleared. The FBI did not look with 
kindness at the fact that they spent an entire afternoon trying to find him and later found out 
he had been at a classified meeting. Spedding did get to keep the scientist, but warned him 
at the end of the war not to get into work that might require FBI clearance. (Frank H. 
Spedding, "Example of Wrong Way to Get Clearance: 1943," Spedding Manuscript, 1-2). 
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stamped on the side. Several Ames residents saw them and within two hours 
of their arrival, a general in charge of soldiers in Iowa was on the phone with 
Spedding wanting to know why he had not been informed of soldiers in Ames. 
Because Spedding had been instructed by Groves not to even admit there was a 
Manhattan District project in Ames, he had to tell the general that he knew 
nothing about soldiers; furthermore, the general could call Washington if he 
really wanted to know why they were in Ames.233 Evidently, the general never 
followed through. 
Document Protection Regulations 
Federal regulations for document protection 
Classification of documents within NDRC followed the standard 
military classification scheme: secret, confidential, and restricted. Secret 
documents were those where disclosure would endanger national security; 
confidential documents contained no information that would damage 
national security but could cause embarrassment or be prejudicial to the 
interests or prestige of the government if released; restricted documents had no 
secrets but were not for the general public to read.234 The resolution containing 
these classifications went into effect on August 29, 1940.235 
Marking and distributing these documents also demanded strict 
regulation. Restricted was clearly marked on documents, and these had to be 
233Frank H. Spedding, "Security Foul Up," Spedding Manuscript, 1-2. 
234stewart 29, 250-251. The War Department issued several regulations under No. 380-
5 with the latest issued March 15,1944. That document was included in MED History, Book I 
General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, Appendix C-8. 
235stewart, 29. 
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kept under lock and key at night. Confidential and secret documents were 
more protected and could only be transmitted to other destinations by courier 
or registered mail, two processes that actually created delays in getting the 
critical information in areas that had no courier service. 
Under OSRD, the above principles continued, and in 1944, the War 
Department added Top Secret and Secret Security to the document classification 
scheme in order to protect those secrets of the most profound nature as 
America geared up its war machine. These documents could be transmitted 
only by officer courier.236 
The Manhattan District continued the same scheme of document 
classification, and in 1943, in an Intelligence Bulletin, the District published 
just what constituted each classification. For example, materials and 
documents that related to technical designs; letters and other material that 
contained names, formulae, and technical data; documents relating to 
personnel and organizational matters of concern to the Manhattan District; 
maps, photographs displaying features of the Project; material and supplies 
distinctly related to the project; and documents showing meanings of codes all 
deserved a Secret rating. Confidential matter included documents relating to 
design where only code names were used; documents of a financial nature that 
did not divulge secrets; drawings, and photographs that showed parts of the 
project; material less critical than those under the secret category; and 
236stewart, 251-52. The information was also given to all the Manhattan Engineering 
District Offices through K. D. Nichols, "District Circular Letter (MI44-113)," May 6, 1944 
included in MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, Appendix A-6. 
The letter detailed the classification, transmission and handling, processing, reproduction, 
storage, and destruction requirements of these documents. 
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meanings of code names of less critical nature. Restricted was reserved for 
documents relating to the design of non-technical building associated with the 
project; documents of relatively unimportant administrative matters; 
drawings of sites prior to construction and with no labels divulging what is to 
be located there; documents that use code names in such a way that no one can 
interpret the scope of the project from them; documents referring to shipment 
of coded materials; personnel clearance investigation matters where no 
adverse information was disclosed.237 
This bulletin also spelled out in great detail the rules for marking, 
receiving, transmitting, storing, and destroying documents. Markings on all 
documents, for example, had to be in red color with letters not less than one-
quarter inch in all capitals. Notations on the classified documents appeared 
along with a statement about the Espionage Act. Dissemination, transmission, 
and receipt of secret documents had to be handled with great care by authorized 
agents. Inventories of contents were to be clearly displayed and copies kept in 
transmitting offices. Numbering of separate parts and notations of copies of 
each document were displayed in prominence. Secret material had to be 
locked in a safe or lock files and was never to be left unattended on desks. Top 
secret documents had to be filed in a three-combination safe whose 
combination was known by certain designated people, including at least 
confidentially-rated secretaries. Combinations had to be changed at least twice 
^^^Manhattan Engineer District, "Safeguarding Military Information Regulations," 
Manhattan Engineer District Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, November 27, 1943, Revised 
September 1,1944,2-4. Provided in MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and 
Security, Appendix B-7. Also see MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and 
Security, Appendix C-8 for the March 15, 1944 Army Regulation No. 380-5, called 
"Safeguarding Military Information." 
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a year. Destruction of material was also handled by level of classification. 
Secret documents could be only burned and in the presence of a disinterested 
person who served as a signatory to the Certificate of Destruction. Restricted 
documents could be shredded or burned by an authorized person, but not a 
custodian. Waste (drafts, worksheets, carbon paper, etc.) could be shredded and 
burned under the supervision of an employee cleared to handle classified 
information. Classified material destroyed in any form required a report to be 
sent to the District Intelligence Officer explaining the type of material 
destroyed, its value, and the name of the person supervising the destruction.238 
This is probably why very little material was destroyed on the project and why 
so many copies of what was written down survive today. 
Press restrictions and censorship were also a part of the control of 
military information during the Manhattan Project days under the Censorship 
Review Program. Shortly after the District came into being, the Army 
surveyed several daily newspapers and periodicals for release of information. 
Starting with only the major serials, a list of approximately 370 newspapers and 
70 magazines began to receive scrutiny, primarily from members of the 
Women's Army Corps hired in the District Engineer's Office. By 1944, Branch 
Intelligence Officers reviewed periodicals in their own area offices. Bush had 
suggested voluntary compliance for the nation's newspapers, and at first the 
Army and Groves resisted, but with the insistence of men like Nathaniel 
Howard formerly of the Cleveland News and then an assistant director in the 
Office of Censorship, Groves finally agreed to voluntary censorship. On June 
History, "Safeguarding Military Information," 6-16. 
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28, 1943, Byron Price the Director of Censorship sent a confidential note to the 
nation's editors and broadcasters asking them to voluntarily refrain from 
mentioning anything about new and secret military weapons in general, but 
especially to exclude mention of terms and concepts involving atom smashing, 
atomic energy, atomic splitting, radium, radioactive materials, and any 
references to elements like uranium, thorium, and others. Although Groves 
wanted any references to Los Alamos excluded completely, he allowed local 
newspapers around Clinton and Hanford to publish limited articles in order to 
avoid drawing attention to their work by trying to suppress all information. 
The program, by and large, worked, and, though there were some small 
breaches of security, they caused no known detrimental effects. The process 
continued even after the war, with most newspapers using District-prepared 
press releases after the bombing of Japan rather than reporting their own 
information.239 
Information protection at Iowa State College 
All materials were handled in the ways described above by the 
government throughout the period (see Appendix D for a typical document 
with markings). All classified documents were also placed under lock and key 
at Iowa State College. These included letters, reports from Ames and from 
other projects, and research notebooks that every scientist kept. There were 
some incidents of slack handling of security, especially early in the project, but 
problems were generally worked out quickly. In 1942, for example, one of the 
History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 6.14-6.16; Jones, 
277-278; Groves, 146-148. 
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scientists reported to Spedding that on at least one-half dozen instances, he had 
seen notebooks lying open in full view of the custodial staff. Spedding 
immediately addressed a note from his Chicago Office to Wilhelm: 
I am still very much worried about the matter of secrecy. I have 
had one complaint about Ames from an indirect source so I think 
we should take double precautions to see that notebooks are not 
left around, that secret letters are not opened in front of other 
people, and that reports are not lying around where people 
coming into the office can see them, either in the typewriter or on 
the table. Please pass this information on to the stenographers 
and the other boys.^^o 
The conditions improved considerably after the warning, and there were no 
other instances or reports in the files indicating problems with documents. 
Code names also protected documents from the public at Iowa State and 
other sites. The Manhattan District particularly encouraged this practice. Lists 
would periodically appear from the District Office with new code names added. 
Uranium was generally called "tube alloy" throughout the project, for 
example, although at first it was designated "copper" until studies of copper 
and uranium alloys system began to appear. Until the code name for uranium 
changed to tube alloy, the metal copper was sometimes called "Honest to God 
Copper." Tube alloy was an official code name for the British uranium project 
throughout the war. The Metallurgical Laboratory developed several of its 
own codes too. They preferred "the metal" for uranium, "sensitivity" for 
radioactivity, "green salt" for uranium tetrafluoride, and "black powder" or 
"brown powder" for the types of uranium oxides. Codes were also developed 
240(2 p Gray, "Letter to F. H. Spedding on Security Breach, "August 6,1942; Frank H. 
Spedding, "Letter to H. Wilhelm on Security," August 8, 1942; C F Gray, "Letter to F. 
Spedding on Security Follow-up," August 11,1942, Spedding Papers. 
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for use on the telephone. Spedding recalled several farm terms developed by 
the Ames group. "Eggs" were 2" diameters of uranium and often the caller 
would indicate "2-dozen eggs shipped." Later, when Clinton wanted a 1" x 4" 
length of uranium shipped, these were called frankfurters or hot dogs; billets 
4" in diameter and 2-3-feet long weighing 250 pounds were called "cheeses." 
Iowa State shipped uranium scrap turnings as "hay." Boron, a dangerous 
poison and contaminant, was called Vitamin B. Reports referring to a percent 
of Vitamin B content contained in the metal or tube alloy meant that the 
uranium contained a certain percent of boron.24i 
Code names were also used for the heads of laboratories and other 
prominent scientists. Dr. Enrico Fermi, for example, was called Mr. Farmer, 
Dr. Eugene Wigner was known as Mr. Warner, and Dr. Arthur Compton 
answered to Mr. Comas.242 Sometimes, though the code name system 
backfired. In his manuscript history, Spedding explained well what could 
happen to even a Manhattan District person who made a mistake in realizing 
the importance of security as far as codes were concerned. As noted earlier, 
documents of specified classifications were delivered in certain ways. By 1943 
and 1944, secret documents were usually sent by registered mail, and top secret 
S. Apple, "Letter to C. M. Cooper on Proposed Codes at the Metallurgical 
Laboratory," October 30, 1942 Spedding Papers; Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 10-11; 
Frank H. Spedding, "A Security Scare—Boy Saying Uranium," 1-2. Humorous names also 
appeared. At some point later in the project, when Iowa State began shipping thorium 
billets, some people in the Chicago Metallurgical lab called thorium "mernalloy" after the 
actress, Myrna Loy. (Spedding, "A Security Scare," 2.) See also Frank H. Spedding, 
"Interview with George Tressel for film on anniversary of CP-1," July 12, 1967, Transcript in 
Ames Laboratory Papers, 10-11. 
242Frank H. Spedding, "Top Secret Incident," Spedding Manuscript, 1; Compton, Atomic 
Quest, 141 
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ones were sent to Ames by a courier. For delivery of top secret documents, 
usually the courier was a lieutenant who would come to Ames by train or 
plane. He would contact the director, Spedding, personally and get his 
signature on the document before he left. To protect the identity of the 
directors, each courier used code names to hide their true identity. One time, a 
man carrying a British top secret document on turning rhodium into platinum 
arrived in Ames looking for Spedding. Spedding related the rest of the tale in 
his history: 
[He] went to the telephone booth at the Sheldon Munn Hotel and 
got out his little black book which informed what my true name 
was instead of my code name, and what my telephone number 
was. He called me and I made arrangements to meet him at my 
office. When he arrived, he suddenly became very concerned, 
because he had left his little black book with the code names for 
all prominent scientists in the phone booth. We immediately 
sent him down with a car, but the little black book was gone. He 
was a very concerned young lieutenant, with some justification, 
because he had to report the loss! I never saw the young 
lieutenant again, but I did hear from Washington gossip that he 
had been transferred to a company which was stationed on the 
outermost Aleutian Islands.^^) 
Whether or not all of the story is true is probably not so important, but it does 
point to the fact that the Manhattan Engineer District considered adherence to 
its security policies a serious matter indeed. 
Sometimes secrecy and protection of documents led to unusual 
applications. At Iowa State, all books on atomic energy and related topics were 
removed from the College library and placed in a room behind a barricade that 
was built across the east and north halls of the first and ground floors in the 
^^^Frank H. Spedding, "Top Secret Incident," Spedding Manuscript, 2. 
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Chemistry Building. According to one scientist on the project, since Spedding 
had been given almost carte blanche from President Friley to obtain whatever 
he needed, when several scientists needed access to books on radio-chemistry, 
the library was instructed to let him have any books he wished on indefinite 
loan. To explain the loan to the Ames Project, the entry in the check-out 
records in the library told users the books were at the bindery. Scientists thus 
had their own private library behind the wall of secrecy, probably a great 
convenience as well as a security measure to let no one know what was being 
used, but any student who wanted information on a field of atomic energy 
found books that had once appeared in the library suddenly and inexplicably 
missing.244 
Evidently, newspapers in Ames and the surrounding towns obeyed the 
censorship orders prohibiting any news about the secret project. From January 
1942 until August 5, 1945, there were only passing references to the project in 
the loTva State Daily Student, the College newspaper. It was not because the 
project was so secret that no one knew about it. In fact, there was no attempt to 
hide the fact that war research was being conducted on campus; no one though 
questioned just what kind of research was undertaken. In the student 
244svec, interview with author, 1991, 3. See also Daane, telephone interview with 
the author. The books were still behind the barricade in 1946, when an auditor from the 
Project noted that: "Library books are numbered with yellow paint and charged out by a 
librarian on a loan basis." (E. Stimpson, Auditor's Report, November 12, 1946, OSRD Files, 
Finance, National Archives, Washington, DC). These same books after the war became the 
nucleus of the Physical Sciences Reading Room which Spedding had built from funds left from 
overhead recovery. (Margaret Mae Gross, "Interview with the Author," January, 1992, Ames, 
Iowa; Charles H. Brown to Charles Friley, "Memorandum on the Future Organization of the 
College Library," November 10, 1944, Libraiy Dean's Office Subject File, Record Group 25/1/1, 
William Robert Parks and Ellen Sorge Parks Library, Iowa State University, Ames Iowa, 1-2 
(hereafter called Library Papers); "Physical Sciences Reading Room," The Library at Iowa State 
2, no. 3 (November 19,1947): 33. 
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newspaper, censorship rules were first referred to even before the Manhattan 
Project took over. In an editorial on May 22, 1942, the newspaper editor hinted 
that tough measures would come to those who were caught either 
intentionally or unintentionally revealing secret information.245 
Direct references to the project during the time period totaled four 
articles and one editorial. A blaze that damaged the chemistry roof was 
reported in July 1942. The Ames Fire Department was called, but about thirty 
members of the chemistry staff had almost extinguished the fire before the fire 
trucks arrived. The explanation for the fire, given by W. F. Coover, was: "an 
experiment using highly inflammable materials and a continuously running 
motor was being conducted for defense work."246 This article was the only 
time the project, even in an indirect way, made the front page of a paper before 
the official announcement in August 1945 about the role of the College in war 
work. Later that year, Coover reported in the paper that "26 members of the 
Chemistry Department are engaged in vital war projects of a confidential 
nature."247 His reference was never explained in any follow-up article. Earlier 
that same month, B. H. Piatt, the head of the building and grounds department 
at the College, indicated "considerable remodeling on the inside of the 
[Chemistry Building] where storerooms and classrooms were rearranged."248 
245Lyie Abbott, "Be Patriotically Quiet," The Iowa State Daily Student, May 22, 1942, 
3. 
246"Chemistry Roof Blaze Brings Out Firemen," The Iowa State Daily Student, July 7, 
1942, 1. 
247"Chemists Needed for War Work," The Iowa State Daily Student, September 23, 
1942, 4. 
248"BuiIding and Grounds Men Kept Busy," The Iowa State Daily Student, 6. 
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No mention was made that this extensive remodeling included erecting 
barricades across the halls of the building. A more direct reference to secret 
research was made in January 1943 when a report appeared about the building 
of a gas main for the new research laboratory east of the Dairy Industry 
Building. "What the gas will be used for was not revealed since the activities 
within the laboratory are defense secrets."249 This article was the last to appear 
and only a small letter to the editor in 1943 complaining about the lack of fire 
exits in the Chemistry Building followed. In that letter, a reference was made 
by the student to new construction that " closed off the hallway."250 The 
voluntary censorship plan must have worked because no more mention was 
made of the project at all. This search of the papers probably proved that 
Groves' method to allow casual references in every day matters did work at 
least at Iowa State College. The secret was never that there was secret work 
going on; it was just that the details of the involvement with atomic research 
and any mention of the Manhattan Project was prohibited.^si 
249"jsjew Research Laboratory Connected to Gas Main," The Iowa State Daily Student, 7. 
250Louise Jaggars, "Believes Chemistry Building Need More Fire Exits," The Iowa State 
Daily Student, March 30, 1943, 3. 
There is some evidence that even town's people knew that secret work was on 
campus. For example, Margaret Mae Gross, a young secretary in the library at the time 
remembered taking her father's farm milk to the Dairy Industries Building for testing and 
knowing that secret work was going on next door (Gross, interview with author, January 1992). 
Also Bess Ferguson, a longtime Ames resident remembered walking by on the cinder path that 
ran near the present day Physical Plant and knowing that secret work was progressing in 
what later became known as Little Ankeny (Mrs. Fred Ferguson, "Interview with author," 
April 21, 1986, Ames, lA, 10). The attitude in both cases seemed to be that even if you knew, 
you just did not talk about it; after all a war was in progress. 
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Materials Shipping Security Regulations 
Federal rules and regulations for shipping materials 
The OSRD and NDRC developed no specific requirements for shipping 
hazardous materials, so the general regulations of the War Department 
regarding all military information served as the guide.252 However, by the 
time the Manhattan District took over, shipments were becoming more 
numerous, so the District instituted a survey in November 1943, followed by 
specific regulations on handling shipments. Guard pools were created at 
specified sites around the country, including over twenty guards who were 
stationed at Chicago to guard rail and truck shipments of critical materials to 
Hanford from sites in the East and shipments of recovery materials from 
Hanford to sites in the Midwest and East (including Iowa State College). The 
courier system was also enlarged with pools established at various sites, 
including Chicago, especially after the institution of the Top Secret 
classification scheme, to carry small items, often radioactive, in personal 
luggage from site to site. Finally, a scheme of eight forms of transportation 
methods ranging from Railway Express to Courier in descending order was 
standardized to prescribe shipment of the critical materials by the most 
appropriate and secure means.253 
Materials shipping security at Iowa State College 
Harley A. Wilhelm received the honor of taking the first "shipment" of 
uranium to Chicago when he made the historic trip with an 11-pound ingot 
^^MED Histoiy, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 5.1. 
^^MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 5.1-5.9. 
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carried in the old suitcase some students had earlier given him.254 Frank 
Spedding continued that tradition for a short while when he transported metal 
on his weekly trips into Chicago. Soon the quantity and weight of shipments 
grew too great to hand carry, so the project began to use railway express and 
then freight. Shortly before moving to the Physical Chemistry Annex, the 
small 4" X 4" x 3' boxes would be trucked down to the depot to catch a Railway 
Express car, but when the production plant was set up at the Annex, a train box 
car would be called to come to the railroad sidetrack that ran by the power plant 
close to the Annex. Men from the plant would load the train, lock it, and give 
instructions for shipping the materials. On the other end, quite often Chicago, 
someone from the laboratory would meet the train and unload it. The railroad 
personnel had no reason to suspect what was in the little wooden boxes. The 
trains appeared to come into Ames empty and leave empty because usually 
one layer of 4" by 4" boxes was all that was necessary to come close to exceeding 
the weight limits. Most freight cars at that time held approximately 40,000 
pounds, so quite often less than 400 boxes would meet the weight limits. Most 
trains left Ames with what looked like a higher floor, but if anyone had 
examined the train closely, they would have seen axles straining or even 
bending under the extreme weight.255 
Early under the jurisdiction of the Manhattan District, there were no 
special guard details. After the Manhattan District required shipments of this 
type to carry guards from the Chicago pool, two men in civilian clothes. 
254wilhelm, interview with author, 11-12. 
255peterson, interview with author, 7. 
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usually overalls and sweaters, came and left with the shipments. Spedding 
recalled that people in town soon spread stories that empty train cars were 
coming into the College with two hobos in the car and were leaving empty 
with those same two hobos aboard. Those who saw the trains probably 
thought that the scientists or the College had so much power that they could 
order and send out empty trains when farmers throughout the state could not 
get a train to ship out their corn.256 But security remained intact and no one 
reported in the newspapers the incidents of the empty trains.257 
Plant Security 
Governmental plant security regulations 
In the case of academic institutions, the NDRC and OSRD required no 
special integrity checks or loyalty signatures for the institution as it did for 
individuals within the organization. Unlike the educational institutions, 
companies and other private contractors were checked for violations of laws, 
fraud, and any poor performance with government contracts. OSRD and 
NDRC made no physical inspections of the majority of plant operations, since 
it did not have a separate staff from the committee or organization to perform 
^^Spedding, interview 5 with Calciano, 10; Peterson, interview with author, 1990, 6-
7; Wilhelm, interview with author, 1990, 16-17; Spedding, Wilhelm, Daane, Interview, 1967, 
12; Frank H. Spedding, "Freight Car Boondoggle," Spedding Manuscript, 1. 
257There was only one small breach, or what was initially believed to be a breach, in 
security during the shipping days. A young boy of about twelve, watching some of the men 
loading the Railway Express car, noticed that they were having trouble lifting the boxes. He 
shouted, "What are you loading there, uranium? When military security got wind of the 
incident, they were sure a breach of security had occurred. Upon investigation though, it 
seemed that the boy had been studying chemistiy and the elements on the periodic table. He 
had made the assumption that the highest numbered element (uranium) was also the 
heaviest. He just used that as a reference to the heaviness of the boxes. No one from the 
Project had talked. (Frank H. Spedding, "A Security Scare—Boy Saying Uranium," Spedding 
Manuscript, 1-2.) 
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them. All of that activity was left to individual contractors. There were 
twenty-five plants, however, plants that were contributing a major portion of 
research expertise, whose operations were checked for any violations of 
government security measures. The violations though were reported only to 
OSRD and it was left to the committee to bring about compliance with the 
recommendations. The national headquarters adopted minimal security 
measures: staff wore photographic badges like those used by the Army and 
Navy, the Federal Works Agency provided guards for duty around the 
building, and OSRD installed electrical burglar alarms in sensitive areas to be 
turned on after the offices closed.258 
The Manhattan District instituted a much more thorough program of 
plant security when it launched its Plant Protection Program in August 1943. 
The program required a survey of all installations engaged in important work 
to discover if conditions existed to delay and hamper production or to violate 
security, particularly checking to see if a loss or comprise of sensitive 
information occurred. Reports and recommendations were forwarded to the 
Area Engineer or an officer assigned to that facility as security officer. The 
District compiled a list of important facilities and revised it bi-monthly starting 
in June 1944. Each facility was rated A (where interruptions would seriously 
delay the project work), B (infractions would cause minor delay), and C (where 
violations would cause no delay). Each report contained a composite rating of 
Excellent, Good, Fair, or Poor. All A and B facilities had to maintain at least 
2S8stewart, 253-254. 
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Good and Fair ratings respectively, and it was up to the area engineers to bring 
them into compliance.259 
Protection against sabotage was another concern of plants, so erecting 
barriers like fences and screens as well as locking entrances and providing 
guard details was common practice. Usually workers wore an identification 
badge to gain entrance to restricted areas that were normally set aside or 
protected in some way. The Manhattan District also instituted a rigorous 
program of visitor access in order to protect the plant from the unwanted, the 
undesirable, or the curious. For a visitor to gain access, written permission had 
to be obtained from the District Engineer Office. Since most visits were 
personnel employed elsewhere on the project, background checks had already 
been completed. Those completely outside the jurisdiction of the Manhattan 
Project facilities at first had to undergo a background check before gaining 
admittance to a site facility. Later, the Area Engineer's Office initiated a 
standard pass and completed checks, which speeded up the process of visitor 
access. When visits were considered urgent by the contractor, as was quite 
often the case later in the war, teletype and telephone clearances substituted for 
written requests.260 
"^^MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, S4-S5., 4.1-4.9. 
History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 4.9-4.11. See 
also The War Department, "Plant Protection for Manufacturers," Pamphlet No. 32-1, May 1, 
1943, revised from the Februaiy 1942 pamphlet of the same name for more information on 
every aspect of plant security from sabotage to fire protection. 
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Plant security at Iowa State College 
At the start of the project, Iowa State developed its own security system. 
After clearances were received, all employees were informed that the Ames 
Project's purpose was to obtain pure materials used in the construction of an 
atomic bomb and that the work was highly classified. No one was to discuss 
the work with another person except others on the project. Papers and 
notebooks were always to be locked up and no non-project person who was in 
the area at the time should see handwriting on paper or on the blackboard. By 
summer, the Chemistry Building had two wooden partitions or barricades 
erected, one at each end of the area in which the project people were working, 
and a guard was posted at each barricade at all times to check identification 
badges of workers and passes from visitors. That guard kept a log of visitors 
with names, time of arrival, and time of departure. There were no special 
barriers erected at the production plant, but it was guarded at all times and 
spotlights were placed outside and fluorescent lighting inside for extra 
protection. Since three shifts ran 24-hours per day, it was probably thought that 
guards and the spotlights were sufficient. The Manhattan District added some 
guards to the local force and also required extensive logs to be kept. Work was 
compartmentalized and only the top men in each project were briefed on work 
elsewhere. 261 
John W. Moore, personnel director of the Ames Project, in an interview 
with a local Ames paper in 1945, explained a bit more about the local personnel 
261 Frank H. Spedding, "Problems Encountered with Setting and Maintaining a Security 
System," Spedding Manuscript, 1-2; Frank H. Spedding, "Security," Spedding Manuscript, 1-2; 
"Building and Grounds Men Kept Busy," 6; "'Little Ankeny' Plays Part in Victory," Iowa State 
Student, August 15,1945,6. 
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situation at Ames, especially the hiring and maintaining of guards. Moore 
conducted the personnel checks for many of the Ames workers hired on the 
project. He was also responsible for hiring guards. These men, usually local 
residents, were equipped with revolvers and controlled passage in and out of 
buildings. Moore went on to explain the tight security: 
A system of pass identification (if you didn't have one, you didn't 
get in period, and if you had left it home you went home after it 
period) was worked out for employees. The guards were tough, 
too. On one occasion, even Moore was refused admittance 
because he had left his pass at home, although he remedied that 
situation by writing one out.262 
Several scientists found out that the guards were just as strict about notebooks 
or research materials left about. If someone left a notebook unlocked, he or she 
was telephoned at home and told to come back immediately to put it in the 
safe. Needless to say, coming back late at night to put away secret materials 
soon cured the forgetful scientists about carelessness.263 
Few documents remain recording the results of plant inspections,264 but 
in one recorded instance, the security inspection team proposed some unusual 
measures to correct a perceived security problem. Iowa State disposed of the 
slag material from the reduction experiments at the College dump. The 
material included calcium fluoride, lime, and probably a little uranium that 
might be left in the slag. The calcium chloride, according to Spedding, served 
2626emie Kooser, "Intricate System of Passes for Bomb Project at College," Ames Daily 
Tribune, August 10,1945,8. 
263pg^erson, interview with author, 2. 
26^See, for example, John L. Ferry, "Letter to F. H. Spedding about Visit to Project to 
take Radioactivity Tests," August 18, 1943, Ames Laboratory Papers. 
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as a good rat poison, but the security officials for the Manhattan District were 
concerned about the uranium pieces as a security risk. The project employees 
were instructed to dig up material that had been deposited in the dump and 
ship it to New Jersey for storage as well as any future waste. Security inspectors 
also noticed that small amounts of the uranium tetrafluoride were sometimes 
deposited in the soil at the Chemistry Annex building. The Ames Project 
personnel dug up six inches of soil in a strip twenty inches wide all around the 
Annex to ship to New Jersey also. Filters were installed on the exhaust fans to 
eliminate the deposition of uranium outside the annex. 
The project administration searched in vain for containers to ship this 
material in until Wayne Keller suggested that in his Kentucky hometown, 
whiskey barrels were quite often left over from the distillation process and 
could make suitable containers. Spedding approved the suggestion and asked 
him to order 1,000 whiskey barrels. By mistake, Keller's secretary typed on the 
purchase order, "one thousand barrels Hiram Walker Whiskey." The 
purchasing agent of the college, Mr. Potts, had been told early in the project 
that for security reasons he was to approve anything Dr. Spedding ordered, and 
the government would pay for it. Despite the security requirements. Potts 
called Spedding at 6 o'clock one morning and questioned why he was ordering 
whiskey through the College in Iowa, a dry state. Needless to say, Spedding 
straightened out the agent and assured him that it was just a typographical 
error; he only needed the barrels.265 
265spedding, interview with Hacker, 37-38; Frank H. Spedding, "Security Involving 
Scrap," Spedding Manuscript, 1-3. This stoiy also appeared in varying forms in several 
publications including many Ames Laboratory publications after the war. 
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That was not the only trouble the project had with those whiskey 
barrels. When the barrels arrived, a group of men who did the heavy lifting 
around the project called the "Bull Gang/' were instructed to dig up the dump 
material. Suddenly, Dr. Wilhelm had too many men volunteering for this 
dirty and strenuous duty. He suspected something was amiss, and when he 
went to the dump, he found that the men were propping the whiskey barrels 
on the edge of a hill and draining about a cup of whiskey from each barrel 
before filling them with the dump material. Despite the happy workers, the 
slag was eventually crated and shipped to New Jersey as the instructions 
provided. What New Jersey finally did with the fine Iowa black dirt and slag is 
not mentioned in any records, and evidently no one to this day knows.266 
Occasionally, more than plant security was threatened by secrecy. 
Because the chemicals were volatile, frequent fires errupted. Since the Ames 
fire department could not come into the buildings that housed the production 
plant or the research activities because of secrecy requirements, the College 
allowed the firemen and equipment to come, but remain outside in the event 
a fire went out of control. Luckily, the workman were always able to use the 
lime and powdered graphite around the production building to squelch any 
flames. Some days that was quite a chore; there were at least six explosions in 
one day because some wet raw lime being mixed in the bomb retort containers 
adversely affected the reduction experiment.267 
266Frank H. Spedding, "Security Involving Scrap," Spedding Manuscript, 1; Frank H. 
Spedding "Interview with Dorothy Kehlenbeck," July 5,1961, Transcript in Spedding Papers, 
5-6; Tressel, 10-11; Daane, Spedding, Wilhelm interview, 1967, 13-14. 
267Kooser, 8; Frank H. Spedding, "Explosions," Spedding Manuscript, 4-5; Daane, 
Spedding, Wilhelm Interview, 1967, 25. 
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Incidentally, that was the day that several secretaries threatened to resign 
and one Army officer received a rather suspicious wound. Secretaries, who 
were at an office attached to the production plant, had to pass through the 
firing pit area in order to get outside the building. After that series of 
explosions, they were wary of staying any longer in a potentially dangerous 
work environment. Spedding, however, convinced all but two of them to stay 
after he promised to strengthen the wall between the office and the operations 
area and to cut a door to the outside directly from their office. That same day 
Major H. A. Savigny, an Army officer who also happened to be the Area 
Engineer, came to investigate the problem after the third explosion. While he 
was there, another explosion occurred, and, of course, he immediately ran for 
the door. As he was talking to someone a few moments later, he suddenly 
grabbed his leg, and a small piece of metal fell from a burned hole in the seat of 
his pants. Since he sustained a minor burn, he was kidded that he was 
probably entitled to a purple heart that could be used as a patch to cover that 
hole in his pants. Others, however, thought it might be somewhat hard to 
justify his "bravery" since it was apparent what he was doing when he was 
injured.268 
When there were breaches of plant security, Spedding could often 
depend upon his own personnel to let him know about potential problems. 
Only one letter existed in the documentary files about a potential lack of 
security, and that was from a night shift manager at the Physical Chemistry 
268Frank H. Spedding, "Explosions," Spedding Manuscript, 5-6; Daane, Spedding 
Wilhelm Interview, 1967, 11-12, 25-26. 
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Annex I. During a blackout one night that foreman, testing the project 
security, found that he could move freely around the building without being 
challenged since only one roving guard was posted. He noticed that there was 
no guard in the back room where locked files were located, so he suggested that 
guards be posted in each room. The three regular guards then could be placed 
at the front door, the back door, and roving.269 
Compartmentalization of Information 
Federal rules for compartmentalization 
Compartmentalization of information as conceptualized by the NDRC 
and OSRD meant that no person contracting a project from the government 
needed more information than what was necessary to complete a contract. As 
a result, no one except the members of the committee or some central staff 
members knew the entire operation of NDRC or OSRD. The purpose of this 
restrictive policy was to minimize the amount of damage if any individual, 
either intentionally or inadvertently, divulged secrets.^^o The policy was 
highly criticized by the scientists throughout the war as a detriment to 
efficiency. The principle, as it operated under NDRC and OSRD, was probably 
as much a concession to the armed forces to allow them to entrust the agency 
with classified information as it was to protect indiscretion since there were no 
known cases of the latter. 
26^Jack Boyt, "Letter to Frank H. Spedding, on Security," July 30, 1943, Spedding 
Paper. 
270stewart, 28-29. 
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The guiding principle for the Manhattan Engineer District was also 
compartmentalization, interpreted in the most stringent of terms. Groves took 
his rules from an intelligence bulletin that stated: 
Two cardinal rules govern the right to possess classified 
information: 
(1) The person must be authorized to have the information 
(i.e., known to require the information in connection with 
official duties and in performance of his work.) 
(2) If the person is authorized to have the information, then 
he is entitled to only so much as is necessary for him to 
execute his function.27i 
Groves applied this policy much more literally than the guidelines used 
under the NDRC or OSRD. For example, blueprints for plant construction 
project had to be broken into parts to conceal total project designs; orders for 
raw materials were supposed to come from a number of suppliers because a 
large quantity coming from one supplier could betray the project's purpose; 
and functions like assembly of certain equipment and its manufacture were to 
take place in separate locations. The Army took a much stricter view of 
information and personnel exchange between laboratories and even within 
each laboratory. As a result, written agreements such as one developed 
between Los Alamos and Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory were spelled out in 
such minute detail that the only practical channel open for exchange of 
information was for Oppenheimer or his representative from Los Alamos to 
visit the Chicago laboratory in person when information was needed.272 The 
271mED History, "Safeguarding Military Information," 4. 
History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, 6.3-6.4; Jones, 
268-270; Hewlett and Anderson, 238-239. 
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case of holding a colloquium at Los Alamos, for example, created such a stir 
within the project that the Military Policy Committee sent Bush to Roosevelt 
for a letter that could be sent to Oppenheimer and project directors 
emphasizing the need for strict compartmentalization. Finally, a compromise 
was reached with Los Alamos where they were allowed to continue weekly 
colloquiums for exchange of information; these meetings were restricted as to 
who was given access, a concession to Groves' extreme interpretation of 
compartmentalization.273 
Compartmentalization at Iowa State College 
There was some compartmentalization at Iowa State, especially after the 
Manhattan District took over. Only the top research directors had access to 
what transpired at other sites and travel between sites became more restrictive. 
But the seminars started under Spedding in 1942 continued throughout the 
war. The Manhattan District seemed to be much more interested in the 
products that came out of the Ames Project itself, and since production was not 
interrupted, the Manhattan District did little to interfere with the internal 
workings of the scientific side of the laboratory. 
Just like at other institutions, the Manhattan District did provide its own 
separate staff to Iowa State College. An area manager, security agents, safety 
engineers, and auditors were placed on campus to run the project 
administratively. These agents could not interfere with the scientific progress. 
273Franklin Roosevelt, "Letter to Leslie R. Groves, on Security in Manhattan Project," 
June 29,1943 in MED History, Book I General, Volume 14 Intelligence and Security, Appendix 
A-1; Hewlett and Anderson, 238-239; Wyden, 99-100. 
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but they reported production progress, checked security measures, and audited 
travel and other expense accounts. Spedding revealed in his manuscript 
history that these people were rarely scientists, or were they even security 
agents by training. They were often businessmen or lawyers, so they had little 
experience with either how science worked or how to make a plant secure. 
They used compartmentalization techniques that were handed down from 
headquarters, but often they did not understand what they were 
implementing.274 So often this level of organization seemed to the scientists 
more of a nuisance than actually facilitating the project's goals. 
The District Area Manager himself was Spedding's counterpart on the 
Army side. Usually, he was a major in training for a higher management 
position in the Army and because Ames was such a small installation, the area 
managers changed as often as every six months. It became almost a joke that 
Ames was breaking in so many new managers constantly. Spedding said the 
Army told him (in jest he assumed) that they would send someone to Ames, 
and, if he could get along with Spedding, he was ready for a larger assignment, 
such as a project that employed 5,000-30,000.275 
Compartmentalization affected many sites much more than Iowa State. 
Because Iowa State, by the time the Manhattan District arrived, had already 
completed much of its original research under freer conditions, it was not as 
hampered. From 1943 onward, Iowa State was primarily serving as a 
274Frank H. Spedding, "Security of Scientific Information, 1941-1954," Spedding 
Manuscript, 3. 
275prank H. Spedding, "My Personal Contacts with General Groves," Spedding 
Manuscript, 2-3. 
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production facility and also doing specific research at the request of other 
contractors. Its purification program may have benefited from access to others' 
files, but most of that was done on demand from another contractor with 
whom conversation was allowed. The Manhattan District's strict rules and 
regulations were more a nuisance than probably anything else. 
Effect of Security on the Academic Laboratory, 1942-1945 
Despite the requirements and regulations imposed by added security 
when the Manhattan District acquired the atomic bomb project, the Ames 
Project remained an academically-managed unit. The security requirements 
were added along side the academic structure, and even the military employed 
academic management techniques when time and expediency required it. For 
example, compartmentalization often broke down when a laboratory wanted 
information to continue its project. Los Alamos was a perfect example when 
Groves allowed the weekly seminars to continue. Groves never set foot on the 
Iowa State College campus during the war, and Spedding recounted several 
instances when security was compromised to accommodate other concerns. 
For example, once a security officer asked that bars be placed on the windows in 
the Chemistry Building to prohibit entry by some saboteur. There were no bars 
placed on the windows because the design of the building required that 
ventilation go through those windows when experiments were in process. 
Another time, a Manhattan District officer told Spedding to darken some 
windows in the Chemistry Building. They were never darkened because 
Spedding thought that would make the working area for the scientists too 
dark. It was also a well-known fact that the Manhattan District officers were 
140 
required to go through channels, but if a research director had an urgent 
problem, he could even directly approach Groves if he wished.276 
Security did prevent publication of the results of research, and on the 
surface that was a military victory. But that requirement was imposed long 
before the military took over, and the scientists found a substitute for 
publication that served the project just as well in secrecy—the report. In the 
beginning of the project, weekly reports were required, then bi-weekly, and 
eventually monthly reports of progress in each laboratory. Each project leader 
was responsible for his own group's report and those were summarized by 
Spedding and submitted to the Metallurgical Laboratory.277 An elaborate 
process of coding, numbering, and distributing these reports was instituted, 
and the only way added security from the military affected this system was to 
require that only laboratory or project directors request reports from another 
facility. Written agreements had to be formulated with each facility as to what 
it could provide to others. But by the time this took effect in 1943 and 1944, 
most scientists already knew, in a general way, who was working on the project 
and what each laboratory might discover. It was a matter of getting around the 
paperwork to obtain information. 
276gpedding, interview with Hacker, 1980, 25-26. 
277Numerous memos and letters abound in the files relating to the receipt of reports, 
weekly, bi-monthly, and then monthly. For a sampling, see A. H. Compton, "Letter to S. K. 
Allison, Encouraging Widespread Use of the Reports for Dissemination of Information," June 5, 
1942; J. A. Wheeler, "Memo to Research Associates on the Change in Plans for Weekly 
Reports to a Monthly System," August 13, 1942; Warren C. Jones, "Memo to Boyd, Burton, 
Coryell, Seaborg, Spedding, Eastman, and Latimer Discussing the Receipt of Reports to 
Provide Summaries for Dr. Compton," August 4,1943; "Request for Assistance in Indexing Your 
Reports," n.d.; A. H. Compton, "Letter to F. H. Spedding Requesting a Report for the Transfer 
of OSRD Contracts to Manhattan District," April 19, 1943; and Canfield Hadlock, "Letter to 
F. H. Spedding on the Consolidation of Monthly Reports and Letters into Semi-monthly 
Reports," September 6, 1943, all located in the Ames Laboratory Papers. 
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Visits to other facilities were still allowed under the Manhattan 
Engineer District though more paperwork accompanied each visit. There is 
some discrepancy in how much time the military security requirements 
actually delayed the project. In a Senate Hearing after the war, Leo Szilard 
complained that he thought compartmentalization delayed the atomic bomb 
deployment by up to eighteen months.278 When one considers that in the 
National Academy Report in 1941, Compton predicted a device by January 
1945, compartmentalization and other security measures delayed the 
achievement of the final goal only until August. Other problems were just as 
important in the delay as the nuisance of security measures: innovative 
procedures had to be developed; shortage of raw materials delayed the 
development of processes; and the experimentation and calculation and 
recalculation in a new field certainly caused as much delay as security. Groves 
even hinted in his book that perhaps the Manhattan Project speeded up the 
process because scientists were not allowed to discuss every alternative and 
spend a great amount of detail in the discussion process. When a method 
worked, it was immediately used and usually became the preferred method; 
action on all others was stopped.279 Perhaps, in some strange way, that was the 
case. The military did not change the existing academic structure set in place by 
Bush; it merely added procedures and requirements along side the other 
278"fjearings Before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Senate Resolution 
179: A Resolution Creating a Special Committee to Investigate Problems Relating to the 
Development, Use, and Control of Atomic Energy," November 27, 1945-February 15, 1946,294. 
^^^Groves, 140; Hewlett and Anderson, 239. See also Richard G. Hewlett, "Beginnings 
of Development in Nuclear Technology." Technology and Culture 17, no. 3 (July 1976): 469. 
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structure. In most cases when security was lifted, what was left was an 
academically-styled unit or laboratory. 
However, there was one area in which security continued to exert a 
detrimental influence and that was in the declassifying process of documents 
used in the creation of the atomic bomb and the many processes developed for 
atomic energy applications. As early as 1944, there was a movement under way 
to discuss ways to notify the public about atomic energy. Henry Smyth was 
hired to begin the history of the project and release certain kinds of 
information at the end of the war. The process of declassification of 
information though became ensnared in procedure after procedure. The 
Tolman Committee (Spedding served on the committee) was commissioned 
in early 1946 to implement a declassification scheme, designating which 
information could be released to the public and when it could be released. 
Information to be released immediately included that of "a broad scientific or 
general technical nature."280 Information to be held secret included the 
"design and availability of atomic weapons. On these we believe that release of 
information must be made a matter of general policy to be determined by the 
Congress and the President."28i 
The major complication after World War II was the developing Cold 
War, with the Soviet Union as the target of continued secrecy. The Tolman 
Committee recommendations were not implemented quickly by the new 
civilian agency overseeing atomic research. By 1948, three of four research 
280"stateinent of Recommendations on Release of Atom Bomb Project Information," 
Spedding Papers, 2. 
"Statement of Recommendations on Release of Atom Bomb Project," 3. 
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papers from the laboratories of that civilian body, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, were still classified "Secret." Also after the war, academic theses 
on atomic energy remained classified until information could be later released, 
and academic journals could publish nothing about atomic processes. It was 
not until 1955 after the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy that many of the previously held secrets were released. This conference 
was also coupled with a directive from President Eisenhower that all atomic 
energy information be released so that industry could use the information to 
build nuclear reactors.282 
2®2Kevles, 378; Greenburg, 216. Also see Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, 
Atomic Shield, 194711952 (A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. II; 
College Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969). At Iowa State theses also 
remained classified. By 1951, Robert Orr, the Director of the Library, reported that at that 
point a total of 26 theses were still classified and 5 were restricted. Of the 31 total, 11 were 
from Physical Chemistry (Robert Orr, "Record of Classified Theses Written at ISC," Library 
Papers). 
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CONTRACTING—FINANCIAL CONTROL OF THE AMES PROJECT 
Introduction 
Just as security challenged the administration of research, financial 
control also became an important issue in research administration. Financial 
controls were placed on the Ames Project by the NDRC, the OSRD, and the 
Manhattan Engineer District. Each of those wartime national organizations 
adopted a financial management device known as a contract, a mechanism that 
essentially redefined the relationship between government and the academic 
world. Unlike security, which was by and large a temporary measure that 
affected primarily the administration of a wartime laboratory, contract 
administration actually changed the nature of research administration forever. 
Early University/Governmental Research Relationships 
Contractual arrangements actually developed out of a long-time and 
somewhat ambivalent relationship between scientists and the federal 
government.283 The academic scientist, particularly in the non-agricultural 
disciplines, generally taught courses while completing research and 
2®^For detailed reports on early governmental and academic relationships, see A. 
Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government, who traces what he calls a split between 
the government that values primarily applied research and the universities that conduct 
what he calls basic research. Though this argument doesn't take into consideration all of the 
complexities governing the developing relations, it does portray the fact that the two entities 
did in many ways feel suspicious of each other. Also see Daniel S. Greenburg, The Politics of 
Pure Science (New York: New American Library, 1967), 51-67 for a discussion of pre-World 
War attitudes in academia and government towards scientific research. 
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scholarship at his/her own expense as a part of the teaching appointment. 
Little governmental support of academic science developed before World War 
II, except some attempts at supporting application-oriented research that would 
have short-term benefits to a particular segment of society (i.e., that provided 
by agricultural support or public health research). A report commissioned by 
Franklin Roosevelt in 1938, for example, reported that universities spent $50 
million on research in 1935-36; of that $6 million came from the federal 
government, mostly supporting agricultural research.284 
By the 1930s, some of the barriers to government funding changed by a 
complicated set of circumstances. The financial situation, caused in large part 
by the Depression, eroded many university endowments as well as those of 
private foundations that had supported scientific research through the 1920s. 
By the beginning of World War H, coupled with the advent of more 
sophisticated and expensive research equipment, the transition to large group 
research, and the need for large infusions of money to make new scientific 
discoveries in fields like nuclear physics, scientists had begun to make 
overtures to interest the government in funding scientific research.285 
However, the eroding world situation was probably as much a 
contributor to the changing attitude as anything. Most documentary sources 
do not give enough credit to this dangerous condition, but physicists and other 
scientists were most often, as the majority of professionals and non­
professionals alike, patriotic people. This situation more than anything else 
^^'^Research—A National Resource: I. Relation of the Federal Government to Research, 
National Resources Committee, December 1938, 189. 
285Greenburg, 65-66; Dupree, 367. 
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probably made the difference in the relationship between government and 
science—they needed each other to win a war which was to be fought with 
advancing technology as well as human resources.286 The split between 
academic scientists, if indeed there was an actual split, and the government 
establishment dissolved when scientists and federal money were both needed 
to win the war against Germany. 
Cementing the Relationship—Bush's NDRC and OSRD 
When the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) and the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) were established, they did not 
create their own laboratories to support scientific efforts, but they decided to 
support research through existing laboratories, mostly in educational 
institutions. The idea was certainly novel, since during the last war scientists 
had most often worked in uniform at makeshift laboratories away from their 
home institutions. This new approach though necessitated some way to 
register the government/academic relationship, thus the NDRC looked at the 
contract as a device to cement that relationship with academic laboratories. 
Interpreted in its broadest sense as an agreement between two or more 
parties to conduct work for the benefit of those involved, the contract had long 
existed as a device to control relations between the government and others. 
For example, the government had been known to contract for surveys of 
coastal or geographic areas of importance, to fund expeditions across the 
Arnold Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (New York: Prentice Hall, 1965), 
10-17, argues that scientists in war time have generally reacted to the national needs of the 
countiy. 
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country, or to support some project of national importance throughout its 
history, but these were not by and large scientific ventures.287 By the early 
twentieth century, the primary support for science funding was still located 
within the university structure. Government support of scientific research 
efforts in World War I became temporarily necessary for national defense. 
Scientists were recruited into the military forces and given problems, especially 
those of a chemical nature, to solve. The National Research Council was set 
up as an agency to oversee this cooperative research, but after the war when 
the emergency was lifted, most scientists returned to their individual 
institutional efforts.288 
The agricultural research movement 
That is not to say there were no cooperative ventures between the 
government and the academics. Federal money provided through semi-
independent research institutes called experiment stations had supported 
agricultural research at land grant colleges since the passage of the Hatch Act in 
1887. The Adams Act in 1906, the Purnell Act of 1925, and the Bankhead-Jones 
Act in 1935 further codified and structured the rules for agricultural research. 
The experiment station was organized as essentially a separate, but cooperating 
organized research unit (ORU) or research institute, or center within a 
2®7For the most definitive work on government and science relations see Dupree, Science 
in the Federal Government. See also books like Alice M. Rivlin, The Role of the Federal 
Government in Financing Higher Education (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1961), 
Chapters 2 and 3; and Homer D. Babbidge and Robert M. Rosenzweig, The Federal Interest in 
Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), Chapter 1 for general historical surveys on 
governmental and academic relations. 
288john C. Burnham, ed., Science in America; Historical Selections (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 257. 
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university or college. The Hatch Act was not explicit about the particular 
structure to be employed in the organization of experiment stations, except that 
the stations act somewhat like departments in colleges or universities: 
in order to aid in acquiring and diffusing among the people of the 
United States useful and practical information on subjects 
connected with agriculture, and to promote scientific 
investigation and experiment respecting the principles and 
applications of agricultural science, there shall be established, 
under direction of the college or colleges or agricultural 
departments of colleges in each State or Territory ... a department 
to be known and designated as an "agricultural experiment 
station" .. .289 
Since the research crossed several departments, for all practical purposes, 
most stations were separately administered by their own staff, quite often run 
by governing boards from various disciplines in universities or colleges. Early 
on, some university presidents even served as station directors, but by 1905 
only four states remained in this situation. A more common practice saw the 
dean of agriculture serving as the station director.290 This administrative 
structure, akin to a quasi-departmental structure, surfaced again in the 
twentieth century as a standard model for interdisciplinary research in physics 
and chemistry during and after World War 11.291 The passage of the Hatch Act 
289"Act of 1887 Establishing Agricultural Experiment Stations," in H. C. Knoblauch et 
al.. State Agricultural Experiment Stations: A History of Research Policy and Procedure, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture Miscellaneous Publication No. 904 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1962), 219. 
290Alfred Charles True, A History of Agricultural Experimentation and Research in the 
United States 1607-1925, U.S. Department of Agriculture Miscellaneous Publication, No. 251 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 134-136 
291 Several works have been written detailing the passage and effects of the Hatch 
Act and subsequent legislation. See H. C. Knoblauch et al., 1962 for a summary discussion of 
the Hatch Act and its subsequent implementation; Alfred Charles True, 1937 for one of the 
first surveys of agricultural research and its relationship with the government; and Alan I 
Marcus, Agricultural Science and the Quest for Legitimacy; Farmers, Agricultural Colleges, and 
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and its subsequent legislation affecting agricultural research, certainly set the 
stage for certain notions of contract research to be implemented later in the 
twentieth century. 
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
However, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) 
came closest to the actual model for contract research as interpreted and put 
into place by Bush. NACA employed a contract type arrangement to fund 
research in both its own laboratory and in those instances it went outside to the 
university. Created in 1915, NACA consisted of a committee of twelve unpaid 
people, including two from the War Department, two from the Navy 
Department, one each from the Smithsonian, the Weather Bureau, the Bureau 
of Standards, and five more at-large members commissioned to solve 
problems in the aeronautics field.292 After splitting into thirty-two 
subcommittees during World War I, the Committee reorganized after the war 
Experiment Stations, 1870-1890 (Ames, lA.: Iowa State University Press, 1985) for an 
examination of the complicated relationships between the various peoples and associations 
involved in establishing and maintaining the experiment stations in the late nineteenth 
century. Robert S. Friedman and Renee C. Friedman, The Role of University Organized Research 
Units m Academic Science, National Science Foundation Report, NTIS PB 82-253394 
(Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1982), 35-36 point to these agricultural units 
being separate from academic departments and foreshadowing a trend for research institutes 
in the twentieth centuries as separate, sponsored-driven and funded, task-oriented, and 
problem-focused entities. Agricultural research received the lion's share of federal funding 
from the federal government up until World War II. For example, from the time of the 
enactment of the Hatch Act through 1933-34, experiment stations had received almost $74 
million. (Malcolm M. Willey, Depression, Recovery and Higher Education: A Report by 
Committee Y of the American Association of University Professors (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1937), 360. 
^^^Roger Bilstein, Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990 
(Washington, D. C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1989), 4. 
150 
into six technical committees and a research director who handled most 
administrative matters. 
By the late 1920s, the committee was enlarged to fifteen members with 
its own national laboratory conducting most of the research work. The 
committee received suggestions for research from three sources: the 
government (most often the military), the NACA staff, and outside sources 
like aircraft manufacturers. The projects from outside sources were assigned to 
a subcommittee in the area for evaluation on technical merit and then sent to 
the executive committee for final approval. The suggestions from the military 
services and other government bureaus were sent directly to the executive 
committee and approved unless they duplicated work already in process. Once 
a project was approved, it generally ended up at the Langley Laboratory where a 
research authorization was written with a scientist who was allowed great 
latitude in the conduct of the research. Review of the research was guaranteed 
at the beginning of the project and at intervals along the way, but researchers 
were essentially left to conduct the research by their own devices.293 Prior to 
building the laboratory at Langley, NACA had also contracted research on 
aeronautics to individuals within universities. The earliest contracts were for 
studies on propellers with William F. Durand at Stanford, who coincidentally 
was a member of the main committee.294 Even after establishing the 
laboratory, NACA continued to contract with universities for scientific 
293Alex, Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
1915-1958 (Washington, D. C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1985): 103-
106. 
294Roland, 33. 
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research work. By 1939, NACA had contracts for twelve investigations at ten 
universities.295 This flexible contract style of research management attracted 
Vannevar Bush when he became the committee's chairman in 1938. 
The Contract As Developed By NDRC and OSRD 
When Bush looked around for a structure to administer NDRC 
research, contracts were fairly common. However, those developed outside 
the USDA and NACA were most often military procurement devices so 
fraught with requirements and special safeguards that they would not work 
with universities that already suspected government control. When Bush 
originally developed the plan for the NDRC organizational structure, he made 
a decision to split the actual research areas from the business side of the agency 
under the assumption that once work started, the scientist need not worry 
about financial regulations with the Bureau of the Budget or the Patent Office 
or the other bureaucratic agencies that were concerned with the administration 
of research. He chose Irvin Stewart, a lawyer who had been a member of the 
Federal Communications Commission, to oversee the business side, or the 
administration of contracts.296 
In Stewarf s mind as well as Bush's, the development of a special 
contract with universities must "combine a maximum of freedom for the 
exercise of scientific imagination on NDRC problems with those safeguards 
295Dupree, 366. 
296stewart, 191; Bush, Pieces of the Action, 37-38. Conant, My Several Lives, 241. 
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necessary for the expenditure of public funds."297 Upon first hearing of this 
new way of mobilizing science, James Conant, Bush's colleague, remembered: 
I recall saying something to the effect that, of course, we would 
have to build laboratories and staff them with government 
employees. "Not at all," Bush replied. "We will write contracts 
with universities, research institutes and industrial laboratories." 
He pointed out that such a procedure had already been used by the 
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics of which he was 
then chairman.. .. Scientists were to be mobilized for the defense 
effort in their own laboratories. A man who we of the committee 
thought could do a job was going to be asked to be the chief 
investigator; he would assemble a staff in his own laboratory if 
possible; he would make progress reports to our committee 
through a small organization of part-time advisors and full-time 
staff.298 
The actual contract form adopted on August 29, 1940, contained two 
characteristics: work at the home laboratory and complete flexibility in the 
research plan of attack. The performance clause, the key to the new contract, 
was an exercise in simplicity: the contractor would conduct studies on a given 
topic and make a final report on a specified date; no details were provided as to 
how the work must be performed.299 
Another departure from past contracting procedures required contract 
negotiation with the investigator's institution, not the individual. This legal 
precedent freed the researcher to do the work but did not leave the institution 
holding the bag if additional costs were incurred. To provide further 
safeguards, the contract was written on a no-cost basis to the institution, plus 
an overhead recovery, or administrative charge, of fifty percent of the wages 
^^^Stewart, 191. 
29®Conant, My Several Lives, 236. 
^^^Stewart, 191. 
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and salaries to cover the institution's cost in providing research facilities.^oo As 
Bush later reported: 
We proposed to contract with the university itself, thus placing 
on it the responsibility for all such matters, and also giving it the 
authority necessary for proper performance. In return we 
proposed to pay its overhead costs, the portion of its general 
expenses properly attributable to the added operation.^oi 
OSRD also adopted the contract device as developed by NDRC, and by 
January 1943, it created what became known as Standard Form 1001 to use for 
all contracts (See Appendix E for a copy of this form). When procurement 
became a necessary part of the project as it scaled into its engineering stage, 
another contract form, the Standard Form 1002, was created allowing for work 
on a fixed price, plus a reasonable profit for the contractor. Educational 
institutions, however, never benefited from this form since by charter they 
could not make a profit. 
Establishing research administration at the institutional level also 
involved splitting the functions of business and research. NDRC and then 
OSRD assigned each institution receiving a contract both a research officer and 
a business or contracting officer. Likewise, the institution receiving a contract 
was expected to assign someone to handle business affairs for the institution, 
in addition to the principal investigator already chosen by OSRD to handle 
research. This important division into two functions became a characteristic of 
300stewart, 191; Irvin Stewart, "Memo on Explanation of Overhead and Survey Report 
on Possible Changes," August 5,1942, in OSRD Papers, Record Croup No 227, National 
Archives, Washington, D. C. 
^Olpugj,^ Pieces of the Action, 38. 
302stewart, 19192-198. 
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the wartime research, but it also continued as government relations with 
universities continued to grow after the war. It is still a common characteristic 
of academic research administration.303 
This type of research organization succeeded then, partly because of the 
novel form of the contract, and partly because scientists were more than 
willing to support the defense efforts. By 1942, work on between 400 and 500 
contracts with about seventy-five educational institutions had commenced.304 
The Manhattan District followed the policies of OSRD and NDRC in the 
contracting area. It used the cost plus overhead basis for all its academic 
research program contracts. Payment for work completed continued by a 
reimbursement system just as it had under OSRD. However, the Manhattan 
Engineer District required each contractor to submit a voucher to its assigned 
area office first where a preliminary audit would be conducted before the 
request for reimbursement would be forwarded to the District headquarters.^o^ 
Contracting at Iowa State College 
The University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory negotiated the first 
contract with Iowa State College, actually a subcontract from its own OSRD 
Contract No. OEMsr-410 in February 1942 for $30,000, to last until July 1942 to 
conduct experimental studies on the chemical and metallurgical aspects of 
SOS^ilton Lomask, A Minor Miracle: An Informal History of the National Science 
Foundation (Washington, D. C.: National Science Foundation, 1975), 38-39. 
^^^Karl Compton, "Scientists Face the World of 1942," in Scientists Face the World of 
1942: Essays by Karl T. Compton, Robert W. Trullinger, and Vannevar Bush (New Brunswick, N. 
J.: Rutgers University Press, 1942), 20-21. 
History, Book IV Pile Project, Volume 2 Research, Part 1 Metallurgical 
Laboratory, Appendix D-1. 
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uranium and related materials.306 Most early contracts were actually letters-of-
intent with specific details to be worked out later in a formal written 
document. In the summer of 1942, the OSRD negotiated directly a separate 
contract (No. OEMsr-433) with Iowa State College for experimental studies of 
tube alloy and for experimental chemical and metallurgical studies in building 
a power plant.307 (For examples of versions of these two contracts, see 
Appendix E.) In late November 1942, the Manhattan Engineer District took 
over OEMsr-410, changing its status to a production or supply contract and 
continuing it as Contract No. W-7405-eng-7 until termination on December 31, 
1945.308 OEMsr-433 transferred to the Manhattan District as Contract No. W-
7405-eng-82 on May 1,1943, when most other OSRD contracts were placed 
under district control. That contract with some modifications is the present 
contract with which the Ames Laboratory continues its work through the U. S. 
Department of Energy.^o^ (See Appendix E for extracts of those under the 
Manhattan District, and the full contract with the U. S. Atomic Energy 
Commission is included for 1948.) 
306a^E£) History, Book IV Pile Project, Volume 2 Research, Part 1 Metallurgical 
Laboratoiy, 2.1. E. I. Fulmer, "History of the Ames Project under the Manhattan District to 
December 31, 1946, 7 also published as MED History, Book I General, Chapter 11 Âmes Project 
(Iowa State College). 
^'"'vannevar Bush, "Letter to F. H. Spedding Appointing Him as Official Investigator 
for Contract OEMsr-433," July 20,1942. "Contract OEMsr-433, Supplement No, 2," December 26, 
1942, 1, both located in Ames Laboratory Papers, Parks Library. 
^O^Manhattan Engineer District, "History of Account," attached to an Audit by E. J. 
Stimpson, May 6, 1947, in Manhattan Engineer District Files, Record Group No. 77, National 
Archives, Washington, DC. Also see MED History, Book IV Pile Project, Volume 2 Research, 
Part 1 Metallurgical Laboratory, 2.9 
^(^^Manhattan Engineer District, "Listing of Accounts," attached to an Audit by E. J. 
Stimpson, May 6, 1947, in Manhattan Engineer District Files, Record Group No. 77, National 
Archives, Washington, DC. 
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As seen in the appendix, the early contracts with the University of 
Chicago and OSRD were quite flexible. When the Manhattan District took 
charge, the production contract underwent several modifications. Because all 
contracts were on a cost plus overhead basis, there could be no profit to an 
educational institution like Iowa State. Particular problems arose when the 
Manhattan Engineering District wanted to negotiate the contracts on a price-
per-pound delivery of uranium and also on certain purity and quantities 
produced. However, there was no adequate way to predict the costs of these 
requirements. Price per pound started at about $22 when the district took 
control, but Spedding thought that he could make uranium for around $8.50 
per pound. It was actually produced at a cost less than that, so with each 
contract supplement, the price was negotiated downward as quantity and 
purity scaled upward. Renegotiating supplements demanded by the no profit 
clause created a constant problem, and during the war it was never solved 
because Iowa State, an educational institution, was the only full-fledged 
industrial plant operating under no-profit requirements. Eventually, the 
Manhattan Project had to reimburse Iowa State for actual costs because the 
project could not get extra money from the College or anywhere else if the costs 
of materials suddenly changed or delays were encountered in the processing. 
By December 31, 1946, the face value of the Ames contracts amounted to 
approximately $7 million. However, the work, including research, production, 
and service had been carried out for $4 million with the laboratory producing 
^l^Frank H. Spedding, "Contracts," Spedding Manuscript, 1-2; Manhattan Engineer 
District, "Listing of Accounts." See the appendix for the history of costs reductions. 
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over two million tons of uranium billets with smaller amounts of thorium 
and other rare earths. Uranium production costs fell from around $22 per 
pound to $1 per pound before the end of the war, in most part, because of the 
Ames process of uranium production. All in all, the government received 
quite a bargain working on a no profit basis with the College.3^^ 
The issue of overhead cost recovery was a particular thorny issue for 
Iowa State because of the difference in the face value of the contracts and the 
actual costs incurred. After the war, that charge was negotiated and 
renegotiated until Iowa State finally received approximately $1.2 million in 
administrative charges for research and development work for the war 
work.312 Some of the federal overhead money paid for a new building that 
linked the chemistry and physics departments physically as well as 
symbolically. President Friley, as controller of the overhead money, spent 
$10,000 for journals and books to start a Physical Sciences Reading Room on 
the second floor of the new administration building; some of the funds even 
went to assist the new commercial television station on the campus.313 These 
3"Fulmer, 7. 
^^^lowa State Board of Education, Minutes of the Iowa State Board of Education, 
December 9,1947,97. To understand the enormous value of that figure one needs only note 
that the entire operating budget of the College for 1944-45 was $4.5 million (Biennial Report of 
the State Board of Education Ending June 30, 1946, 476). The total value of business transacted 
by Iowa State during the 1944-45 fiscal year was $8 million, a 50 percent increase over the 
last peace time year 1941-42. Most of that increase was due to increased activity in military 
training and war-related research (Biennial Report of the State Board of Education Ending June 
30, 1946, 394). 
^^^Frank H. Spedding, "1946-55," Spedding Manuscript, 3; Spedding, Wilhelm, Daane 
Interview, 1967, 35-36. Actually Gaskill and Friley could sign for Iowa State according to a 
resolution adopted at the February 8, 1944 Board of Education meeting: "WHEREAS, 
President Friley has reported the negotiation of contracts with governmental agencies for war 
research, BE IT THEMFORE RESOLVED that the President of Iowa State College, the 
Business Manager of Iowa State College, and Harold V. Gaskill, Dean of the Division of 
Science be authorized to sign, either separately or jointly, contracts with U.S. Governmental 
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funds were spent essentially at the discretion of the President, and it was not 
until 1950 that a policy was created to handle this administrative money 
differently (see Appendix F). That policy again established the two tier system: 
both a science officer and a business officer for the College needed to negotiate 
contracts. The policy for handling administrative costs was also established: 
that all overhead funds should go into the General Fund instead of the 
President's Office to compensate the College for the costs of doing research.314 
Shortly after the war's end, Spedding approached the state of Iowa to 
take some of the overhead money and invest in the initiation of an Institute 
for Atomic Research at Iowa State College to run atomic research projects of 
interest to the state. The Ames Laboratory was also established in 1947 funded 
from the federal government, and continued under the newly formed U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission the same research and development contract held 
by the old Manhattan Engineer District. The contract declared that Iowa State 
as a national laboratory should continue atomic research, particularly 
specializing in materials preparation research. The newly-formed Institute for 
Agencies for War Research, and to accept grants for such research programs, subject to the 
approval of the Building and Business Committee" {Minutes of the Board of Education, 
February 8, 1944, 273). A separate account was created to receive the funds from the 
government for war research, but Friley reported each of the payments to the Board of 
Education during the war. (See Minutes of the Board of Education, June 22, 1943, 181 for a report 
of the receipt of $300,000; Minutes of the Board of Education, March 28, 1944, 298 for a report of 
a $500,000 amount on a research supplement as well as the report of the inspection of an 
addition to the Physical Chemistry Annex on February 14 paid for by government funding; 
Minutes of the Board of Education, September 19, 1944 for receipt of $1,314,000 for continued 
research. Subsequent reports follow in June 1945.) 
3^^Iowa State Board of Education, "Statement of Principles Relating to the 
Negotiation and Acceptance of Research Contracts," Minutes of the Iowa State Board of 
Education, 1949150, March 15-16, 1950, 269-272. 
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Atomic Research would contractually administer the federal laboratory for the 
College.315 
Patents and the Contracting Process 
The use of the contracting mechanism by universities had one 
requirement that greatly affected research administration during the war as 
well as set a precedent after the war: all patents belonged to the United States 
government when research work was completed on federal contracts. This 
policy developed out of lengthy discussions during the time both NDRC and 
OSRD controlled atomic research. As can be seen in the Standard Contract 1001 
there are two forms for patents. The first patent arrangements, worked out 
with companies, essentially stated that the government received a royalty-free 
license from any invention developed from war research. This policy helped 
break the bottleneck that developed when companies refused to sign contracts 
that did not give them title to patents. However, all atomic research 
eventually came under jurisdiction of the short form which stated that the 
goverrunent had the sole right to determine who had title to the patents. In 
the beginning, the long form patent policy was used, but as the project grew, in 
the summer of 1942, President Roosevelt instructed Bush to make sure that the 
government obtain assignment of the patent titles for all research done under 
Sl^Note the similarities between this unit and the agricultural research units 
described atwve. Spedding went to the state legislature also hoping to receive state funding 
for his research unit, much like an experiment station. It was separately administered by a 
research institute outside any one department; it was focused upon research in both chemistry 
and physics as they related to atomic research; and it was sponsored by the federal 
government through a contract-like appropriation. 
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the government-sponsored programs.316 Bush succeeded in convincing all 
OSRD contractors to move toward that goal. 
It was agreed that no monetary consideration would be given by 
the Government for the patent rights that already had been vested 
in the contractors through operation of the original provision, but 
instead that the necessary legal consideration would be supplied 
by the signing of supplemental agreements to continue the work, 
as each of the contracts involved required renewal.^^^ 
Bush wanted someone familiar with Army and Navy patent practices to 
administer patents for OSRD, so the Navy assigned Captain Robert A. 
Lavender (retired) the task of handling the patenting process for the OSRD.^i® 
When the Manhattan District took over the project, it continued the practices 
set up by the OSRD and even allowed Lavender to handle all patents for them 
as well, since he was already familiar with the rules and regulations that 
governed military and defense interests.^^^ Bush as director of the OSRD 
continued to receive "on behalf of the Government, assignments of rights to 
inventions made under the Manhattan District contracts/'^^o Bush, in turn, 
assigned the patents to the public, thus keeping individuals after the war from 
profiting from research completed by the contractors during the war. 
The practice of issuing patents followed very specific instructions, and 
all projects upon termination had to clear up and file patents according to 
316stewart, 229-230, Bush, Pieces of the Action, 83-84; MED History Book I General, 
Volume 13 Patents, S2, 2.1-2.4 See also Office for Emergency Management of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, "Inventions and Discoveries," Administrative Circular 
10.06, MED History, General, Volume 13 Patents, Appendix A3. 
^^^stewart, 230. 
3^8stewart, 226; Bush, Pieces of the Action, 83. 
^^^Stewart, 226-227; MED History, Book I General, Volume 13 Patents, 6.1. 
320stewart, 231. 
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those specifications. For example, research notebooks could be used as proof 
and evidence for both assigning the patent to the government and crediting a 
patent to the named contractor. This evidence was followed with statements 
and certifications from the prime contractor head.32i As of December 31,1946, 
over 5,600 inventions had been docketed by the Patent Advisor Lavender's 
office from over 2,400 prime and subcontracts.322 
After the project was discontinued, this kind of paperwork created 
additional headaches for men like Spedding who not only had to worry about 
the disposal of property for the projects under them, but they also had to clarify 
what was patentable and then go through the lengthy processes of determining 
who should be credited for the inventions. Spedding, for example, spent 
countless hours and several letters clarifying the varying potential patentable 
processes under his control at Chicago and Ames during the war.323 
The Impact of the Contract on Research Management Styles 
The contract encouraged universities to participate in defense work 
because of the benefits incurred doing government research without many of 
the administrative problems that had previously plagued agency-supported 
^21 Amy Services Forces, Manhattan District, "District Circular Letter," Legal 44-5, 
June 12,1944, MED History Book I General, Volume 13 Patents, Appendix AlO. 
History Book I General, Volume 13 Patents, 5.1. 
^^Spor just a sampling of the various cases that required Spedding's attention, see the 
following letters all in the Ames Laboratory Papers: Frank H. Spedding, "Letter to Col. H. E. 
Metcalf Regarding Case S-520, Patent for a Uranium Hydride Method Under Newton and 
Johnson," February 27, 1945; Frank H. Spedding, "Letter to Col. H. E. Metcalf Regarding Case 
S-324, Reduction of Uranium Tetrafluoride with Magnesium," May 4, 1945, Frank H. Spedding, 
"Letter to Col. H. E. Metcalf Regarding Cases S-4035 and S-4036, Purifying Uranium 
Materials," May 11, 1945. 
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research. At first, the contract was flexible, open-ended, and did not prescribe 
the work needed. Those principles laid down by NDRC and OSRD were in line 
with basic goals and principles of academic management techniques. The 
contract also allowed administration of research to be split from the actual 
work of research and that appeased the scientists involved. It satisfied the 
educational institutions because they were to be reimbursed at cost, plus an 
administrative fee for providing facilities and other necessities to enable the 
scientists to undertake the necessary work without jeopardizing the financial 
situation of the institution. The patent clause became an additional control 
device over the project because no one person could benefit financially from 
the work undertaken though due credit for effort and innovation was 
promised. The Manhattan District did not do away with the contract or patent 
principles laid down by OSRD, even though it made the contract somewhat 
more prescriptive, particularly under those regulations that controlled 
production. 
But the contract did more than enhance the academic style of 
management; it allowed the relations between government and universities to 
continue in much the same fashion after the war was over. Unlike World 
War I, the scientists did not retreat from seeking research funding from the 
government, because Bush had brought that research support along with its 
administration to the researcher in his own laboratory, and in order to 
continue work with necessary support, the scientist had a stake in seeing that 
the relationship with government continue to grow after the war. The 
contract helped cement that relationship between the academic world and 
government in ways that heretofore had been unknown. The contract 
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remained the primary way of doing business with the government until the 
National Science Foundation was created in 1950. At that time, the non-
military agencies like the National Science Foundation began to develop what 
they called a new mechanism to control scientific research. However, if one 
looks closely at the grant, it was first and foremost a flexible contract. It had all 
the characteristics of Bush's earlier device: non-limiting in its geographical 
applications, supporting project research with no prescribed formula except the 
demand of a report at project's end, the award of the funds to the institution 
rather than the individual, and fiscal as well as research responsibility 
demanded from the institution. The contract then—first a wartime fiscal 
device—grew to be the controlling device for most research administration 
after the war. It was the foundation upon which the academic world and the 
government built a long-term relationship, a relationship that appeared to 
mutually benefit both parties. 
164 
WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Introduction 
Mr. Premo Chiotti was working with Dr. Wilhelm and me on the 
reduction of thorium fluoride to thorium metal. Mr. Chiotti was 
adding a booster to the reaction in a room a few doors down the 
hall from my office. Suddenly there was a terrific explosion 
which blew out several of the windows in the front of the 
chemistry building. When I came out of my office to see what 
had happened, the corridor was filled with dust about six feet 
above the floor to the ceiling. I was relieved to see that Mr. 
Chiotti had not been injured, but he looked very dazed and was 
pacing up and down the corridor. As I passed him, I heard him 
muttering, "I must have misplaced that decimal point, I must 
have misplaced that decimal point."324 
The story above was probably embellished in the retelling, because 
health and safety of workers were serious matters on the Ames Project. As 
long as the atomic bomb project remained a research project, worker health 
protection schemes concentrated on protecting scientists, who by training were 
careful experimenting with potentially hazardous materials, from the dangers 
of known radioactive and toxic materials that would be used in the wartime 
laboratories. Little was known though about the risks with new materials like 
plutonium, thorium, and other potentially harmful daughter products created 
as a result of splitting uranium. Since the scientific literature contained 
information about the harmful effects of radioactivity, it was natural to start a 
protection program upon that established knowledge base. However, when 
^^^Frank Spedding, "Humorous Stoiy Concerning Explosions and Education," Spedding 
Manuscript, 2. 
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the project turned to production, engineering, and construction, different 
considerations were brought into play. For example, scientists were not 
usually placed in the role of industrial production workers nor were they 
typically supervisors of industrial personnel, so common industrial safety 
procedures were often unfamiliar. Additionally, nonscientific personnel were 
brought into the project, people who were not trained in taking proper safety 
precautions in dealing with potentially volatile materials. 
Early protection measures to protect the health of scientists, were 
suggested as a part of OSRD contracts, but the implementation generally fell to 
the individual laboratories to develop procedures for their own unique 
situations. When the Manhattan Engineer District took over the bomb 
production processes though, it established and maintained two 
administrative units, one to protect the health of workers from potentially 
hazardous materials and another to protect the workers' occupational safety in 
a production, construction type environment. 
Early Health Protection Under OSRD Jurisdiction 
The early wartime knowledge of health issues concerning bomb 
building centered primarily around laboratory procedures for proper handling 
of the radioactive materials that might be produced in chemical and physical 
reactions. Radioactivity protection actually began shortly after the scientific 
discovery of radioactivity and the elements that produced it. In 1895, Wilhelm 
Conrad Roentgen, a professor of physics at the University of Wurzburg, 
published his famous paper on the discovery of x-rays. In 1896, inspired by 
Roentgen's work, Henri Becquerel discovered that uranium emitted rays. 
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Within two years, Marie and Pierre Curie had added thorium, polonium, and 
radium to the list of elements that emitted rays; the Curies even called the 
process radioactivity.In 1903, Ernest Rutherford and his colleague Frederick 
Soddy examined and broke the rays into three kinds—alpha, gamma, and beta. 
Rutherford and Soddy also discovered that radioactive elements decayed, or 
passed through stages where they emitted rays or particles until reaching the 
last stage, lead.326 By the end of the nineteenth century, of these new 
elements, radium had become the most useful, but like x-rays, it was also the 
most dangerous. Only a few radium burns were reported publicly before the 
1920s, but during that decade a more insidious discovery was made—radium 
poisoning. In 1924, Theodore Blum, a dentist, treated a woman whose jaw 
failed to heal after dental surgery. Blum labeled the syndrome radium jaw and 
attributed the problem to her occupation, painting luminous dials on clock 
faces.327 
325Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-
1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 19. This book published under the aegis 
of the Department of Energy's Nevada Operations Office was the first complete examination 
of the U.S. record in radiation safety practices. Based on both oral interviews and classified 
documents, it is the first volume of a seminal work on radiological safety in nuclear weapons 
testing. This volume covers the war years and stops with the end of the management of the 
atomic bomb project by the Manhattan Engineer District in 1946. Also see Alfred Romer, The 
Restless Atom (New York: Doubleday, 1960) and Lawrence Badash, Radioactivity in America: 
Growth and Decay of a Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979) for detailed 
discussions of the history of radioactivity. See Otto Classer et al. Physical Foundations of 
Radiology 3d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) for a more technical discussion of 
radiology in its historical setting. 
^^^Glasser et al., 318. 
3277he stoiy of the radium dial painters has been told in several sources, so see reports 
in the following sources for the full story: William B. Castle, et al., "Necrosis of the Jaw in 
Workers Employed in Applying A Luminous Paint Containing Radium," Journal of Industrial 
Hygiene 7 (1925): 371-382; Roger J. Cloutier, "Florence Kelley and the Radium Dial Painters, 
Health Physics 39 (1980): 711-716; Robley D. Evans, "Radium Poisoning: A Review of Present 
Knowledge," American Journal of Public Health 23 0933): 1017-1018; Frederick L. Hoffman, 
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Workers in a factory belonging to the United States Radium Company 
in Orange, New Jersey, were the most affected by these famous radium 
poisoning episodes. Fluorescent items were in vogue in the twenties, but none 
more coveted than the luminous radium dials on watches. Since radium was 
extremely expensive, the company found that substituting cheaper, but 
unknown to them, more rapidly decaying radium isotopes and substituting 
water-based paints for oil paints, they could fill the mass market demand for 
luminous watches, however at a deadly health cost. Oil paints had been 
applied with rods, but water paints required a very fine brush that workers 
invariably pointed by wetting with their lips. This process called tipping caused 
the workers to ingest the paint, which contained the radium isotope, into their 
mouths and finally into their bodies. Only about 7.5 micrograms per week of 
radium would be taken in the body, so no one thought that those small 
amounts could endanger anyone. By the end of 1924 though, nine women had 
died of the radium jaw syndrome. There were probably more cases that went 
unreported, or other deaths attributed to anemia, rheumatism or other 
misdiagnosed diseases that were actually caused by radium poisoning. By 1925, 
partly due to publicity by health advocates and others, some controls against 
"Radium Necrosis," Journal of the American Medical Association 85 (1925): 961-965; Daniel 
Lang, "A Most Valuable Accident," New Yorker (May 2, 1959): 49-94; Harrison S. Martland, 
"Occupational Poisoning in Manufacture of Luminous Watch Dials: General Review of Hazard 
Caused by Ingestion of Luminous Paint, with Especial Reference to the New Jersey Cases," 
Journal of the American Medical Association 92 (February 9, 1929): 446-473;. A short summary 
also appears in Hacker, The Dragon's Tail, 20-23. For summaries of the radium dial painters 
as well as other instances of public stories about the effects of radium in the twenties and 
thirties, see Spencer R. Weart, "Radium: Elixir or Poison?" in Nuclear Fear; A History of 
Images (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 36-54. 
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tipping had been instituted in the company, but many of the women who did 
not die in the twenties died later of cancer or other debilitating diseases. 
Throughout the period, the company refused to acknowledge that 
radium was the culprit, although they did finally settle several out-of-court 
suits with individuals. In 1933, Robley D. Evans published a report that 
concluded that as little as two micrograms fixed in the bones of a human could 
cause death, but only two percent of the total amount of radium ingested 
probably remained for any time in a person's body. No one knew how much 
radium the bodies of these particular employees retained, but even 
conservative estimates placed the amount at far more than two micrograms.328 
Although tragic, the cases actually added much to the medical knowledge 
about radioactive elements. The literature was replete with reports that could 
be used as a base for the treatment of radioactively exposed patients in World 
War II. These cases also helped set the stage for the later radioactivity tolerance 
standards. 
Scientists and personnel working with ores and compounds of the 
radioactive elements were also victims during this period. Often the problems 
resulted from poor ventilation or careless chemical techniques that allowed 
these people to ingest chemicals into the mouth. Many of the careless practices 
were discontinued in the 1930s after public outcry and treats of legal action. 
Medical patients injected with radium were also victims of overexposure, and 
often many of them were unsuspecting recipients of radium in popular over-
the-counter medicines. After the death of several famous people who took 
328Evans, "Radium Poisoning," 1019. 
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these false cures, research began to be published on just how much radioactive 
material a person could safely ingest.^29 
This idea of tolerance was debated widely throughout the late twenties 
and thlrties.330 Developing out of the debate came the first quantified measure 
of exposure tolerance, the roentgen. Adopted at the 1928 International Congress 
of Radiology, it was based upon the ionization per unit volume of air by the 
radioactive rays in question.331 By 1934, the agreed upon exposure for a 
human being was no more than .1 roentgen (r)/day for most of the body and 
perhaps 5 r/day for the fingers. This tolerance standard remained in force 
throughout the next decade and became the starting point for the Manhattan 
Engineer District to use for its atomic bomb project.332 By 1941, the National 
Bureau of Standards had also published the first handbook detailing safe 
standards of handling radioactive substances. Fortunately, this handbook 
proved to be just in time for the war projects; subsequent health and safety 
protections substantially built upon these published standards.333 
The Health Division at the Metallurgical Project 
When the Chicago Metallurgical Project was created in 1942, health 
issues began to be discussed in earnest. The materials to be used in the project 
^^^Hacker, Dragon's Tail, 23-24: Lang, "A Most Valuable Accident," 49, 51. 
^^(^For a discussion of tolerance and a general history of radiation standards see 
Lauriston S. Taylor, Radiation Protection Standards (Cleveland: CRC Press, 1971), 13-21. 
^^^Glasser et al., 228-230. 
^^^Taylor, Radiation Protection Standards, 18-19. 
^^^Hacker, Dragon's Tail, 25. 
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obviously posed considerable dangers. Interestingly, the half-life of 
uranium238, the most common isotope and the one that was to be used in ton 
quantities on the project, was measured in billions of years and uranium235 in 
hundred of millions, numbers not presenting significant radiological 
hazards.334 Plutonium though was another matter. So much was unknown, 
but it was certain that the separation processes would involve far more 
radioactive materials than those produced in the radium industry to date. 
Even the effects of plutonium on the body were virtually unknown.335 
As a result of the known and unknown health concerns, the 
Metallurgical Project established the Chicago Health Division under Robert 
Stone, originally from the University of California, to protect all the scientists 
and workers under the jurisdiction of the Metallurgical Laboratory. The unit 
was formed August 6,1942, with divisions in medicine, health, and a new 
division called health physics to cover radiation protection or the special hazard 
as it became commonly known. Health physics was an unusual name for the 
new division. Perhaps "radiation protection" was not secure enough, but that 
new division gave the name to a profession that later came to denote the 
334Hacker, Dragon's Tail, 21, 35; Smyth, 90. For one of earliest letters detailing the 
potential problems with uranium toxicity see C. R. Wallace, "Letter to Lyman Briggs on the 
Toxic Properties of Uranium Metal, Uranium Oxide and Uranium Hexafluoride," July 24, 1941, 
the Ames Laboratory Papers. Wallace reports that though little is in the literature about 
uranium salts, it is a toxin exhibiting itself through symptoms of high sugar levels in the 
urine of the exposed. He also reviews the general symptoms of uranium poisoning, concluding 
that though it is not a grave danger, great care should be given to prevent its ingestion since 
that is where its potential danger lies (1-2). 
335Robert Spencer Stone, Industrial Medicine on the Plutonium Project; Survey and 
Collected Papers, National Nuclear Energy Series, Manhattan Project Technical Section 
Division IV [Plutonium Project], vol. 20 (Elmsford, NY: Microforms International, 1977, 
microfilm), 2, hereafter called Stone, Industrial Medicine. 
171 
entire field of radiation protection.336 Three plans of action were developed 
early in the Metallurgical Project by these divisions: the development of 
sensitive instrumentation and clinical tests to detect radiation and other 
harmful exposures; research on the effects of radiation exposure on people, 
animals, and instruments; and the incorporation of shields and safety 
measures into actual plant design and construction. These Metallurgical 
Project sections soon set the standard for health and medical care for entire 
Manhattan Project, serving as the model for providing information on and 
protection from radiological exposures.337 
The medical section 
The medical section at Chicago performed the normal functions related 
to personnel on the project: conducting pre-employment health examinations, 
taking routine tests of blood and urine, and conducting x-rays of the chest. But 
the section was also charged with developing clinical tests to detect exposure as 
^^^Hacker, Dragon's Tail, 29-30. Stone, Industrial Medicine, 3; Robert S. Stone, "Health 
Protection Activities of the Plutonium Project," A paper read at the Symposium on Atomic 
Energy and its Implications, Joint Meeting of the American Philosophical Society and the 
National Academy of Sciences, November 16-17, 1945, Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 90 (1946): 13. Also see S. T. Cantril, "Letter to all Group Leaders Detailing the 
Dangers of Radiation Exposure and Eliciting the Support of Group Leaders to Educate Workers 
to the Dangers," September 15, 1942, the Ames Laboratory Papers. 
^^^Smyth, 123. In addition to the medical, health, and health physics sections, there 
was also a military section established in the beginning. It was short lived because it was 
soon taken over by the Army since it was concerned with German atomic weaponry design and 
the use of German weapons in the field and what effect they might have on troops in the 
area. At this time, it was thought that Germans were developing an atomic weapon. 
Additionally, there was some deliberation on using a pile to produce radioactive materials 
other than plutonium as offensive weapons against the Germans. That idea was quickly 
dropped, and the defense against German weapons was completely taken from the 
Metallurgical Laboratory and placed under the Army's control. Stone, Industrial Medicine, 4. 
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well as conducting research on the many medical aspects of potential health 
hazards.33® 
Blood and urine tests were both used to detect exposure in personnel. 
At the beginning of the project, blood counts were considered an accurate 
measure of abnormalities, but the medical section research revealed that 
normal changes in blood count varied so much that a small amount of 
exposure to radiation or hazardous products could never be determined with a 
great deal of accuracy. Since no better tests were developed during the period 
to detect low level exposure, these blood tests continued to be used to monitor 
personnel once a month for potentially high levels of exposure.^^^ 
Urine tests were successfully instituted to detect small amounts of 
uranium and plutonium. Since uranium would be handled in ton quantities, 
and it was already published in research literature that uranium was a highly 
toxic substance once inside the body, there was concern for providing adequate 
protection to these workers. Conversely to the scientific literature though, 
personnel from the Port Hope factory in Canada had been extracting radium 
from tons of uranium for years with no adverse effects. Also some early 
research with mice exposed to thick levels of uranium oxide dust showed no 
ill effects on the animals. After several toxicology studies, the Metallurgical 
Project proved that while uranium was toxic once in the blood, its various 
compounds were difficult to get through the lungs or intestines to the blood. 
However, plutonium was another matter. In the beginning, plutonium only 
^^®Stone, "Health Protection Activities," 12; Stone, Industrial Medicine, 2-3; J. E. 
Wirth, Medical Services of the Plutonium Project," in Stone, Industrial Medicine, 22-31. 
^^^Stone, "Health Protection Activities," 12. 
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existed in micrograms so there was little danger of exposure, but after 1943, 
cyclotron production raised that amount to gram quantities and subsequent 
research proved that plutonium was just as dangerous as radium. Since it had 
no gaseous daughters like radium with its radon, the problem was controlling 
the dust and vapors of the element. Because it was excreted in a person's 
urine, laboratory procedures were developed to detect it in very minute 
quantities.340 
Research in the medical section tied very closely to clinical services. All 
research with human beings was placed under the jurisdiction of the medical 
section, and many of the early tests studied blood cells for evidence of minimal 
radiation damage. Urine was also examined and studied for any radiological 
damage to kidneys. Because it was well known that the liver was the 
detoxifying center of the body, studies were undertaken on the liver, but 
changes found here were so small that they could not definitely be linked to 
overexposure.341 A summary of the contributions of the section up until 1945 
included: the rapid and simple method of detecting uranium in the urine, 
sensitive to one-hundred-billionth of a gram; urine uranium studies of Ames 
personnel showing good correlation with their history of uranium exposure; 
and significant correlation of personnel exposure to uranium, beryllium, and 
other metals to their urinary excretion of certain products.^^z 
^'^''Stone, "Health Protection Activities," 13; Wirth, "Medical Services," 35. 
^^^Stone, Industrial Medicine, 3; Stone, "Health Protection Activities," 12. 
^^^Stone, Industrial Medicine, 14. 
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The health-physics section 
The health-physics section provided physical methods to provide health 
protection from hazards, but its goal was more than just designing instruments 
or measurement development. Its ultimate goal was to test and monitor these 
methods and instruments and to provide whatever protection personnel 
needed from any dangers that the new and unknown materials might deliver. 
Its first task was to determine the amount of shielding needed when piles 
became commonplace. All of the early protection schemes initiated from the 
principle of placing enough material (gas or solid shielding) between the 
source of radiation and the person nearby in order to reduce the radiation to 
less than the maximum dose (or the tolerance level as discussed above).343 
Piles presented a particular problem because concrete alone was not 
always adequate shielding. For example, holes had to be placed in the walls for 
unloading and loading the uranium into the pile. Since shielding alone could 
not provide adequate protection, monitoring systems were developed to keep 
tract of dangerous exposures. Photographic film had long been used to detect 
radiation levels but had been problematic in detecting the rays of different 
energies to which the workers would now be exposed. New badges were 
developed with a thin shield of metal to cover all but a small area, so that these 
rays of varying intensities could be detected.344 
Public safety was also under the domain of the health-physics section. 
Every attempt at safety by the health-physics section involved prevention. 
J. Nickson, "Protective Measures for Personnel," in Stone, Industrial Medicine, 75. 
^'^'^Stone, "Health Protection Activities," 14-15. 
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particularly prevention from harmful substances entering the body. Air-
control devices such as hoods, respirators, face masks, and even oxygen supply 
units were made available to protect the workers against radioactive 
substances. Dust-laden air was also taken away from workers by the use of 
ventilated hoods that filtered air out through ducts. This principle of air flow 
away from the body had been used for years because scientists often worked 
with noxious fumes. This principle worked equally well for radioactive 
materials. There were some problems introduced because of the necessity to 
completely change the air every four minutes, particularly in work with 
plutonium. Fans capable of handling over 50,000 cubic feet of air per minute 
were purchased for the job, but then heating the buildings became a problem. 
Accurate measuring devices to monitor contamination had to be developed 
since there was not often enough time to design completely effective hoods.345 
Prevention of ingesting hazardous materials through the mouth or skin 
was another matter of concern to the health physicists. Eating food with 
contaminated hands, smoking and inhaling hazardous materials along with 
the smoke, or using contaminated eating vessels were all ways to ingest 
dangerous materials. Smoking was prohibited in places where toxic materials 
were handled, and at Chicago it was prohibited in all areas and offices of the 
plutonium laboratory. Rubber gloves were encouraged when working with 
any radioactive material to partially prevent contact with the skin by 
radioactive materials, but also to prevent transfer of the materials to the 
mouth through the hands. Geiger counter systems of monitoring the alpha. 
^^Nickson, "Protection Measures for Personnel," 81-86. 
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beta, and gamma particles and rays on the hands were established at Chicago 
and other sites. Additionally, special clothing was worn to protect other parts 
of the body and laundry facilities were employed to decontaminate these 
working clothes. Instruments were developed to monitor the particles from 
the clothing before and after laundering. Personnel were also required to 
shower before leaving the sites to prevent taking contamination outside to the 
home. Any skin wound was a particular hazard since radioactivity could enter 
an open wound and react with the body just as if the material had been 
injected. Any wound, occupational or not, had to be reported; no one was 
permitted to work with radioactive materials until a cut healed.346 
S. T. Cantril, reporting his observations about the working conditions of 
the chain reaction experiment in late 1942, suggested several measures to 
protect workers at the Stagg Field, controls that were later put into force 
throughout the project. He detailed items like the importance of cleanliness of 
workers through showering. He recommended adding several showers as well 
as always providing the proper kind of soap. He suggested paper cups and 
sodium-bicarbonate for brushing teeth after working in the affected areas. 
Protective clothing like gloves and overalls as well as masks in the dusty areas 
were recommended. He also suggested altering ventilation systems in the pile 
area, the materials storage room, and other preparation centers to better protect 
workers. He finally recommended the hiring of a full-time janitor to collect 
clothing and masks and supply clean clothing at the beginning of the day as 
^^^Nickson, "Protection Measures for Personnel," 87-92; Stone, "Health Protection 
Activities," 15-16. 
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well as routinely clean shelves, floors and benches to kept the affected areas as 
free of dust as possible.347 
Waste disposal was also under the jurisdiction of the health physicists. 
All sites had to develop burial grounds for radioactive waste materials. 
However, the problem with most of the burial sites was that long-lived 
materials like plutonium were buried along with those of short-lived status. 
This problem continued long after the war when containers broke or seals 
came undone contaminating ground water and soils around particularly 
hazardous sites. No final solution to this problem was devised during the war, 
but suggestions for disposal ranged from burying the more contaminated 
materials at sea in concrete to firing rockets of contaminated material out of 
the earth's atmosphere into deep space.348 
It fell to the health-physics section not only to build instruments that 
monitored hazardous materials, but it also became their charge to keep 
meticulous records of the levels of the exposure to personnel and also those 
levels of radiation found in plants, soils, water, and other living things for 
information to future generations. These personnel became especially 
valuable to the project during the war, and those trained in this area during 
the war found that their tasks continued well after the war years. 
T. Cantril, "Memo to R. L. Doan Regarding Safety Precautions for the Experiment 
at the West Stands, Stagg Field," August 31, 1942, Ames Laboratoiy Papers, 1-3. 
348Nickson, "Protection Measures for Personnel," 87-92; Stone, "Health Protection 
Activities," 15-16. 
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Biological research section 
Most of the biological research dealt with the maximum permissible 
exposures to radiation. The roentgen had already been established as the unit 
measure in monitoring radiation activity, but further studies were conducted 
throughout the war on large exposure in chain reacting piles or other 
conditions where large amounts of alpha and beta particles and gamma rays 
might be present. Studies of the decay of various fission products like iodine, 
strontium, barium, and yttrium were conducted in relation to the metabolism 
of these elements by animals and humans. The effects of plutonium on the 
human body was also examined, and researchers found that it was indeed just 
as dangerous as radium when deposited in the bone. Studies examined the 
elimination of these elements from the body, while others examined 
overexposure in animals and humans.349 
349summaries of the research appear in Stone, "Health Protection Activities," 16-19 
and S. T. Cantril, "Biological Bases for Maximum Permissible Exposures," in Stone, Industrial 
Medicine, 36-74. For more details see the individual reports that were also presented at a 
symposium at the 32nd annual meeting of the Radiological Society of North America, 
Chicago, December 1-6,1946. The reports were published in an issue of Radiology in 1947 and 
include the following: Raymond Zirkle, "Components of the Acute Lethal Action of Slow 
Neutrons," Radiology 49 (September 1947): 271-273; Egon Lorenz et al., "Biological Studies in 
the Tolerance Range," Radiology 49 (September 1947): 274-285; Leon O. Jacobson and E. K. 
Marks, "The Hematological Effects of Ionizing Radiation's in the Tolerance Range," Radiology 
49 (September 1947): 286-298; C. Ladd Prosser et al., "The Clinical Sequence of Physiological 
Effects of Ionizing Radiation in Animals," Radiology 49 (September 1947): 299-313; John R. 
Raper, "Effects of Total Surface Beta Irradiation," Radiology 49 (September 1947): 314-324; 
Joseph G. Hamilton, "The Metabolism of the Fission Products and the Heaviest Elements," 
Radiology 49 (September 1947): 325-343; William Bloom, "Histological Changes Following 
Radiation Exposures," Radiology 49 (September 1947): 344-34; P. S. Henshaw, E. F. Riley, and 
G. E. Stapleton, "The Biologic Effects of Pile Radiations," Radiology 49 (September 1947): 349-
360; and Hermann Lisco, Miriam P. Finkel, and Austin M. Brues, "Carcinogenic Properties of 
Radioactive Fission Products and Plutonium," Radiology 49 (September 1947): 361-363. 
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Summary 
The Metallurgical Laboratory established the first and probably most 
comprehensive medical and health protection unit during the war period. In 
1942, there was a limited body of knowledge upon which to build, but by 1945, 
Stone could list several division accomplishments: 
We calculated the anticipated hazards from known facts and 
extrapolated to the probable permissible levels of exposure. It was 
agreed at the time that we would be given the opportunity to 
check our calculations by experiments and so establish the 
tolerable limits of exposure on solid ground. Our program to date 
has been based on accomplishing these aims for uranium, fission 
products, plutonium, neutrons, beta rays, pile gamma rays, and 
other chemically toxic and radioactive substances that might come 
into the processes on the Metallurgical Project. In addition we 
have attempted to understand the mechanism by which these 
agents acted so as to be able to treat anyone who might be 
overexposed to any of them.. .. The results which we have 
obtained and will obtain are of value not alone to the 
Metallurgical Project, but also to any Project making use of the 
materials developed with the Manhattan District.^so 
The Development of Health and Safety Measures 
under the Manhattan Engineer District 
The Manhattan Engineer District developed essentially two areas of 
expertise under its jurisdiction: the health or medical program and the safety 
program. Each of these programs built upon previous OSRD installations like 
the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory. 
3^®Stone, Industrial Medicine, 9-10. 
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The medical program 
The medical program developed slowly at first since the District was 
involved with just engineering and construction in the early days. After the 
OSRD projects became a part of the District in 1943, it was apparent that some 
coordination of the diverse medical operations needed attention. At first. 
Groves considered pulling Stone from the Metallurgical Laboratory to oversee 
the entire operation, but as he visited with installations one name continued 
to surface as the best choice for coordination of the entire program: Stafford L. 
Warren, professor of radiology at the University of Rochester. Warren was 
brought into the project, initially in June 1943, as chief of a provisional medical 
section at the District headquarters. The need to procure and retain medical 
men and women necessitated militarizing the medical operation, so 
negotiations soon began with the Office of the Surgeon General. After 
negotiations concluded successfully for the Manhattan District, Warren moved 
to Clinton where he was commissioned as a colonel on November 2, 1943.35^ 
Warren quickly set about reorganizing the Medical Section's three 
branches: medical research, industrial medicine, and clinical medicine.352 The 
basic objective of the medical research branch was to collect data on toxic 
material to protect workers who were being hired for the plant projects and to 
^^^Stafford L. Warren, "The Role of Radiology in the Development of the Atomic 
Bomb," in Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, Radiology in World War II 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Superintendent of Documents, 1966), 841-842, hereafter known as 
Warren, "The Role of Radiology." Also see K. D. Nichols, "Letter to Stafford L. Warren on 
the Responsibilities of the Medical Section," MED History Book I General Volume 7 Medical 
Program, Appendix A1 for a detailed elaboration of the responsibilities of the Medical 
Section. 
3®2jones, 410-413; MED History Book I General, Volume 7 Medical Program, 6.1-6-3. 
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treat those who might be overexposed to these same materials. The 
Metallurgical Laboratory conducted much of the early research on toxic 
materials and continued that research when the Manhattan District took 
supervision of its contracts in 1943. Other laboratories involved in this 
research included the University of Rochester, initially under Warren, which 
investigated the exposure of animals to high-level x-rays in its radiology group, 
the radioactivity of certain toxic chemical substances in its pharmacology unit, 
and the design of monitoring devices that were to be tested in Clinton, 
Hanford, and elsewhere in its instrumentation group. Columbia University 
also tested instruments as well as Hanford, which had its own instrument 
testing group. The University of California carried out medical research in the 
area of fission products at its Crocker Radiation Laboratory. The Clinton 
Laboratories had a complementary research program directly under S. T. 
Cantril who originally worked with Stone at Chicago.353 
The industrial medicine program tried to control the particular 
industrial hazards associated with the atomic bomb production processes. 
Captain John L. Ferry, the head of this branch, established groups to monitor 
industrial hygiene activities at the University of Rochester, to oversee hazards 
in materials procurement at the Madison Square Area Engineers Office, and to 
serve as consultants in first aid or whatever needed throughout the District. 
The industrial medicine program did not oversee Clinton, which was under 
the University of Chicago, or Los Alamos, which had its own industrial 
^^^Jones, 414-416; Warren, "The Role of Radiology," 850-853; MED History Book I 
General, Volume 7 Medical Program, 5.1-5-23. 
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hygiene group. The program also had a large field effort that encouraged 
doctors to conduct research studies on special industrial activities and hazards 
through the District. They also drafted minimum procedures and standards 
that were sent to the various facilities detailing approved methods of working 
with materials like fluorine, uranium hexafluorine, or plutonium, including 
the proper first aid measures in working with those hazardous materials. 
Inspections were also under the control of this group and those were carried 
out according to the type of contract involved. Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract sites 
and others where the government had financial responsibility for the costs 
were likely to receive very close scrutiny; where a company had primary 
liability for costs were inspected less often and less rigorously.^54 
The clinical services branch provided the isolated installations of 
Clinton, Hanford, and Los Alamos with on-site medical facilities. These 
facilities operated primarily without supervision or interference from the 
Manhattan Engineer District. Facilities at Oak Ridge in Clinton included a 
fifty-bed hospital, an animal hospital, a psychiatric and social welfare 
consultation service as well as the full range of medical services for its 
community. The Hanford clinical medicine program, primarily civilian in 
nature since it was under the control DuPont, provided regular medical 
services as well as emergency dental care and public health services. Los 
Alamos residents also received full medical care, an important program for 
^^'^Jones, 416-418; MED History Book I General, Volume 7 Medical Program, 3.1-3-6; 
Warren, "The Role of Radiology," 858-859. 
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such a remote site. In 1944, Warren even sent a psychiatrist to help with the 
tensions in this strain-producing plant.^55 
The safety program 
The start of the large-scale building activities under the Manhattan 
District required the implementation of safety standards in the plants for the 
workers. In June 1943, James R. Maddy was hired to assume command of the 
safety program and immediately began the accident prevention program for 
the District. By the end of 1943, Maddy had reorganized his program into two 
units: an occupational safety section that operated as any large industrial staff 
requiring contractors to provide workers with safe drinking water, goggles, 
hard hats, safety shoes and other items that would prevent accidents, and a 
public safety section that worked with the community in Hanford and Oak 
Ridge to implement programs in traffic control and other areas of community 
safety. The District employed a district safety engineer and several resident 
safety engineers to serve as consultants to the various area engineers.356 
The Manhattan Engineer District, just like the earlier agencies, 
acknowledged the importance of health and safety issues in its operations. It 
took the policies that had been developed in laboratories like the Metallurgical 
Laboratory and applied them to the entire district. In short, what had been 
started under individual laboratories was continued and coordinated by the 
Manhattan Engineer District. 
355jones, 422-426; MED Histoiy Book I General, Volume 7 Medical Program, 4.1-4.40; 
Warren, "The Role of Radiology," 872-875. 
^^^Jones, 426-427; MED History Book I General, Volume 2 Safety Program, 1.1-1.6,2.1-
2.12, 3.1-3.8, and 6.1-6.4. 
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Health and Safety at Iowa State College 
Because the Ames Project at first fell under the jurisdiction of the 
Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, there was always a concern for the health of 
the workers on the project. Ames worked with uranium in ton amounts and 
most of the health considerations evolved from that work in the pilot plant 
situation. As long as the chemists were involved in research with the various 
elements, typical laboratory precautions were taken. Ventilating hoods to take 
the dust away from workers were already being used before the war and 
obviously continued throughout. Respirators were used on occasion, and 
some scientists remembered that lead aprons were around when needed to 
work with particularly hazardous chemical materials. Chemists were generally 
careful people, trained in working with danger. So if explosions were a 
problem, they built walls to hide behind when processes could be potentially 
dangerous. Even when working with the unknown, they took precautions 
based upon what was in the research literature about the chemicals with which 
they were working. Uranium was thought to be toxic when ingested, so proper 
methods of handling already discussed were implemented at Ames when 
scientists were working with the materials. Rarely did any scientist receive 
more than cuts or abrasions from the work they were doing. Spedding 
indicated that when experiments were discussed in the Sunday seminars, 
instructions were also included on safety precautions. It was most often when 
someone was careless that problems occurred, such as falling off a chair, or 
doing something careless to get metal in the eyes. Those were typical accidents 
185 
recorded by the scientists throughout the war period. This same attitude 
continued under the Manhattan Engineer District.357 
Radiation was never a large problem at Ames, but unfamiliar elements, 
like beryllium, probably caused the greatest risks at Iowa State. Little was 
known about dangerous levels of exposure to this chemical, but it was a 
concern because Iowa State experimented with this element in quantity, 
particularly in crucible making. Beryllium was an insidious killer in many 
installations, but Iowa State scientists had a particular built in safety feature all 
around them—large amounts of calcium. Unknown at the time, beryllium 
was a bone seeker, but if the body could get enough calcium, it would reject 
beryllium. Fortunately, there were great quantities of calcium around the 
Ames laboratory.358 
There were a few instances at Iowa State of overexposure to beryllium by 
the scientists, and nationally there were over fifty known deaths from 
handling of this material. Norman Carlson, for example, one of the 
researchers, received too much beryllium and was put into the university 
hospital with a high fever for a short time. He did recover though and had no 
further exposure problems.359 Premo Chiotti, another scientist on the project, 
remembered that he too visited Dr. Grant at the hospital for an overexposure 
problem. Ironically, his developed not from the reduction experiment that 
^^^Spedding, interview with Barton Hacker, 1980, 14, 24, 29,38-39; Premo Chiotti, 
interview with Barton Hacker, 1980 in Ames Laboratory Papers, 3, 11-15; David Peterson, 
interview with Barton Hacker, 1980 in Ames Laboratory Papers, 4, 9, 12,15; Spedding, 
Wilhelm, Daane interview 1967, 23-24; Frank Spedding, interview with George Tressel 1967, 
16. 
358spedding, interview with Hacker, 1980, 18. 
3®^Carlson, interview with the author, 1990, 7. 
186 
used open pots to reduce beryllium fluoride with magnesium but from 
making his work area clean. A gummy sort of fluffy dust collected on the side 
of the pots and Chiotti decided that he would clean them out one Saturday 
morning. He got a pail of water and sponge, rolled up his sleeves, and washed 
the areas thoroughly. By Sunday morning, he had chills and by Monday a rash 
on his arms. It was subsequently cured, and he also never had a recurrence, 
but it pointed to the dangers of handling a material that evidently affected 
people differently.360 
Beryllosis was the most dangerous reaction to beryllium. When 
beryllium traveled to the lungs, it acted much like the flu initially, but then it 
migrated to the bones and behaved like radium, displacing calcium. Some of it 
would also travel back to the lungs, giving the symptoms of tuberculosis, 
inevitably causing death. Wayne Jones, a nonscientist glassblower on the 
project, did die of beryllosis later in his life, and though he was never in the 
main area where beryllium was handled, he may have ingested it from the 
glass he was blowing or from even the beryllium in fluorescent lighting in his 
glassblowing area. Twenty years after the project he died, and the Atomic 
Energy Commission settled the case out of court with his family.361 
There were few examples of safety breaches or carelessness by the 
scientists at the Ames Project. The production area though presented quite a 
different problem. Scientists generally had security clearance, so they knew 
with what they were working. Because of their past training, they also 
^^'^Chiotti, interview with Hacker, 5-6. 
^^^Frank Spedding, "Spedding's Role as Guinea Pig," Spedding Manuscript, 2-3; 
Spedding, interview with Hacker 1980, 18-19. 
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generally knew to handle certain substance carefully. When Iowa State 
instituted a pilot plant, a rarity for an educational institution, two problems 
arose: scientists were unfamiliar with some industrial safety practices in some 
cases, and workers, often from the community, had to be hired who were often 
unfamiliar with even routine industrial practices. They rarely had enough 
security clearance to know the dangers of the materials with which they were 
working. Most of the foremen though, who were in charge of shifts and the 
production areas, were, in most cases, at least undergraduates in chemistry, so 
they did know about chemical reactions, but most had little training in 
industrial practices. At first these foremen, with the help of other scientific 
leaders, instituted safety and health procedures much like any college research 
laboratory. Ventilation and hoods were provided, but it soon became apparent 
that stricter adherence to safety would be needed. There was also a basic 
conflict trying to balance safety with accomplishing the work in time to win the 
war. Iowa State's production facility was set up in a small house-like building 
that had to be equipped with even the basics in safety features. Due to the 
emergency, much of the early work was not done under the best of conditions, 
and there was certainly a make-do attitude combined with great difficulty in 
obtaining safety equipment, or any equipment for that matter. For example, 
most of the tools that had been obtained from Bill Maitland's shop garden in 
downtown Ames were hand-driven, so power apparatus had to adapted and 
added to them. Also many of the grinders, cutting mills, and machining tools 
were originally manufactured for other industrial purposes and naturally did 
not have all the necessary safety features for working with uranium. It took 
months to obtain fans that were needed for proper ventilation in the building. 
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and since much of the work took place in hot months without the luxury of air 
conditioning, respirators and masks, though required for particularly dusty 
work, were sometimes discarded for worker comfort. Rules and regulations 
were clearly spelled out by project leaders, but it was up to the individual work 
chiefs to enforce them while also completing the production work on time.362 
David Peterson, one of the foremen on the project, remembered: 
There was a higher level of concern, probably at the higher levels 
of management, and we were given some instructions on what to 
do. I was acting as either assistant foreman or foreman for a crew 
of from six to fifteen or sixteen people. We had the direct 
responsibility for seeing that things were done as they should 
have been done. In a situation of that type it often falls on the 
immediate supervisor to make some decisions with his own 
judgment. I would say that we were perhaps occasionally guilty of 
erring on the side of, "Well, lef s get the job done and not worry 
too much about this or that safety rule." .. . There were other 
factors at that time which were probably weighed in. This was a 
period of wartime. There were other hazards besides radioactivity 
to be concerned with. There was a great deal of emphasis and 
interest in trying to push things along quickly, one reason being 
that at that time it was not at all known for certain that the 
Germans weren't working along parallel line.363 
Dust was a particular industrial problem on the Ames Project, as it was 
evidently throughout the District, probably even more of a problem than 
radiation exposure itself. Uranium salts had to be ground, which produced 
dust; boosters and other materials placed in reaction with uranium had to be 
ground from salt or compound chunks; cleaning uranium caused dust; and 
362gpedding, Wilhelm, Daane interview 1967, 19-20; Chiotti, interview with Hacker 
1980, 19-20; Peterson, interview with Hacker, 7-8,10,15-15. For the example of obtaining fans 
for metal work in the chemistry building see W. F. Coover, "Letter to F. H. Spedding 
Regarding Order of Fans and Rating Problems Slowing Deliveries," July 31,1942, Ames 
Laboratory Papers. 
^^^Peterson, interview with Hacker, 4-5. 
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finally uranium machining operations also caused dust build-up. Uranium in 
dust form could be more easily ingested, so there were several research studies 
conducted by the medical research section at Chicago and at other installations 
in the Manhattan Engineer District on uranium ingestion in this form. In fact, 
it was one of the early experiments with mice and uranium dust that proved 
work with uranium was not as dangerous as first thought.364 
Probably the second most difficult problem in Ames was controlling the 
hazardous chemicals to prevent explosions. Impure materials caused 
explosions as well as wet materials. Improper handling or lack of attention to 
properly lining the bomb retorts could cause blowout problems when the 
uranium reaction came into contact with the steel or iron in the bomb 
containers. Magnesium was a particularly volatile material, and protection 
from explosions on many occasions became making sure that at every step of 
the process workers had a wall between the bomb vessel and themselves. As 
noted earlier, in one day alone there were six explosions. Once an explosions 
blew out the south wall of Little Ankeny in the early hours of the morning; by 
then explosions were so commonplace that the workmen went outside and 
pushed the wall back in as far as they could. Fires were also a danger at several 
steps in the process. Magnesium could shoot a flame several feet in length 
sometimes setting anything in its path on fire. Until the proper insulation 
techniques were learned, uranium cutting or machining caused fires when the 
cutting blade struck such a hard metal. Controlling these special chemical fires 
364peterson, interview with Hacker, 18; Jones, 419; Warren, "Role of Radiology," 855. 
190 
with lime or graphite became a common practice that every worker had to 
learn.365 
There were several industrial safety measures employed in the 
production facility at Ames. When grinders or cutting mills were used, 
workers had to wear respirators; that requirement was apparently rigorous 
enforced. Every man and woman was given time off to shower and change 
clothes at the end of the shift in order to prevent taking uranium and thorium 
particles home or outside the work area. Special work uniforms were issued to 
every worker and required to remain on the premises at the end of a shift. 
Washing thoroughly before eating was also rigorously enforced. To prevent 
ingesting radioactive dust in the process of smoking, no one was allowed to 
smoke in work areas; smoking was allowed in the locker rooms, however. 
Sometimes, a fire would occur at the bottom of a bomb, and molten uranium 
would pour out on the floor. The building personnel would immediately 
evacuate and wait until the fumes died down before cleaning up the accident. 
Ventilation was at least adequate in the old house, due partly to the fact that it 
was a drafty old building. After fans were installed, the air was changed and 
filtered enough to prevent the kind of dusty haze often encountered in the 
average foundry operation.366 
Sometimes, these extreme safety precautions caused trouble with the 
uranium production purity standards. One summer, boron began to show up 
^^^Frank Spedding, interview with Hacker 1980, 18-19; Frank Spedding, "The Day the 
Wall Blew out of Little Ankeny," Spedding Manuscript; Frank Spedding, "Explosions," 
Spedding Manuscript. 
^^^Peterson, interview with Hacker, 6-11. 
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in uranium samples at the rate of 1-2 parts-per-million, enough to 
contaminate the runs. After a thorough investigation, the culprit was found to 
be the shower. After the men showered, they used a preparation to treat 
athlete's foot that contained boron. They tracked the boron into the plant from 
the shower, thus contaminating the uranium runs. A sign finally had to be 
placed in the shower area warning against certain powder preparations.^^/ 
Occasionally, there were people on the Ames Project who did not follow 
safety rules. The most notorious person at Ames was a man known locally as 
the "Green Hornet" because he did not properly shower or clean up after 
working on the shift. According to the prevailing stories, he did not wear a 
respirator and refused to take other precautions in his dusty work. Since 
uranium tetrafluoride was a green salt, the dust stuck to his clothes, giving 
him his nickname. Unfortunately though, no one knows exactly what 
happened to this man as a result of his dangerous overexposure to dust. 
Spedding told the story in his manuscript history that this man was chosen as 
one of the most likely subjects to be tested for heavy exposure to uranium. He 
was approached by one of the medical researchers asking for a sample of bone 
tissue from his sternum. Apparently, he agreed but when time came for the 
test, he vanished, from the room, and from the project. The Ames Project 
owed him several days of pay, but he never came back to claim it. No one 
evidently ever heard from him again.368 
^^^Frank H. Spedding, interview 1 with Calciano, 5-6 
3^®Frank Spedding, "The Green Hornet," Spedding Manuscript, 3-4. The story was also 
repeated in varying detail in the following sources: Adolf Voigt, interview with the author 
1990, 6; Spedding, Wilhelm, Daane interview 1967, 15-16. 
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On several occasions, the tight security of the Manhattan Engineer 
District also interfered with health and safety standards. One security expert 
from the District tried, for example, to get Spedding to put bars on windows in 
the long narrow rooms of the Chemistry Building, but since that could have 
prevented escape in the event of an emergency, Spedding had that plan 
overruled. Another time a security officer insisted upon painting the windows 
black in the same building to prevent sabotage. That would have led to a very 
dark room in which to do the dangerous chemical work; again he was 
overruled.369 At yet another time, Elroy Gladrow, one of the scientists on three 
separate compartmentalized projects, gave three different blood samples each 
week from his ear lobes. Once, after appearing before Spedding with swollen 
ear lobes and asking why he needed three separate samples, Spedding 
convinced the officials to take only one sample and divide it into three parts 
for the health reports.370 
A thorough safety and health program was instituted at Ames over a 
period of time. The program at the pilot plant was aimed at eliminating the 
typical kinds of accidents common in any industrial situation. In August 1943, 
a survey conducted at the pilot plant concluded that since August 16, 1942 there 
were 16.2 injuries per million men hours, somewhat high for a chemical plant, 
but probably low considering the plant was experimenting with new, 
heretofore untested processes. The production plant was also run by scientists 
369Frank Spedding, "Frustration of the Manhattan District Safety Officials," 
Spedding Manuscript. 
^''^Frank Spedding, "Gladrow's Ears," Spedding Manuscript; Spedding, interview with 
Hacker, 1980, 30-31. 
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who were not familiar with all industrial practices, and many of the employees 
were local men and women who had little experience with labor practices.371 
In June 1943, Elroy Gladrow took over the health and safety program, working 
closely with group leaders in the scientific project and initially with Mr. Rafdel, 
one of the guards, on the production pilot plant project.^^z 
Finally though it was radiation, the "special hazard," that received the 
most attention at every installation. Research studies monitored and kept a 
record of the dangers of the levels of exposures of employees. Clinical testing 
was also employed at Ames as well as other installations. Blood tests were 
administered routinely, though most employees do not remember what was 
done with them. Urinalysis tests administered at least once a month 
evidently, were turned in to higher authorities at the Metallurgical Laboratory 
and the Manhattan District. No medical doctor was on staff for the Ames 
Project though Dr. John G. Grant of the University Hospital was called upon to 
provide some support in treatment and research. Thelma Bruce, a nurse 
evidently at the hospital, was the other medical technician who administered 
routine blood and urine tests throughout the war. On occasion, certain staff of 
the Ames Laboratory participated in research studies to determine the 
effectiveness of clinical tests or to serve as subjects for medical research carried 
on by the district. Those research studies were particularly important because 
they became the foundation upon which standard exposure levels were tested. 
These studies also became the building blocks for protection of workers in the 
"Safety Report for Period Ending 8/1/43," the Ames Laboratory Papers, 2. 
372Frank Spedding, "Letter to Group Leaders," June 16, 1943, Ames Laboratory Papers; 
"Health and Safety Report for the Week Ending June 28, 1943," Ames Laboratoiy Papers. 
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nuclear plants after the war. Workers at Ames were carefully monitored by 
research teams. Certain men and women were also studied after they left the 
project to determine long-term effects of the work they were doing. Probably 
because of this system, very few workers and almost no scientists appeared to 
die due to some problem that arose in the Ames Project. It was incredible that 
the major problems on the Ames Project were those that any industrial 
laboratory or factory might contend with—accidents, carelessness in handling 
heavy materials, and typical first aid cuts and abrasions.3^3 
research studies, for example, see Samuel Schwartz, "Letter to Dr. Grant on 
Report of Studies of Personnel at Ames, Iowa," June 1, 1944, in Ames Laboratory Papers, 1-2 for 
blood, urine, kidney, and liver studies on a group of 19 employees with heavy, moderate and 
relatively slight exposure to uranium activities. The results indicated "less abnormality than 
I would have expected from the amount of exposure these men are getting" (2). Other 
research studies were reported in S. T. Cantril, "Letter to F. H. Spedding on Testing of Two 
Men for a very Sensitive Urine Test Developed by the Metallurgical Laboratory," January 29, 
1943; Samuel Schwartz, "Letter to J. G. Grant for Results of Kidney Studies on a Select Group 
of Workers," June 7,1944; Samuel Schwartz, "Letter to J. G. Grant on Tests for Certain Named 
Employees for Urine Samples," June 14, 1945; in the Ames Laboratory Papers. For the kind of 
follow-up studies that were conducted, see numerous letters in the files to those who were 
leaving the project requesting that they submit to tests after leaving. For example, see Elaine 
Katz, "Letter to Mr. Elmer J. Peterson on Weekly Urine Tests for One Month," January 19,1945 
in the Ames Laboratory Papers. Also see Appendix F for a sample letter of this type. 
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SUMMARY: THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY MANAGEMENT STYLE 
UPON THE ACADEMIC MANAGEMENT STYLE, 1942-1945 
The Manhattan Engineer District represented the typical military 
management style, controlling three areas of administration during World 
War U: security, contracting, and health. However, as seen in the preceding 
chapters, each of the areas had already been addressed before the Manhattan 
District took control of the project, and, in most cases, the organization and 
administration of these areas remained essentially academic in management 
style. The Ames laboratory, even under the Manhattan District, ran by 
committee, as exhibited by group leaders' meetings every Saturday to both 
discuss results and plan for the next week's activity. These sessions employed 
an academic style where everyone participated and added ideas to the group. 
Often the plan of research changed or modified itself based upon suggestions at 
these meetings.374 Even that these seminars continued was a victory for the 
academic management style, because Groves had tried at one point to 
discontinue these at Los Alamos, without success. 
374For the organization and topics of these meetings, see "Meeting of Metallurgical 
Group October 15, 1943," "Meeting Saturday 2:30 p.m.. Chemical Group," "Meeting October 24, 
1943, 12:30 p.m.," "Chemical Meeting October 30, 7:30 p.m.," and "Metallurgical Meeting 
October 30, 1943, 2 p.m." Norman Hilberry, somewhat in jest, indicated that at Chicago there 
was not always consensus in these typically academic meetings: "There was never consensus. 
Each one consensed with himself and went out and did—go thou and do as thou pleaseth. The 
real consensus was that this gave a mechanism for two or three different brilliant people to 
disagree effectively because the instant they made up their minds that the path that they 
were on was wrong, that was the last you ever heard of it. . . . It was an extremely effective 
management system and a complete anarchy in a sense" (Hilberry, interview with Tressel, 
1967, Reel 2, 19). 
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Security did affect the academic management style to an extent though. 
The Ames Project remained isolated from the other installations, and this 
isolation probably meant that, to an extent, no one knew when duplication was 
going on between this laboratory and others. Personnel were also not as free to 
travel to other installations, so later in the war, the group at Ames knew less of 
what was transpiring at Los Alamos or Hanford than at Chicago. Early in the 
project, there was a great deal of interaction between the laboratory and other 
facilities, partly because Spedding was more involved at a central facility early 
in the war. He became somewhat isolated from Chicago when Ames 
demanded his full attention. By that time. Groves moved the bulk of the 
activity to the secret, well-guarded sites at Los Alamos, Hanford, and Clinton. 
Even Chicago was out of the loop for what was going on at the Sccrt't facilities. 
That decision had been a military victory of sorts because those new facilities 
were under much stricter secrecy requirements.375 
The strict requirements for secrecy though did not really affect the style 
of management at Ames because the laboratory's organizational structure had 
been established long before the Manhattan Engineer District took over the 
^^^There were several other reasons for the move to three secret facilities than just 
isolation. Compton had been in trouble for disclosing secret information to some uncleared 
workers in early 1942. Bush had interceded on his behalf, but when it came to building the 
bomb, the site was moved from Chicago partly because of this security problem at the 
Metallurgical Laboratory. (For a more complete discussion, see Montgomery Cunningham 
Meigs, 69-70.) Groves also had particular problems with other scientists at Chicago, such as 
Szilard and other immigrant scientists, when he had to inform them about DuPont taking over 
the Oak Ridge project instead of them. The resulting isolation of the Metallurgical 
Laboratory probably extended in some ways to Iowa State since Ames was a contracting agency 
under Chicago. Groves never visited Iowa State, for example, and though it was used as an 
industrial plant to supply uranium and other metals, after December 1942, Ames was not a 
part of any policy making group. It served as a supplier to other facilities like Oak Ridge, 
Hanford, and Los Alamos, laboratories that were making decisions. (For these various 
concerns see Groves, 1962,42-46.) 
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contracts. The Manhattan District did send security personnel as well as 
financial and safety advisors to Ames where the Iowa Area of the Manhattan 
District was located, but these personnel were essentially placed there to see 
that work was completed on time. They did conduct safety and security 
inspections and reported those back to District headquarters, but they must 
have had little effect on the day-to-day operation because the research scientists 
barely knew these men and women were around. No reports remain of their 
activities in the files at Ames and most of the scientists were never sure what 
they were there to do.376 
Contracting certainly influenced the direction of research in the Ames 
Project. However, it was not the Manhattan District that placed the basic 
tenants of contracting—flexibility, institutional responsibility and control, fiscal 
accountability, no cost/no profit terms—in place. Those characteristics were 
developed from the OSRD and NDRC, both civilian, academic-type 
organizations. The Manhattan District continued contracting under much the 
same system, although it often added more requirements or stricter controls. 
376None of the scientists that I or others interviewed spoke of the group of Manhattan 
Project personnel who were in Ames. Scientists made passing references to them, but few 
names were remembered except when humorous stories about their inefficiency or insufficient 
training were noted. Spedding's manuscript refers to them in passing and is the only local 
account of their existence. However, the miscellaneous records from Oak Ridge show 
correspondence from several majors in charge of the area, plus at least a couple of minor 
officers who often signed correspondence for the area engineer. There was also a project 
manager, a financial officer who checked vouchers and reported discrepancies to both the 
Madison Square Area Office and brought the same concerns to Spedding's attention. The best 
estimate on the number of these military staff members located at Ames must have been under 
ten. There were certainly not enough of them to create much of a sensation on the campus. 
(See bills of lading and miscellaneous correspondence between Oak Ridge and these officers in 
the Oak Ridge Papers). The property manager or fiscal officer was located in the Collegiate 
Press Building ("History of Account," attached to 1946 Audit, [1]). Whether other personnel 
were there or not is unknown, but it was a logical place for offices since the building was 
across the street from Little Ankeny. (It is also somewhat ironic that such a secret group of 
personnel were located in a press building.) 
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Patent administration was not controlled by the District either; those policies 
were already set in place by OSRD. In fact, the Manhattan District chose to use 
the existing OSRD structure to manage the patent process for its facilities too. 
Health was certainly a concern of the atomic bomb project, but it was not 
the Manhattan District that initiated most of the health and safety 
organizations. Those carried over from the individual laboratories like the 
Metallurgical Laboratory. In fact, the Manhattan Engineer District used the 
Metallurgical Laboratory for its model to establish an organization to 
coordinate all the facilities under its jurisdiction. The District continued to 
supply many of the same services as those created originally by the 
Metallurgical Laboratory. 
It is true that these areas of administration—security, contracting, and 
health and safety—changed research administration during and after the war. 
However, those changes did not originate out of military style management 
techniques employed by the Manhattan District. It might be said that the 
Manhattan District, while employing some military management techniques, 
such as hierarchical control and strict adherence to command structure, for 
example, was also controlled from the top by an academic management 
structure, a committee. The Military Policy Committee actually made final 
decisions on every activity that the District undertook. So, in a sense, the 
academic management style won the last victory, finally determining and 
controlling the policies for the Manhattan District operations. 
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CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF THE AMES PROJECT UPON 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE 
From 1942-1945, Iowa State College, like many other colleges and 
universities conducted classified, war-related research. At the beginning of 
World War U, no administrative structures existed for academic institutions to 
conduct classified research. By the end of the war, however, three units—the 
NDRC, OSRD, and the Manhattan Engineer District—had coordinated and 
funded war-related research. Each of these units contributed to winning the 
war, but each was a temporary agency. It was apparent at the end of this war 
that scientists wanted to continue the research started and sustained by these 
agencies. For one thing, the agencies had allowed research to be conducted on 
campuses across the nation, not at some remote military site. Structures to 
handle the administration of research had been developed at institutions, and 
they did not want to see the benefits disappear after the war. There was talk of 
converting the war-time weapon to peace-time uses under civilian control, 
and already there were pockets of research around the country that could 
continue the efforts if an infusion of funds flowed from the federal 
government. Even Iowa State, a small college by many national standards, had 
been greatly affected by the war-time research efforts. 
In many ways, Iowa State could not return to the normalcy of the pre­
war years. The College, like others in the nation, saw its enrollment 
burgeoning after the war years in both undergraduate and graduate areas. 
Spedding understood the future possibilities and immediately after the war 
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started pushing for the creation of an atomic institute at Iowa State to 
incorporate the physical chemistry and physics research into a permanent 
laboratory at Iowa State College. Spedding formalized his plans in a letter to 
President Charles Friley in September 1945, calling for a state-funded institute 
to cut across several disciplines, continuing the work started during the war: 
I believe that a permanent institute should be set up, similar to 
the Agricultural Experiment Station . . . which would cut across 
all divisions and departments, and that this institute should have 
its own state budget independent of any federal money which 
might and almost certainly would be forthcoming. In this way we 
could build a sound research organization which would have 
security over a long range, and which would not be subject to the 
whims of federal patronage.. . Further,... we should be in a 
much better position to maintain our freedom of thought, action 
and research when accepting any federal aid.^^^ 
However, Spedding saw more than just an independent research 
laboratory providing services to the government in return for federal funding. 
He wanted the institute to be fully incorporated into the academic structure of 
the institution. Perhaps because of the concern left from his own lean years of 
searching for an academic appointment, he insisted that the institute be fully 
functioning within the academic structure: 
I feel that the institute should be closely integrated with the 
Science departments on the campus, since the everyday contacts 
of scientists with their exchange and clashes of ideas are very 
fruitful in producing new discoveries. I believe this close 
relationship could be maintained by having the permanent 
members of the institute working a definite part-time for the 
institute and a definite part-time for the departments in their 
major fields. This arrangement would of course have to be 
voluntary with the heads of the departments concerned, but I 
^^^Frank Spedding, "Letter to President Charles E. Friley Regarding Creation of the 
Institute for Atomic Research," September 6, 1945, Ames Laboratory Papers, 3. 
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think it would be mutually beneficial to both parties. It would 
permit the institute to obtain men who would feel a greater 
security in being members of a regular department, and it would 
give us pleasant relationships with the other departments 
involved. It would permit the department to have more exerts 
on their teaching staffs, so that a wider variety of courses could be 
given.378 
Asking for an initial budget of $50,000, Spedding got his institute after 
some negotiations with the University of Iowa, which wanted to establish its 
own nuclear institute.379 After several meetings and discussions, both schools 
were satisfied. On November 1, 1945, the Institute for Atomic Energy at Iowa 
State College and the University of Iowa's Institute of Nuclear Research were 
approved by the Board of Education.^^o in 1947, the Ames Laboratory was 
378spedding, "Letter to President Friley," 6. 
^^^These negotiations revolved around the role of fundamental research in chemistry 
and physics at Iowa State College. President Virgil Hancher from the University of Iowa 
precipitated the discussion when he wrote to President Friley after a Des Moines Register 
article implied that Iowa State was about to enter fundamental physics research rather than 
continue with the type of applied research undertaken for the Manhattan District. He 
questioned why Iowa State should suddenly enter a type of study that previously was Iowa's 
responsibility. In an eloquent reply to Hancher, Friley argued that Iowa State must conduct 
fundamental research in those areas of chemistry and physics that relate to its ongoing war 
research in atomic energy. "These two aspects of any research cannot be separated. Since 
applied science always springs from pure science the two have to go together or the applied 
science dries up and becomes sterile." He went on to indicate that duplication was really the 
problem, and, of course, Iowa State would not duplicate those known strengths of the 
University of Iowa. (Virgil M. Hancher, "Letter to Charles E. Friley Referring to Article in 
Paper on Establishing an Atomic Institute," September 13, 1945, Papers from the Office of the 
President, Charles E. Friley, located in the Robert Parks and Ellen Sorge Library, Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa (hereafter called the Friley Papers); Charles E. Friley, "Letter to 
Virgil M. Hancher Regarding Creation of an Atomic Institute," September 25, 1945, Ames 
Laboratory Papers, 2. See also R. M. Hixon, "Letter to Charles E. Friley on Fundamental and 
Applied Science Issues," September 15, 1945, Ames Laboratory Papers; Harold V. Gaskill, 
"Letter to Charles Friley on Recommending the Institute," October 12, 1945, The Ames 
Laboratory Papers; G. W. Stewart, "Minutes of a Meeting of a Group from Iowa State College 
and the University of Iowa," November 1, 1945, Friley Papers; Harold V. Gaskill, "Letter to 
Charles Friley on Establishing the Institute," November 9, 1945, Friley Papers; R. E. 
Buchanan, "Letter to Dean H. V. Gaskill Regarding the Role of the Graduate College in the 
Institute," November 13, 1945, Friley Papers.) 
^^^Minutes of the State Board of Education, November 2-3, 1945, 317. 
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established by the Atomic Energy Commission to be administered by the state-
established Institute for Atomic Research.38i Spedding's plan had worked; he 
had created both a state-operated and federally-funded facility on the Iowa State 
campus linked academically to the institution. Spedding hired departmental 
faculty members part-time at the Group and Section Leader levels for the new 
laboratory. There were some members of the Ames Laboratory hired without 
faculty rank, but not that many until much later when the Department of 
Energy needed very specialized scientists who were not represented by a 
departmental area of expertise. He also managed to get some of the men on 
the project who already had Ph.D.s to stay in his employ and receive academic 
appointments in departments part-time and continue their research work at 
the laboratory. 
Several other men remained behind after the war to complete studies or 
finish up advanced degrees. Many of the men working on the project had the 
equivalent of a Ph.D. but had not finished their theses. In the next few years, 
several of these men finished degrees, including: Donald Ahman who 
finished a Ph.D. in 1949; John Ayers, Ph.D. 1946; Norman Baenziger, Ph.D. 
1948; Charles Banks, Ph.D. 1946; Adrian Daane, Ph.D. 1950; Elroy Gladrow, 
Ph.D. 1946; Harry Svec, Ph.D. 1950, and James Warf, Ph.D. 1946. Dave Peterson, 
a foreman at the pilot plant even finished his bachelor's degree in 1947, his 
Ph.D. in 1950.382 There was one problem with these men getting degrees 
38^Chemistry Department Newsletter, January 1, 1947, 3; Frank Spedding, "The 
Operation and Scope of the Ames Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission," n.d.. The 
Ames Laboratoiy Papers, 1-2. 
382Robert Orr, "Thesis Card Files" the Library Papers. 
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shortly after the war. Their theses were classified; however, by 1955, all of these 
plus others had been released, and the men and women could finally publish 
their classified results. 
War research work certainly added new men and women to the 
scientific ranks of colleges and universities across the nation. Iowa State 
benefited greatly from the infusion of these scientists who were already willing 
to form partnerships with the federal government. They had worked under 
strict conditions during the war, gaining expertise, if not in publishing research 
results, certainly in reporting research. It was only a small matter for them to 
become active in publishing their research results in the national journals of 
the day. 
However, the Ames Project and its successors served as more than 
educational laboratories for the increasing numbers of graduate students 
making their way through Iowa State College. This laboratory and its successor 
served as models for developing research relationships with the federal 
government after the war. As noted above, the OSRD, the NDRC, and the 
Manhattan District were merely temporary structures in the federal 
bureaucracy. Shortly after the war though, the type of research and contracting 
agreement with universities remained while the civilian versus military 
status could be debated in Congress. The relationships forged during this 
interim helped Iowa State set up its administrative apparatus to handle 
research funding that would come as a result of the federal government's role 
in agencies like the National Institutes of Health and in the establishment of 
new agencies like the National Science Foundation in 1950. The Manhattan 
District continued its contracting with the Ames Project under much the same 
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circumstances as during the war. When the civilian Atomic Energy 
Commission took over from the Manhattan District in 1946, it too continued 
to use the contracting principles established during the war. 
This was also a time when Iowa State and other institutions solved 
many of the overhead problems created by the war. Iowa State finally 
instituted and clarified its regulations and in 1950 with Board of Education 
approval published both a policy for conducting research and a policy for 
accepting and maintaining an overhead fund. Those two policies were 
developed out of the experiences of the Ames Project contracts just in time for 
the creation of the National Science Foundation in the same year.383 
After the war, a familiar theme about research funding recurred, one 
prevalent during World War II—that research was somehow connected to 
national security and thus a federal responsibility—developed partly because 
of the new conditions of Cold War confronting the nation. When the federal 
agencies like the Manhattan District, OSRD, and NDRC dismantled, 
research funding distributed itself in three different directions, all borrowing 
from the administrative structures of the war organizations. When the 
atomic bomb exploded in Japan, the Manhattan Engineer District as a unit 
no longer had a mission. It disappeared only after numerous hearings in 
the Congress discussed its future, but finally a civilian board took over the 
jurisdiction of atomic energy on January 1,1947, keeping many of the same 
administrative structures.384 Iowa State's contract under the Manhattan 
^^^Minutes of the Board of Education, March 16, 1950, 269-272. See the two policies in 
Appendix G. 
384Hewlett and Anderson, 654-655. 
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Engineer District was transferred to this civilian board, and later that year, 
the Ames Laboratory appeared to administer atomic energy research at 
Iowa State College. 
When the OSRD disappeared, weapons research was in limbo. The 
military picked up the slack by contracting directly with institutions. The 
Navy established its Office of Naval Research (ONR) and adopted the 
research contract as its mechanism of administering research. Weaponry 
though was not its only interest. As the military agencies came to realize, 
the future of military research was dependent upon advances in the 
fundamental sciences. Boyd Keenan in Science and the University 
examined the role of military research after the war and concluded that 
"realizing that the future of naval weaponry depended on progress in the 
entire range of sciences, ONR provided support and let contracts in fields 
ranging all the way from biology to physical sciences, mathematics, nuclear 
science, and engineering."385 Military research funders used many of the 
structures that characterized war research and certainly exhibited the 
attitude that research was related to national security. 
Vannevar Bush had set the stage for the third path as early as 1944 in 
his Science: The Endless Frontier when he stated, "it is my judgment that 
the national interest in scientific research and scientific education can best 
be promoted by the creation of a National Research Poundation."386 This 
foundation should 
385Boyd R. Keenan, Science and the University (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1966), p. 47. 
386Bush, 1945, 27. 
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develop and promote a national policy for scientific research and 
scientific education, should support basic research in nonprofit 
organizations, should develop scientific talent in American youth 
by means of scholarships and fellowships, and should by contract 
and otherwise support long-range research on military affairs.^®^ 
Bush thought that his foundation would incorporate medical research, 
natural science research, and military research. That did not happen, but 
eventually the National Science Foundation, created in 1950, contained many 
of Bush's ideas about research that he had developed in his capacities as 
head of several war-related organizations. Interestingly though, it did not 
allow support of secret research. After much debate in Congress, the 
"representatives decided that fundamental, scientific research was of such 
great national importance as to warrant the expenditure of Federal funds in 
its support."388 Again, the inference to national security determined the 
direction and structure of this new organization. It had embodied many of 
the principles of war-related research, including its primary administrative 
structures—the flexible contract, no geographic requirements for the 
research work, the cost, plus no-profit principles, and institutional rather 
than individual contracting responsibilities. 
In conclusion, in the post-war period, science again became linked 
with national security, which was by law a federal responsibility. Research 
funding also came under jurisdiction of the federal government because 
there the most money could be expended to secure America's future in a real 
war or in a cold war. This attitude was an important carry-over from war 
387Bush, 1945, 27. 
^^^Annual Report of the National Science Foundation, 1 (1950-51): vii. 
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research support days. Also, administrative and financial structures had 
been created in both the federal government and universities and colleges to 
regulate research funding. Although classified research required special 
considerations and the Ames Project encompassed these stringent rules and 
regulations, many of the administrative structures survived or evolved into 
the post-war period to affect a new generation of research organizations, but 
ones with similar attitudes to those developed during the war. 
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The Einstein Letter to Roosevelt 
Albert Einstein 
Old Grove Road. 
Nassau Point 
Peconic, Long Island 
August 2nd, 1939 
F. D. Roosevelt, 
President of the United States, 
White House 
Washington, D.C. 
Sir: 
Some recent work by E.Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been com­
municated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uran­
ium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the im­
mediate future. Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem 
to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part 
of the Administration. I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring 
to your attention the following facts and recommendations: 
In the course of the last four months it has been made probable -
through the work of Joliet in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in 
America - that it may become possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction 
in a large mass of uranium,by which vast amounts of power and large quant­
ities of new radium-like elements would be generated. Now it appears 
almost certain that this could be achieved in the immediate future. 
This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, 
and it is conceivable - though much less certain - that extremely power­
ful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this 
type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy 
the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, 
such bombs might very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by 
air. 
226 
- 2 -
The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate 
quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, 
while the most important source of uranium is Belgian Congo. 
In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some 
permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group 
of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way 
of achieving this might be for you to entrust with this task a person 
who has your confidence and who could perhaps serve in an inofficial 
capacity. His task might comprise the following: 
a) to approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the 
further development, and put forward recommendations for Government action, 
giving particular attention to the problem of securing a supply of uran­
ium ore for the United States; 
b) to speed up the experimental work,which is at present being car­
ried on within the limits of the budgets of University laboratories, by 
providing funds, if such funds be required, through his contacts with 
private persons who are willing to make contributions for this cause, 
and perhaps also by obtaining the co-operation of industrial laboratories 
which have the necessary equipment. 
I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium 
from the Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she should 
have taken such early action might perhaps be understood on the ground 
that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, von Weizacker, is 
attached to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin where some of the 
American work on uranium is now being repeated. 
Yours very truly, 
(Albert Einstein)^®® 
^Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, The Manhattan 
Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age (Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press, 1991), 18-19. (Original in Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, 
New York.) 
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Campus Map, 1945 
Important Buildings on the Campus 
Agricultural Engineering 15 
Agriculture Hall 114 
Armoiy 14 
Beardshear Hall 1 
Botany Hall 86 
Chemistry Building 20 
Collegiate Press Building 76 
Dairy Industry 89 
Engineering Hall 137 
Hospital 126 
Landscape Architecture 78 
Home Economics 87 
Library 8 
Physical Chemistry Annex I 90 
(Little Ankeny) 
Physical Chemistry Annex II 67 
Physical Plant 63 
Physics Building 28 
Veterinary Quadrangle 30 
Women's Gym % 
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A Pictorial History of the Ames Project^^s 
Figure Bl. Physical Chemistry Annex (Little Ankeny) north view. 
Figure B2. South view of Little Ankeny. 
^The Ames Laboratory in Ames, Iowa, provided the photographs on this and the 
following pages from its historical photographic archives. 
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Figure B5. Basement plan of the Chemistry Building where some of the 
research and development work were carried out. Included in the 
basement was the famous seminar room where the Speddinars 
occurred. 
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a. 
Figure B6. The uranium metallic reduction 
process. 
a. Several bombs of various sizes. 
b. 
c. 
e. 
Cutaway view of a bomb retort 
after packing, but before putting 
in charge. 
Using the Sprout Waldon Mill to 
grind calcium for the charge. 
Lining the bomb retort with 
electrically-fused dolomitic oxide. 
Bolting the flange on top of the 
prepared charge and liner. 
Lowering the bomb into the 
reduction furnace. d. 
jl > *• ' ( 'VilA' .if<^-—• 
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Figure B7. The uranium casting process. 
a. A marked uranium biscuit before 
casting. 
b. An induction furnace used to 
melt uranium biscuits into 
ingots. 
c. A uranium ingot on the scale 
after casting. 
d. Uranium ingots in the shape of 
rods or "hot dogs." 
e. Cartoon about the fires in the 
reduction and casting processes. 
f. Cartoon about keeping staff on 
the Ames Project. c-v , - ..  -A 
d. e. 
it boys, 
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Figure B8. The uranium turnings recovery process in 
Physical Chemistry Annex II. 
Figure B9. Pressing the uranium turnings into briquets. 
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Figure BIO. Compressed uranium briquets from turnings 
process. 
Figure Bll. The Army/Navy E Flag represented to Iowa 
State College for excellence in the critical 
wartime materials production from 1942-
1945. 
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Figure B12. Group Leaders in charge of the Ames Project. 
From left to right are: Harley A. Wilhelm, 
Adrian Daane, Amos Newton, Adolf Voigt, 
Wayne Keller, C F Gray, Frank Spedding, 
Robert Rundle, and James Warf. 
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Figure B13. Tearing down Little Ankeny in 1953, south 
view. The building was used shortly after 
World War n for the production of thorium 
and for other particularly dirty processes. By 
1953, it had outlived its usefulness and as 
Harley A. Wilhelm succinctly put it, "it had 
become more reactive than active." 
Figure B14. Stone and plaque that were placed on the 
Little Ankeny site. 
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Figure B15. Wayne Keller's research notebook pages describing the 
successful uranium reduction experiment with calcium and 
uranium tetrafluoride, August 3, 1942. 
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Figure B15. (Continued). 
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The Chicago Pile Experiment, December 1,1942 
NEUTRON 
INTENSITY 
TIME \ 
CONTROL RODS 
REMOVED 
/ 
LEVELING OF 
INTENSITY INDICATES 
PILE NOT YET 
"CRITICAL" 
\ SHARP DROP DUE 
TO CHANGE IN 
SCALE OF 
RECORDING INSTRUMENT 
/ 
SELF SUSTAINING 
REACTION 
EXPONENTIAL RISE OF 
INTENSITY WITH NO 
EVIDENCE OF 
LEVELING OFF 
SHARP DROP IN 
INTENSITY DUE 
TO INSERTION 
OF CONTROL ROC 
Figure B17. The galvanometer showing the start-up of the first self-
sustaining nuclear chain reaction, December 1, 1942. 
Figure B16. An artisf s rendition of the chain reaction experiment on December 2, 1942. Frank Spedding is the man 
leaning forward in the middle of the row of standing people (fifth firom the left). 
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APPENDIX C THE ACADEMIC VS. THE MILITARY STYLE 
OF MANAGING RESEARCH 
Manhattan District Organization Chart, 1943 245 
Madison Square Area Feed Materials Network, 1945...246 
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Manhattan District Organization Chart, 1943^90 
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Madison Square Area Feed Materials Network, 1945 
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120644 
1^' 
I, do solemnly 
swear that I will not by any means divulge nor dls-
olose any sepret or confidential information that I 
may obtain or acquire by reason of my oonneotion 
with the National Defense Research Committee unless 
authorized to do so by the Chairman or a member of 
that Committee. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
, wday of , A#D# 
(City or Place) (State) 
(SEAL) 
/l/(P.77hf^ y- Ekf < L / ,  
COÏMIHSIU.I fXWKi S JliLK 4, \ ^ "2- . 
Note.- If the oath is taken before a Notary Public 
the date of expiration of his commission should 
be shown. 
Figure Dl. Oath of allegiance for Harley A, Wilhelm. 
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Hbe XHniverei^ of Cbicago 
Actntlucglcm labocatotc 
MIDWAY 0000 
EXT.  1ZS0 
December 9> 1943 
#5^  
Dr. 1''. H. Spedding 
Department of Chemistry 
Iowa State College 
m^es, lov/a 
Dear Dr. Spedding: 
As you know, the program for the next Policy meeting of the 
Council has been changed from Wednesday to Monday, December 20th, and as s ronult 
the nctvting with Dr. Thomas will be held on Monday afternoon, contrary to 
\,'hr.t v.-an planned last month. Do you or your men have any contribution to 
r.cke ••'.t the Thonas nceting, and if so, v/ho will make it? We also neod to 
'rHï.T.v v;h'3thsr Homebody from your group will speak in the Chemistry Division 
Seminar for ^ londay evening, and how much time would you like to reserve. 
For the Infor/.iation meeting on Tuesday morning, I have reserved twenty min­
utes for you. Is that all right? 
I hope that you had a good trip home and that you have recov­
ered from your attack of the flu. 
Best regards. 
Very sincerely yours, 
J<VVWC/j 
James Franck 
Figure D2. Sample classified document with appropriate markings. 
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Hanford. 
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Standard Form lOOl^^i 
Standard Form looi. 
Contract No. 
Symbol No. 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made this day of 
effective as of the day of between THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA (hereinafter called "the Government"), represented by the Ex­
ecutive Secretary (hereinafter called "the Contracting Officer"), Office of Scien­
tific Research and Development in tlie Office for Emergency Management, Ex­
ecutive Office of the President, and 
(hereinafter called "the Contractor"). 
WHEREAS, the Government desires that the Contractor conduct studies and 
experimental investigations as hereinafter specified requiring tlie services of quali­
fied personnel; and 
WHEREAS, the Contractor is willing to conduct such studies and experimental 
investigations on an "actual cost" basis as hereinafter specified; and 
WHEREAS, the contemplated work will require that a substantial part of the 
materials, supplies and other articles acquired therefor be either consumed or 
incorporated into equipment or other articles to be constructed or assembled 
during the course of the work; and 
WHEREAS, the Government desires that such studies and experimental in­
vestigations be conducted under the direction of 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (hereinafter called "the 
Scientific Officer") ; and 
WHEREAS, the Contracting Officer finds after careful scrutiny that payment in 
advance on account of actual costs will promote the national interest; 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
ARTICLE i. (a) Subject Wor^. The Contractor shall, with the utmost dispatch 
and in accordance with instructions issued by the Scientific Officer, supply the 
necessary personnel and facilities for and conduct studies and experimental in­
vestigations in connection with 
The Contractor shall report the progress of such studies and investigations from 
time to time as requested by the Scientific Officer, and shall furnish a complete 
final report of its findings and conclusions. Such reports shall be furnished in such 
quantity and form as may be required by the Scientific Officcr. The Contractor's 
undertakings under this paragraph are hereinafter called "the subject work." 
Stewart, Appendix 2, 339-346. 
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(b) Termination. The Contractor shall proceed with the subject work until 
or until such later date as may be authorized in writing by 
the Contracting Officer and agreed to by the Contractor. 
(c) /tcceleration oj Termination. The Contracting Officer may at any time 
advance the date fixed under paragraph (b) by giving the Contractor thirty (30) 
days' notice in writing that the subject work shall terminate at a specified 
earlier date. Upon receipt of such notice the Contractor shall exercise all reasonable 
diligence to obtain the cancellation of its outstanding commitments hereunder 
running beyond such earlier date, but any reasonable cancellation charges in­
curred thereby by the Contractor and any reasonable loss upon outstanding com­
mitments which it is unable to cancel shall be reimbursable hereunder. 
(d) Inspections, The Contracting Officer or the Scientific Officer may inspect the 
subject work at all reasonable times. 
(e) Subcontracts. No subcontract executed hereunder shall provide for (i) pay­
ment on a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis or (ii) the payment of a fixed fee 
in excess of seven per centum of the estimated cost, exclusive of the fee. The 
Contractor shall not enter into subcontracts involving research or development 
of the kind contemplated by this contract without obtaining the written approval 
of the Scientific Officer as to the substance and the Contracting Officer as to the 
form thereof. The Contractor shall refer each prospecdve subcontract which 
might involve such research or development to the Scientific Officer, who shall 
determine whether or not such research or development is involved. 
(f) Special Property Acquisition, The Contractor shall obtain the approval of 
the Contracting Officer before (i) purchasing motor vehicles, (ii) making any 
building alteration at a cost of $500.00 or more, (iii) constructing buildings, or 
(iv) leasing, purchasing or otherwise acquiring real property, for the cost of any 
of which reimbursement will be claimed hereunder. 
(g) Properly Furnished Directly by the Government, The Government may 
furnish to the Contractor materials, supplies, apparatus, equipment or other 
property for use in the performance of the subject work, and such property shall 
be used by the Contractor only for purposes approved by the Scientific Officer. 
(h) Definitions, "Contracting Officer" refers to the present Contracting Officer 
and his successors in office. "Scientific Officer" refers to the present Scientific 
Officer and his successors in office. Scientific assistants may act for and on behalf 
of the Scientific Officer in every respect under this contract except in connecdon 
with subconu-acts under Article i (e) hereof. The Scientific Officer may designate 
scientific assistants in addition to, or in substitution for, those initially designated 
below, by naming such assistants in writing and lodging a copy of such designa­
tion with the Contractor by transmitting such copy through the Contracting 
Officer. The following persons are hereby initially designated as scientific assistants: 
ARTICLE 2. (a) Reimbursement for Costs. The Government shall reimburse 
the Contractor, upon the submission of public vouchers supplied by the Govern­
ment and approved by the Contracting Officer, for the "actual cost" to the Con­
tractor of performance of its undertakings hereunder in an amount not exceeding (I ). 
The Contractor may submit such vouchers at monthly intervals for "actual cost" 
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incurred and not previously reimbursed, Tlie Contracting Officer may withhold 
all or any part of the final reimbursement payment until receipt of the final report, 
the property accounting, and the patent disclosure and designation required here­
under. 
(b) Cost Escape, Notwithstanding any other provision hereof, when and if 
"actual cost" in such maximum amount shall have been incurred or obligated 
hereunder, the Contractor shall not be required to incur or obligate furdier 
"actual cost" hereunder unless and until the Government shall first agree in 
wridng to reimburse the Contractor therefor. 
(c) Vouchers, All vouchers submitted shall indicate, with respect to each class 
of items listed by the Contractor thereon, the particular subparagraph of para­
graph (d) below under which reimbursement is claimed, and shall be itemized 
and supported by appropriate substantiating documents as required by the Con­
tracting Officer. 
(d) Cost Determination. "Actual cost" as used herein includes only die fol­
lowing: 
(1) Salaries and Wages. Expenditures by the Contractor for the salaries and 
wages of its employees hereunder, plus Federal and State Social Security 
taxes paid by the Contractor thereon; 
(2) Borrowed Personnel. Expenditures by the Contractor to reimburse other 
employers for salaries and wages paid by them to their employees released 
for and engaged in performance of the Contractor's undertakings here­
under, plus Federal and State Social Security taxes paid thereon by such 
employers; 
(3) Materials and Services. Expenditures by tlic Contractor for such materials, 
supplies, apparatus, equipment and other articles (including processing 
and tesdng thereof by others, and rental of apparatus and equipment 
from others), and for the services of others not reimbursed under sub­
paragraphs (i) and (2), as are necessary for performance of its under­
takings hereunder; Provided, That, when the Contractor furnishes articles 
customarily produced or assembled in the regular course of its business, 
it shall be reimbursed therefor at fair and reasonable prices not in excess 
of the lower of (i) those usually charged by the trade for such articles or 
(ii) the lowest net prices charged by it therefor at the time to any 
customer; 
(4) Overhead. An allowance for overhead costs not otherwise reimbursable 
hereunder in an amount equal to per cent ( ) of the total 
salaries and wages (but not taxes) reimbursable under subparagraphs 
(1) and (2) hereof; 
(5) Communication and Shipping. Expenditures by the Contractor necessary 
for performance of its undertakings hereunder for long distance telephone 
calls, telegrams, cablegrams, radiograms, postage, freight, express, and 
drayage; 
(6) Travel, Expenditures by the Contractor necessary for performance of its 
undertakings hereunder for the transportation expenses of persons directly 
engaged therein, plus reasonable actual subsistence expenses, in an amount 
not exceeding ten dollars ($10.00) per person per day, of such persons 
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incurred during periods of travel or, at the Contractor's option, an allow­
ance, in lieu of actual subsistence expenses of such persons, not exceeding 
(i) six dollars ($6.00) per person for each calendar day or major fraction 
thereof during the period of travel within the continental limits of the 
United States, and (ii) seven dollars ($7.00) per person for each calendar 
day or major fraction thereof during the period of foreign travel outside 
the continental limits of the United States; Promded, That all such 
foreign travel shall be limited to persons directly engaged in the per­
formance of the subject work hereunder and shall be authorized or ap­
proved in writing by the Contracting Officer; Provided, jurther, That 
expenses for transportation hereunder by motor vehicle other than com­
mon carrier or rented automobile shall be reimbursed on a reasonable 
actual expense basis or, at the Contractor's option, on a mileage basis at a 
rate not exceeding five cents (5^) per mile per vehicle, in lieu of the 
actual expenses of such transportation; 
(7) Insurance, Expenditures by the Contractor hereunder for premiums on 
(i) insurance required by law, and (ii) insurance required or specifically 
approved by the Contracting Officer; 
(R) Subcontracts. Expenditures by the Contractor representing payments to 
subcontractors performing any research or development hereunder; 
(9) Real Property. Expenditures by the Contractor hereunder for leasing, 
purchasing, or otherwise acquiring real property or altering or construct­
ing buildings; 
(10) Termination. Expenditures by the Contractor in connection with an ac­
celeration of termination of the subject work; 
(11) Special Costs. Special expenditures by the Contractor which are specifically 
certified by the Contracting Officer in writing to constitute part of the 
"actual cost" of its undertakings hereunder. 
(e) Advance Payments. If the Contractor requests in writing that an advance 
payment be made on account of reimbursable "actual cost," the Government shall 
advance the amount estimated by the Contractor and concurred in by the Con­
tracting Officer as the probable "actual cost" during any calendar month for 
which no payment has previously been made; Provided, That the Contracting 
Officer may in his discretion withhold approval of any such advance payment to 
protect the interests of the Government; Provided, jurther, That in case of such 
advance payment, the Contractor shall submit vouchers for its "actual cost" during 
the month for which such advance is made and an accounting for the full amount 
of such advance before the end of the following month, and shall retivn to the 
Government, when and if requested by the Contracting Officer, the portion of 
such advance for which vouchers have not been so submitted, without prejudice 
to the right of the Contractor to obtain reimbursement payments for "actual cost" 
upon the later submission of vouchers. 
ARTICLE 3. (a) Disposition of Personal Property. At any time prior or subse­
quent to the termination of the subject work, the Contractor shall deliver at the 
Government's expense, when and as directed by the Contracting Officer, all or any 
part of materials, supplies, apparatus, equipment or other articles of personal 
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property not theretofore expended or delivered hereunder which have been 
furnished by the Government or for the cost of which the Contractor has been 
reimbursed or has the right to claim reimbursement hereunder; Provided, Tliat, 
upon the termination of the subject work, the Contractor shall have the right to 
retain any such property other tlian (i) that furnished by the Government and 
(ii) articles acquired for administrative purposes, unless notified by the Con­
tracting Officer that the further prosecution of the war renders such action in­
advisable, by returning to the Government such sum of money as the Contracting 
Officer may determine to be fair and proper, 
(b) Disposition of Premises Altered or Constructed, After the termination of 
the subject work, the Contractor shall elect, with respect to premises upon which 
any alteration or construction has been done hereunder, whether (i) to retain 
the benefit of such construction or alteration, in which case the Contractor shall 
return to or credit the Government with the portion of the reimbursement by the 
Government for its expenditure therefor determined by negotiation between the 
Contractor and the Contracting Officer to be fair and proper, or (ii) to have such 
premises restored to substantially the same condition as prior to such alteration or 
construction, in which case it shall retain all such reimbursement and the Gov­
ernment shall pay the net cost of such restoration. The Contractor shall furnish 
on request all information deemed relevant by the Contracting Officer. 
(c) Accountability for Property. Within one hundred twenty (120) days after 
the termination of the subject work, the Contractor shall render an accounting, in 
accordance with the instructions of the Contracting Officer, of all property the 
disposition of which is governed by this Article. 
ARTICLE 4. (a) Responsibility of Contractor. The Contractor shall be re­
sponsible to the Government for loss of or damage to materials, supplies, apparatus, 
equipment and any other property, real or personal, the disposition of which is 
governed hereby, only if and so far as attributable to the wilful misconduct or lack 
of good faith of an officer of the Contractor or of any other person having com­
plété or substantially complote charge of the establishment where any under­
taking hereunder by the Contractor is performed. 
(b) Insurance. The Contractor shall maintain insurance in such forms and 
amounts and for such periods of time as the Contracting Officer may require or 
approve. 
(c) Indemnity Clause. The Government shall indemnify the Contractor, from 
such funds as may be hereafter appropriated by Congress for such purpose, 
against loss or damage to persons or property arising from performance of its 
undertakings hereunder (including settlements made with the written consent of 
the Contracting Officer) not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, in 
amounts found and certified by the Contracting Officer to be just and reasonable; 
Provided, That the Contractor shall give the Contracting Officer prompt notice 
of the institution of, and permit the Contracting Officer at his election to control 
the defense of, all law suits instituted against the Contractor with respect to any 
such alleged loss or damage. 
ARTICLE 5. Patent Provisions. [Long Form] (a) The Contractor hereby grants 
to the Government of the United States an irrevocable option to purchase a non-
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exclusive license or licenses, subject to the payment of royalties, to make, have 
made, and use, for military, naval, and national defense purposes, and to sell in 
accordance with law, material, and to use processes, under all United States 
patents and applications for patents owned or controlled by the Contractor cover­
ing inventions heretofore developed and actually or constructively reduced to 
practice and concerned with the subject work. Any such license shall be granted 
upon reasonable terms subject to negotiation at the time the Government may 
desire to exercise its option hereunder. 
(b) The Contractor shall and does hereby, in consideration of the premises and 
in consideration of payments to be made by the Government under this contract, 
grant unto the Government a non exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license, to 
make, have made, and use, for military, naval, and national defense purposes, 
and to sell or otherwise dispose of in accordance with law, material, and to use 
processes, under all inventions made in carrying out the subject work, including 
nil inventions [exclusive of inventions covered by paragraph (a)] which for the 
first time were actually or constructively reduced to practice as a result of the 
subjcct work, whether patented or unpatented. The Contractor shall make to the 
Government, prior to the final settlement under this contract, a complete dis­
closure of all inventions made in carrying out the subject work and shall designate 
in writing which of the said inventions have been or will be covered by applica­
tions for patents filed or caused to be filed by the Contractor. The Contractor shall 
have the right, upon notification by the Government, td elect whether it or the 
Government shall file applications for patents on inventions in addidon to those 
designated by the Contractor as aforesaid. 
(c) As to all such inventions that are not covered by applications for patents 
as specified in paragraph (b) the Government shall have the right, at the Gov­
ernment's expense, to file, prosecute, and act upon applications for patents thereon, 
and the Contractor shall secure the execution of the necessary papers and do all 
things requisite to protect the Government's interest in prosecuting such applica­
tions to a final issue. When an application for patent is filed by the Government 
as aforesaid, all right, title, and interest in and under the patent shall be assigned 
to the Government by the Contractor except that the Contractor may retain a 
non exclusive license non-transferable except to an assignee of the entire business 
to which said license is appurtenant. 
(d) The Contractor covenants that it has not entered into and will not enter 
into any arrangement to evade the intent of this Article for the Government to 
obtain without further payment a non exclusive license to patents, applications for 
patents and inventions as called for in paragraph (b) above. 
(e) The execution of this contract shall not constitute a waiver of any rights 
the Government may have under patents or applications for patents. 
ARTICLE 5. Patent Provisions. [Short Form] Whenever any patentable dis­
covery or invention is made by the Contractor or its employees in the course of 
the subjcct work, the Contracting Officer shall have the sole power to determine 
whether or not a patent application shall be filed, and to determine the disposi­
tion of the title to and the rights under any application or patent that may result 
The judgment of the Contracting Officer on such matters shall be accepted as 
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final, and the Contractor, for itself and for its employees, agrees that the inventor 
or inventors will execute all documents and do all diings necessary or proper to 
carry out the judgment of the Contracting Officer. The Contractor shall include 
the provisions of this Article in all contracts of employment with persons who do 
any part of the subject work. 
ARTICLE 6. Security Provisions, (a) During the continuance of the present 
unlimited National Emergency, the Contractor shall not disclose any information 
concerning this contract or obtained as a result of the performance of its under­
takings hereunder to any person, except employees assigned to such work, with­
out the written consent of the Contracting Officer or the Scientific Officer, Subse­
quent to the termination of such Emergency, disclosure of such information shall 
be governed by the applicable laws and regulations governing the disclosure of 
classified information. Disclosure of information concerning this contract or such 
work to any person not entitled to receive it, or failure to safeguard all such 
classified matters within the Contractor's control, may subject the Contractor, its 
employees and subcontractors to criminal liability under the laws of the United 
States, including (i) 50 U.S.C. Chap. 4, (ii) 50 U.S.C. 45-45d, as supplemented by 
Executive Order 8381, dated March 22, 1940, and (iii) 35 U.S.C., 42c. 
(b) The Contractor shall immediately submit a confidential report to the 
Contracting Officer whenever for any cause it has reason to believe that there is 
an active danger of espionage or sabotage affecting any of the subject work. 
(c) The Contractor shall not employ any alien on or permit any alien to have 
access to the subject work or any plans, specifications or records relating to its 
undertakings hereunder without the written consent of the Contracting Officer 
as to each such alien. 
(d) The Contractor, whenever requested by the Contracting Officer or the 
Scientific Officer, shall report to the Contracting Officer the citizenship, country 
of birth or alien status of any or all of its employees at the site of or having access 
to any of the subject work. 
(e) The Contractor shall not employ or continue to employ on, and shall ex­
clude from the site of, any of the subject work any person or persons designated 
in writing by the Contracting Officer or the Scientific Officer for cause as undesir­
able to have access to such work. 
ARTICLE 7. Public Policy Provisions, (a) The Contractor warrants that it 
has not employed any person to solicit or secure this contract upon any agreement 
for a commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. Breach of this war­
ranty shall give the Government the right to annul the contract or, in its discretion, 
to deduct from the contract price or consideration the amount of such com­
mission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. This warranty shall not apply to 
commissions payable by the Contractor upon contracts or sales secured or made 
through bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the 
Contractor for the purpose of securing business. 
(b) No Member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, shall 
be admitted to any share or part of this contract or any benefit that may arise 
therefrom, but this provision shall not be construed to extend to this contract if 
made with a corporation for its general benefit. 
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(c) The Contractor shall not discriminate in any act performed hereunder 
against any person on the ground of race, creed, color or national origin, and 
shall include such provision in each subcontract. 
(d) In the performance of its undertakings hereunder, the Contractor shall 
comply with policies, directives, and regulations prescribed under Executive Order 
No. 9301, "Establishing a Minimum Wartime Workweek of Forty-Eight Hours," 
and with the minimum workweek prescribed in said Executive Order as and 
when applicable under such policies, directives, and regulations; and shall include 
such provision in each subcontract. 
ARTICLE 8. Eight Hour Law, The Contractor shall compensate laborers and 
mechanics for all hours worked by them hereunder in excess of eight (8) hours in 
any one calendar day at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1/2) times the 
basic rate of pay of such laborers and mechanics, and shall include such provision 
in each subcontract. For each violation of the requirements of this Article a 
penalty of five dollars ($5.00) shall be imposed upon the Contractor or sub­
contractor for each laborer or mechanic for each calendar day in which such 
employee is required or permitted to work hereunder more than eight (8) hours 
without receiving such additional compensation, and all penalties thus imposed 
shall be withheld for the use and benefit of the Government. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Government and the Contractor have causcd 
this contract to be signed and sealed, intending to be legally bound thereby. 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Witnesses; 
BY (SEAL) 
Executive Secretary, Office of 
Scientific Research and Development 
(Contracting Officer) 
(Contractor) 
BY (SEAL) 
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Contract OEMsr-410 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made this 10th day of October 1942, 
effective as of the 15th day of Sept. 1942, between the Ohlvei^lte o), 
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (hereinafter called "the Contraotor",. i 
Iowa State College, Amee, Iowa (hereinafter called "the Suboontraetosi^ 
WHEREAS, the Contractor has oontraoted with the UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, represented by the Office of Sclentifio Research amd Development 
in the Office for Emergency Management, Executive Office of the President, 
under Contract No. OEMsr-410, effective as of Deoeaber 20, 1941» as amended 
by Supplement No. 1 thereto, to perform oertain work oe is therein specified| and 
1IHEREAS, the Contractor desires the Subcontraotor to perform por­
tions of said work. 
NOÏÏ, THEREFORE, THE PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOffSt 
ARTICLE l.(a) The Suboontraotor shall, during the period conasncing 
September 15,1942and ending December 31,1942 (both dates iaoluaive), with the 
utmost secrecy and dispatch and in accordance with the iastruotions of the 
Contractor, furnish the necessary laboratory and production facilities and 
skilled technicians for the development and production of tube alloy metal. 
(b) The Subcontraotor shall permit #n authorised repre­
sentative of the Contractor to visit and inspect the work hereunder at all 
reasonable times, shall report the progress of such work froa time time 
as requested by the Contractor, and shall furnish a complete final I'report of 
its findings and conclusions upon completion of suah work* 
ARTICLE 2. (a) The Contractor shall reimburse the Snbeotttraetor 
upon the submission of vouchers in form acceptable to the Oovemmetot, certi­
fied by the Subcontractor and approved Iqr the Contracter for the aotual cost 
to the Suboontractor of performance of its undertakings hereunder in an «ammt 
not exceeding Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) « The Svibeciitraotor luy rabiit 
such vouchers at monthly intervals for actual costs incurred and not previously 
reimbursed, except that the final reimbursement payiuAt shall not be made until 
receipt of (i) the final report required by Article 1(a), and (ii) the lists 
of articles required by Article 3. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1(a), when 
and if actual costs in ouch maximum amount shall have been Incurred or obli­
gated hereunder, the Subcontractor shall not be required to incur or obligate 
further actual costs hereunder unless and until the Oomtraotor shall first 
agree in writing to reimburse the Subcontractor therefor. 
(c) All vouchers submitted shall indicate, with respect 
to each class of items listed by the Subcontractor thereon, the particular 
subparagraph of paragraph (d) below, under which reimbursement ie claimed. 
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Bhall be itemized as required by the C<mtraotor> and ahmll be «uppofted'ty 
the appropriate substantiating documeats required by the Ootttraotéri ittfeh as 
original itemized receipted invoices, original itemized reoalpted bill#, 
original signed pay rolls, receipts from emplpyoes, or certified true copies 
thereof. 
(d) "Actual cost" as used herein includes only 
the following I 
(1) Expenditures by the Subcontractor for the 
salaries and wages of its employees for work required here­
under, plus Federal and State Social Security taxes payable 
by the employer with reference to such salaries and yrageof 
(2 )  Expenditures by the Subaotttractor for such 
materials, supplies, apparatus, equipment and other articles 
(including processing and testing thereof, and rental of ap­
paratus and equipment from others) as are necessary for per­
formance of the work required hereunder; 
(3 )  An allowance for overhead costs in the amount 
of fifty per cent ($0%) of the total salaries and wages (but 
not taxes) reimbursable under subparagraph (l) hereof; 
(4) E3q>endltttres by the Subcontractor necessary 
solely for performance of the work required hereu^er for 
long distance telephone qallo, telegrams, cablegrams, radio­
grams, postage, freight, axpreos, and drayage; 
(5 )  Expenditures by the fiubaontractor neeeeaary for 
performance of the work required hereunder for the traveling 
expenses of persons directly engaged in such work, plus the 
actual eubslstenoe expenses of such persons Incurred during 
periods of travel or, at the Bubccntractor's option, an allow­
ance, not exceeding six dollars ($6.00) per perso* for each 
caleMar day (midnight to midnight) during a period of travel 
(or, for fractional parts of a calendar dav, f of sueh amaumt 
for each 6-hour period or fraction thereof), lA lieu of the 
actual subsistence e^qienses of such persons; Provided. That 
expenses for travel hereunder by motor vehicle other than 
common carrier shall be reimbursed on a mileage basis at a 
rate not exceeding five oents ($*) per mile per vehicle, in 
lieu of the actual expenses of such travel} 
(6) Expenditures by the Snboontraotor for premlvns 
on insurance certified ty the Contractor to constitute part 
of the actual cost of the work required hereunder; 
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( 7 )  ExpendlturoB by the Snbogntravtor. la ut 
amount approved by the Coatraotor, for (i) the alteration 
of its property neoosaary for the perfornauoee of thf wwk 
required under Article 1(a), and (ii) the reetoration Of 
Guch property under Article 3(c). 
ARTICLE 3. Upon the termlm&tion of the work required under 
Artiole 1(a) « the Subcontractor shall (a) furnish to the Coatraotor withlA 
thirty (30) days two lists, itemized and eubstantiated as reqoired ty the 
Contractor, of all materiala, euppliea, app&ratne, equipment, or ether 
articles of personal property in which the Contractor faaa any interest here­
under which (list 1) have previoualy been delivered by the Snboontraotor 
and (list 2) he.v& not been o^ended or delivered hereunder, (b) deliver at 
the Contractor's expense when and as directed by the Ccatractor all such 
articles which have not been expended or delivered hereunder, and (o) 
promptly advise the Contractor whether it elects to have *^y preaisea oa 
which alteration work has been done hereunder restored to aubstaatiaUy 
the same condition as prior to such work; if it elects such reetoratioa, 
it shall retain all amounts reimbursed by the Contractor therefor and the 
Contractor shall paj' it the net cost of such restoration* if it elects to 
retain the benefit of such alteration, it shall return to the Coatraotor 
the portion of such reimbursement determined by the Contractor to be fair 
and proper. 
ARTICLE i. Any non-expended materials, aupplies, apparatus, 
equipment, or other articles, the disposition of which is goreraed by the 
provisions of Article 3 hereof, shall be held at the Subcontractor's risk 
during the term of this contract and aqy renewals thereof, and in the event 
of the loss, theft or destruction of all or any part of sùoh aaterials, sup­
plies, apparatus, equipment or other articles replaceaents shall be Bade 
promptly by the Subcontractor at its om eaqpense, which replaceaents Shall 
be subject to the same terms and conditions as the original aaterials, sup­
plies, apparatus, equipment or other articles so replaced, 
ARTICLE 5» It is understood and agreed that whenever any patent­
able dlsoovexy or invention is made by the Subcontractor or its employees 
in the course of the work called for in Article 1(a) hereof, the Executive 
Secretary of the Office of Scientific Research and Development shall have 
the sole power to deteinlne whether or not a patent application shall be 
filed, and to determine the disposition of the title to and the rights 
under any application or patent that may result. It is further understood 
and agreed that the judgment of the said Executive Secretary on such matters 
shall be accepted as final, and the Subcontractor, for itself and for its 
emplqyeea, agrees that the inventor or inventors will execute all documents 
and do all things necessary or proper to carry out the judgment of the said 
Executive Secretary. The Subcontractor agrees that it will taolude the pro­
visions of this article in all contracts of emplaoraént with psrsons «ho dp 
any part of the work called for In Article 1(a) hereof. 
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ARTICLE 6. The Suboontractor agr«eg nsTer to dlscloea any lit-
formation ooncamixig this contract or obtained as a result of the work 
called for ia Article 1(a) hereof to any person except employees «osigMd 
to suoh work without the written consent of the Oontraotor* 
ARTICLE 7, The Subcontractor shall immediately submit m oonfl» 
dentlal report to the Contraotor whenever for any cause it has reason to 
believe that there is an active dunger of espionage or sabotage affecting 
any of the work hereunder, 
ARTICLE 8. The Subcontractor shall not employ any alien on or 
permit any alien to have access to the plans, spcoificatlone, or work here­
under without the writton consent of the Contraotor as to each suoh alien. 
ARTICLE 9» The Subcontractor* whenever requested by the Con­
tractor, shall report to the Contractor the citizenship, country of birth, 
or alien statue OJE" any or all of its employees at the site of, or having 
access to, any of the work hereunder. 
ARTICLE 10. The Subcontractor shall not employ or continue to 
employ on, and shall exclude from the site of, any of the work hereunder 
any person or persons designated by the Contractor for aqr cause as undesir­
able to have access to suoh work. 
ARTICLE 11. The Subcontractor warrants that it has not employed 
any person to solicit or secure this contract upon any agreement for a com­
mission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. Breach of this warranty 
shall give the Contractor the right to annul tho contract, or, in ita dis­
cretion, to deduct from the contract price or consideration the amount of 
suoh commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. This warranty 
shall not apply to coramisaions payable by the Subcontractor i^on contracts 
of sale secured or made through bona fide established ecmneroial or selling 
agencies maintained by the Subcontractor for the purpose of securing busi­
ness. 
ARTICLE 12. No Member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident 
Commissioner, shall be admitted to any share or part of this contract or 
any benefit that may arise therefrom, but this provision shall not be con­
strued to extend to this contract if made with a corporation for its general 
benefit. 
ARTICLE 13, The Subcontractor shall not discriminate in any act 
performed hereunder againm. uxy citizen on tho ground of raoe, creed, color 
or national origin. 
ARTICLE lU, The Contractor may at any time, notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 1(a) hereof, give the Subcontractor thirty (30) days' 
notice in writing that the work hereunder shall terminate at a specified 
earlier date, and thereupon such work shall terminate on suoh earlier date. 
Upon receipt of such notice the Subcontractor shall exercise all reasonable 
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diligence to obtain the cancellation of any and all outoteJullBg coausltasate 
running beyond suoh earlier date wliich it may hanre made by reason of work 
hereunder, but the Contractor shall indemnify the Subcontractor agalBBt any 
loBS upon outstanding commitmentB which it IB unable to cancel; Provided^ 
That in no event shall the total amount paid and payable under this Article 
and Article 2 exceed the maximum amount specified in Article 2* 
IN niTNESS THEREOF, the Ccmtraotor and the Subcontractor have 
caused this contract to be signed and aealsd, intending to be legally bound 
thereby. 
T'ltnesseei 
^ UY \ ( seal) 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
Business Manager 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE,, 
.(SEAL) 
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certify that 
Ï am the 
secret?ry of <.h? corporitlon niined^  suVicontrs-otor herein; 
tlwt ^ '](hAyC-ÔL  ^
who slansd this contract on behalf of the tml^ aontraotor, tras 
then 
of aaid corporation; that eaid contract v-v.b duly aigaed for and 
In behalf of aaid corporation by authority of Ito governing body, 
and is vithiu the coopa of ita corporate powers. 
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Contract OEMsr-433 
iiBIWRAMDUU OF SUPPLEJJEllTAL A.GREEUEKT between THE UNITED STATES OP 
AUEHICA (hereinafter called "the Government"), repreoented by the Executive 
Secretary (hereinafter called "the Contracting Officer"), Office of Soientific 
Research and Development in the Office for Emergunoy I&uiagement, Executive 
Office of the President, and Iowa State College, Âmes, Iowa (hereinafter 
called "the Contractor"), 
Viin^rJIAS, under date of June 1, 1942, the Government and the Con­
tractor entered into Contract No. OEUBr-433, effective aa of February 15, 1942, 
aa amended by Supplement No. 1 thereto dated August 1, 1942, effective as of 
June SO, 1942, which required the Contractor to oonduot studios and experi­
mental investigations in connection with chemioal and metallurgical aubjeots, 
during the period commencing February 15, 1942, and ending December 31, 1942| 
and 
WlERI'iiS, the Govemmont desires the Contractor to continue the afore­
said studies and investigations for a further period; and 
k'fHEREAS, the parties desire to make other amendments to Contract 
No. OElilsr-433, as amended) 
NOV.', T11EJŒF0RB, THIS SUPPLEUBNTAL AGHEEfiENT MADE THIS 26th DAY OF 
December, - 1942, EFFECTIVE AS OF THE SlST DAY OF DECEfJBER, 1942, miTMKSCEIH, 
1. This contract amends the provisions of Contract No. OEWar-435, 
as amended, to read as set forth below* 
2. (a) The Contractor agrees, during the period commencing 
February 15, 1942, and ending June SO, 1945 (both dates inclusive), to furnish 
the necessary laboratory facilities and skilled technioiuns for and to conduct, 
with the utmost secrecy and dispatch, in accordance with instructions issued 
by the Contracting Officer or his authorised representative, studies and experi­
mental investif^ationa in connection with the ohemistxy and metallurgy of normal 
tube alloy and its allied forms and chemical and metallurgical questions essen-
"tial in building and operating a power plant. The Contractor further agrees, 
to deliver, transportation paid, where and as directed by the Oontracting 
Officer or hi# authorised representative, samples of auch materials aa may be 
developed hereunder. The Contractor ehall report the résulté of its studies 
and investigations from time to time as requested by the Contracting Officer 
or hia authorised representative and, on or before the termination of the 
period specified above, shall furnish a final report of its findin^is and 
oonclusions. 
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(b) The Contractor may procure materials, supplies, 
apparutus and equipment for use In the worlc required hereunder by Con­
tracts with others, but the Contraotor shall net enter into subcontracts 
involving; research or development v/ork of the kind contemplated by this 
contract without obtaining the approval of the Contracting Officer. The 
Contraotor shall refer eaoh prospective subcontract which might involve 
such research or development work to the Contracting Officer or his author­
ized representative, who shall determine whether or not such research or 
development work is involved. Suboontraots involving such research or 
development work shall bo in a fom approved by the Contracting Officer, 
No subcontract shall provide for (i) payment on a oost-plus-a-percentage-
of-cost basis or (il) the payment of a fixed fee in excess of seven per 
centum of the estimated cost, exclusive of the fee. 
(o) The Contractor shall obtain the approval of the 
Contracting Officer before altering or constructing buildings, or pur­
chasing, leasing or otherwise acquiring real property, for the cost of 
which reimbursement will be claimed hereunder. 
(d) The UovemjT.eiic may furnish materials, supplies, 
apparatus, equipment or other articles for use in the performance of the 
work required hereunder, and such property shall be used by the Contrac­
tor only as directed by the Contracting Officer or his authorized repre­
sentative. 
(e) For the purposes of subparagraphs (a), (d) and 
the second sentence of subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the Contract­
ing Officer hereby designates as his authorized representatives! the 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of Section S-1 of the Office of 
Soientiïlo Research and Development and Dr. Arthur H. Compton, Member of 
•aid Committee, 
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3. The Government agrees to reimburse the Contractor, upon pub-
Youchers supplied by the Government, certified by the Contr&otor, &nd 
approved by the Contraotlng Officer or his authorized representative, for 
the actual cost to the Contractor off performance of the work required under 
P a r .  N o .  2 ( a )  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
in an amount not exceedingTwo Hundred Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($216,000,00)# 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Par. No. 2 hereof, when and if actual costs 
as defined herein equal the total amount reimbursablç hereunder, the Con­
tractor shall be under no obligation to continue the work called for under 
Par. No. 2 unless and until the Government shall first agree in writing to 
reimburse the Contractor for the actual cost of such further work. All 
vouchers submitted shall indicate, with respect to each ulasn of items llntod 
by the Contractor thereon, the particular subparagraph, below, of this para­
graph, under which reimbursement is claimed, and shall be supported by 
original invoices, itemized bills, excerpts from payrolls, or other appro­
priate substantiating documents, certified by the Contractor'on the face 
thereof to bo correct and paid. Reimbursement payments shall be made «t 
monthly intervals for actual costs incurred and not previously reimbursed, 
except that the payment othonrtse due upon expiration of the period specified 
in Par. No. 2(a) shall not bo made until after receipt of the final report 
r e q u i r e d  b y  t h a t  p a r a g r a p h .  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
"Actual cost" as used in this paragraph shall include the following only; 
(a) Expenditures by the Contractor for salaries and 
wages of its employees directly engaged in the work 
r e q u i r e d  u n d e r  p a r .  N o .  2 ( a )  -  - -  - -  - -  -  y - _  
plus Federal and State Social Security taxes payable 
by the employer witli reference to such salaries and 
wages ; 
(b) Expenditures by the Contractor for such materials, 
supplies, apparatus, equipment and other articles (in­
cluding prooesBlng and testing thereof, and rental of 
apparatus and equipment) as are necessary for perfom-
ance of the work required under 2(a)| 
(c) Allowances for overhead in the amount of fifty 
per cent ( sojS) of the total salaries and wages reimbursed 
under subparagraph (a)^ ^.d subparagraph (k)| 
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(d) Expenditures by the Contractor neoeesary solely 
for performance of the work required under Par. Ho. 2(a) 
— — " for lon^ dlstanoe 
telephone calls, telegrams, cablegrams, radiograms, 
postage, freight, express, and drayage; 
(e) Expenditures by the Contractor necessary for per­
formance of the work required under par. No, 2(a) - -
for the traveling expenses 
of persons directly engaged in such work, plus the 
actual subsistence expenses of such persons incurred 
during periods of travel or, at the Contractor's option, 
an allowance, not exceeding six dollars (§6.00) per 
person for eaoh calendar day (midnight to midnight) 
during a period of travel (or, for fractional parts of 
a calendar day, ^  of such amount for each 6-hour period 
or fraction thereof), in lieu of the actual subsistence 
expenses of suoh personsj Provided, That expenses for 
travel hereunder by motor vehicleother than common 
carrier shall be reimbursed on a mileage bam is at a 
rate not exceeding five cents (5/;^) per mile per vehicle, 
in lieu of the actual expenses of such travel; 
(f) Expenditures by the Contractor for premiums on 
insurance certified by the Contracting Officer to 
constitute part of the actual cost of the work re­
quired under par. No. 2(a)| 
(g) Expenditures by the Contractor for the leasing 
of real property or the alteration or oonstruotion of 
buildings; 
(h) Expenditures by the Contractor representing re­
imbursement to subcontractors under Par, No, 2(b); 
(i) Expenditures by the Contractor, approved by the 
Contracting Officer or his autliorized representative, 
incurred under Pars, Nos, ^  and ; 
(j) Expenditures by the Contractor v/hich may be speci­
ally determined by the Contrticting Officer and specifi­
cally certified by him in writing to constitute part of 
the actual cost of the work required under 2(a)j 
(k) Expenditures by the Contractor to reimburse otlier 
employers for the salaries of employees released for and 
engaged in the work required hereun-Jer, but whose salarieb 
are not reimbursed under subparaigraph (a) hereof, plus 
Federal and State Woo ill Security taxes paid by the employer# 
on uuoh SMlarlea. 
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4, Upon the termination of the work required under Par. No* g, 
the Contractor shall (a) furnish to the Contracting Officer within thirty 
(3U) days two lists, itemized and substantiated as required by the Con­
tracting Officer, of all materials, supplies, apparatus, equipment, or 
other articles of personal property in which the Government has any in­
terest hereunder which (list 1) have previously been delivered by the 
Contractor and (list 2) have not been expended or lelivered hereunder, 
(b) deliver at the Government's expense when and as directed by the 
Contracting Officer or his authorized representative all such articles 
which have not been expended or delivered hereunder, and (c) promptly 
advise the Contracting Officer whether it elects to have any premises on 
which alteration or construction work has been done hereunder restored 
to substantially the same condition as prior to such work; if it elects 
such restoration, it shall retain all amounts reimbursed by the Government 
fur its expenditure therefor and the Ciovemment shall pay it the net cost 
of sucn restoration; if it elocts to retain the benefit of such construction 
or alteration, the Contractor cliall return to the Government the portion 
of such reimbursement determined by the Contracting Officer to be fair 
and proper. 
6, (a) The Contractor shall be responsible to the Govern­
ment, over and above the amount compensuted by insurance, for the loss of 
or damage to materials, supplies, apparatus, equipment, and any other 
property, real or personal, in v/hioh the government has any interest here­
under, only if and so far as attributable to the negligence of an official 
of the Contractor in hiring or retaining employees or otherwise acting in 
his official capacity. 
(b) The Contractor shall (i) f'.mlsh to the Contracting 
Officer promptly upon the execution hereof an itemized list of all exist­
ing insurance policies which cover any of the risks involved in the work 
hereunder, and its suggestions in v/riting as to additional insurance poli­
cies necessary to protect the Government «*nd the Contractor, and (il) main­
tain insurance in such forms and amounts and for such periods of time as 
the Contracting Officer may a^jprove or require. 
(c) The jovaniment shall indemnify the Contractor, from 
such funds as nay be hereafter appropriated by Congress for such purpose, 
against loss or aoiiage to persons vr property (incluaing settlements 
made with the written consent of the Contruotini; Officer) not compensated 
for by insurance or otherv/ise, arising from the work required hereunder, 
in amounts found and certified by the Contracting Officer to be just and 
reasonable; Provided, That the Contractor shall give the Contracting Of­
ficer prompt notice of the institution of and permit the Contracting 
Officer at his election to control the defense of all law suits instituted 
agai'" ' lie Contractor with respect to losses or damages allegedly occur­
ring onneotion with the work required hereunder. 
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6, It is understood and agreed that whenever any patentable discovery 
or invention is made by the Contractor or its employees in the course of the 
work called for in Par. Ko. g hereof, the Contracting Officer shall have the 
sole power to determine whether or not a patent application shall be filed, 
and to determine the disposition of the title to and the rights under any 
application or patent what may result. It is further understood and agreed 
that the jud^,ment of the Contracting Officer on such matters shall be accepted 
ac final, and the Contractor, for itself and for its employees, agrees that 
the inventor or inventors will execute all documents and do all things neces­
sary or proper to carry out the judgment of the Contracting Officer. The 
Contractor agrees that it will include the provisions of this paragraph in 
all contracts of emplojonent v/ith persons who do any part of the work called 
for in Par. No. g hereof. 
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7. The Contractor a^reea never to dieoloso any information oonoemlng 
this oontract or obtainea as a result of the work oallea for in Par. No. 2 
hereof to any person, except employees assigned to such work, without the 
written consent nf the ContraotinR Officer or his authorised representative. 
3, The Contractor agrees that it will immediately submit a confidential 
report to the Contracting Officer whenever, for any cause, it has reason to 
believe that an active danger of espionage or sabotage exista at the site of 
any of the work called for in Par, No. g hereof. This report shall contain 
complete information relative to the reasons which cause the Contractor to be 
apprehensive of such danger» 
9, The Contractor agrees that it will, whenever requested by the Con­
tracting Officer or his authorised representative, report to the Contracting 
Officer the citizenship, country of birth, or alien status of any or all of 
its employees at the site of, or having access to, any of the work called for 
in No. 2 hereof. 
10, The Contractor agrees that it will refuse to employ on, and will 
exclude from the site of, any of the work called for in Par. No. g hereof, any 
person or persons designated by the Contracting Officer or his authorized rep­
resentative for cause as undesirable to nave access to such work. The Con­
tractor further agrees that it will, upon request of the Contracting Officer 
or his authorized representative, discharge or transfer, and thereafter ex­
clude from the site of such work, any person or persons already employed, who 
may be designated by the Contracting Officer or his authorized representative 
for cause as undesirable to have access to such work. 
11, Tne Contractor agrees at all reasonable times co permit the Con­
tracting Officer and his authorized representatives to visit and inspect the 
work called for in Par. No. g hereof, and to report the progress of such work 
from time to time upon request of the Contracting Officer or his authorized 
representative. 
12, No Member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, 
shall be admitted to any share or part of this contract or to any benefit 
that may arise therefrom, but this provision shall not be construed to ex­
tend to this contract if made with a corporation for its general benefit. 
The term "Contracting Officer" as used herein includes any person 
authorized to perform the functions of the Contracting Officer hereunder. The 
term "authorized representative" refers to any person designated as such by 
the Contracting Officer. 
14* The Contractor shall not employ any alien on or permit any alien to 
have access to the plans, specifications, or work hereunder without the written 
consent of the Contracting Officer as to each such alien. 
20^ The Contractor shall not discriminate in any act performed hereunder 
against any citizen on the ground of race, creed, color, or national origin, 
and shall include such provision in each subcontract. 
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16« BIGHT HOUR LAW» Xha Contraoto|r shall oomponsat* laborer# and 
maohmnlom for all hours norked by them hereunder in excess of eight (8) 
hours in any one calendar day at a rate of not less than one and one-half 
(1^) times the basio rate of pay of suoh laborers and meohanios, and shall 
include suoh provision is each suboontraçt. For eaoh violation of the 
requirements of this paragraph a penaltyjof five dollars (#6.00) shall be 
imposed upon the Contractor or suboontraator for eaoh laborer or mechanic 
for eaoh calendar day in nhioh suoh employee is required or permitted to 
work hereunder more than eight (6) hours yithout receiving suoh additional 
compensation, and all penalties thus imposed sh&ll be withheld for the use 
ani benefit of the Government. 
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17, The Contractor warrants that it haa not employed any person 
to solicit or secure this contract upon any agreement for a commission, 
percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee. Breach of this warranty shall 
give the Government the right to annul the contract, or, in Its discre­
tion, to deduct from the contract price or consideration the amount of 
such commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee. This warranty 
shall not apply to commissions payable by the Contractor upon contracts 
or sales secured or made through bona fide established commercial or selling 
agencies maintained by the Contractor for the purpose of securing business. 
18, If, at any time, the Contracting Officer is of the opinion 
that the progress of the work called for in Par. No. £ hereof indicates 
that such work cannot profitably be carried to conclusion, the Qovemment 
shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon thirty days' notice 
in writing from the Contracting Officer to the Contractor. In the event 
that this agreement shall be so terminated, the Government agrees to in­
demnify the Contractor against loss upon any outstanding commitments, in-
cludlrtg those for personnel, which the Contractor may have made by reason 
of the work called for in Par. No, g hereof, and which the Contractor is 
unable to cancel, provided however, that In no event shall the maximum 
amount parable under this paragraph exceed the total amount payable under 
Par. No. 5 hereof, less any amounts actually paid to the Contractor under 
that paragraph prior to notice of termination. Upon receipt of the notice 
of termination herein provided, the Contractor agrees to exercise all 
reasonable diligence to obtain the cancellation of any outstanding commit­
ments which It has. 
IN WITNESS TVHEREOF, the Government.and the Contractor have 
caused this agreement to be signed and sealed. Intending to be legally 
bound thereby. 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Witnesses 
Scientific Research and Development 
(Contracting Officer) 
/ y BÏL: 
lOVCA STATE COLI^QB 
•'-I ) 
6-0805-nCIBU-'WP 
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I am the 
certifir that 
secretary of the corporation nam^^aa contractor herein; 
that 
who signed this contract on behalf of the contractor, was 
then 
of said corporationJ that said contract was duly signed for and 
in behalf of said corporation by authority of its governing body, 
and is within the scope of its corporate powers. 
(Corporate) 
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EXTRACTS FROM CONTRACTS. 
Datj oij; Ci intri lot : 
Contract I 'o, ; ' i 
Mmms O£ Contact : 
lîFxj- p 
Contraotor: 
Eatj mated Gpstt 
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I I I I • • I I 
i; I 
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ts) account!, i^ shall becomel'ar d rémaih the property 
; vest in the governments The govemnentgrants the 
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Article VII I Records of Goverment-Pwneii P^-opfertyl : j j | i 
Th,6 Property Officer, U. 4. Engiriler Dffice^ Juanhatj.Lah District, ..id 
designated as the officer to maintain:the 
with this contract, ias contemplated by Alt 
Supplemental Agree 
Supplemmntalj Agreement No,' 1 dated 22.May 1943. 
Advance pajyrasnta—Not ajjpllcu 
neeeojiary' property recdrdo lin dor 
35-16520. 
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I. 
fiupplementali AgrH.iment No. 2,-20 Juno l^/i3. j 
j- I :N0t apjjlickBilç. i ; i p I 
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Outline of the Contract for the Institute of Atomic Energy, 1948 
This revised contract Is to beeorac effoctivo July 1, 19A8» 
PURPOSE OF CONTRACT - Tho purpose of this modification io to bring up-to-date 
the present contract and its suppléments 1 to 7 inclusive, and to improve the effic­
iency and effaotiveness of tho progran. This modification amends the original con­
tract and Supplomonts 1 to 7 inclusive, and consolidates them into a single document. 
It is the intent of this contract that the atomic research program be corriod on in a 
spirit of partnership and cooperation and with a maximum of effort and cornnon sense 
to achieve the common objective. 
ARTICLE I - Scope of the Work. The College agrees tocarry on studies and invest­
ira ti ons in the field of atomic energy as authorized by the Atomic Energy Corrniission. 
This -ivork involves studies In motallurcy, radio-chemistry, chemical engineering, 
physics, chemistry, otc, Devolop.-nent cork is to be conducted with materials such os 
thorium and beryllium find other materials an authorized by the Coimnission. In oddition 
to rasoarch, tho College agrees to provide consulting services to the Commission; to 
provide sn/ineoring servicos ond construction for any new building or alteration wliich 
the Commission night decide it requires; to provide truined personnel in tho fiold of 
nuclear physios; and to assist in scicntifio progress in the problems of atomic energy. 
AlTlCir, II - Term of Cont'-act. July 1, I948 to June 30, 1953» unless sooner term­
inated by the Government. 
A^TICL'-J III - Program Development und Finanoing. The College and the Commission 
shall agree from tine to tiT.e upon work proframs covering the objectives to be accomp­
lished. The Commission is to reimburse the College for tho actual cost in an amount 
not to exceed $4,454.300.00, or for such other amount as may, from time to tine, be 
provided by supplemonts. Reimbursement Tdll be made monthly. Tho College is not ex­
pected to obligate itself for further expenses unless the Government agrees in writing 
to reimburse the College for such additional work. 
ARTICLE IV - Ir,formation and Reporta on Program. The College and the Commission 
are to keep each other info mod concorning the work under this contract and in the 
general field of atomic onorgy. The College is to provide the Commission with reg­
ular, special and final reports on tho conduct of the work. 
ARTICLS V - Sub-controcts and Purchases. The College is not permitted to sub­
contract any research without approval of the Commission. All oontracts entered into 
by tho College shall be in writing ond shall not bind the Government or the Commission. 
l!o contract orpurchaso in excess of Î5OOO shall be made without approval of the Com-
misaion. IJo rrotor vehicles shall be purchased without approval of the Commission. 
Building a Iterations costing 5-500 or more; the construction of buildings; the leasing 
of real property or tho purchase of property nay not be undertaken without prior ap­
proval of tho Commission, if tho College intends to claim reimbursement. 
AITICLVI - Cost of Work. Tl:e Commission will reimburse the College for oil 
'ostB incurred in carrying out this contract. Costs are to Include direct, indir­
ect and ovirh;ad costs in unoordanco -with accipted accounting principles. Roimburse-
a!)le costs ir.olutio 1:ho following: labor, materials, tools, machinery, equipment, 
facilities, supplies, utilities and services, training of personnel, pajTnent of sub­
contracts --Pde in eccorûanoo with tlie contract, transportation and atorafe charges 
on materials or equipment, salaries, vQfes, payments of group Insurance, rotirement 
annuities or other employee bonofits, transportation und travel, expense of procuring 
personnel, oxpsnse of expediting delivery and transportation of materials, etc., 
premiums on bonds or insurance polioios as may be approved by the Comniosion, pay­
ments by the College on account of tho QASI tax or otîier disbursements rof^uirod by 
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the State low, parnits, lioonsB faoo, royalties on patenta, ony loss or expense not 
oomponsotod by insurance whioh may bo sustained by the College, accounting costs in 
connection Kith special audits, any cost incurred by the College in the course of 
litigation, including judgmonts, court costs, allowances awarded and attorney fees, 
expenses in connection with temporary or permanent closing-down of the work, publi­
cation of scientific articles relating to the work, medical examinations and jnodical 
expenses for the personnel, and "such other items not e.ipressly excluded by othar 
provisions of this contract as should, in the opinion of the Commission, be includod 
in the cost of the work"« 
In addition to the costs outlined above, the Commission will reimburse the College 
for overhead expenses to be computed by a formula developed and agreed to by both 
parties to the contract. This formula may be modified by mutual agreement from time 
to time. The Commission will also reimburse the College for "all costs and expenses 
not otherwise reimbursed which are actually incurred by the College in food fnith 
arising out of or conneoted with the work under this contract". The contract states 
that the estimated cost of the reimbursement for overhead as provided in this contract 
will amount to approximately $250,000 per year. This amount v.lll be ndvùncoH if re­
quested, in monthly payments subject ;o review annually as to the amount of overhead 
due the College. 
ARTICLE VII - Advance Payments. The Government will advance the College up to 
30,^? of the annual estimated cost of the contract if necessary. Sevorul pages are 
devoted to procedures in connection with liquidating advance paymonts, depositing in 
special tonk accounts, liquidation in case of termination of the contract, etc. 
AITICL'J VIII - Government-Owned Property. All materials, tools, equipment, eto., 
purchased by the College for which reimbursement is made by the Covernnent, romain 
the property of the Government and must be so marked and recorded in an inventory. 
Upon conplotion of the contract, all Government property must be returned ae specified 
by the Commission. The College is not hold liable for loss or destruction or damage 
to Government property unless such loss results from misconduct or failure to exer­
cise [ood faith. The College is not ro:juirod to carry any insurance on the Govern­
ment property unless ordered by the Commission, in which case the premium payments 
are reimbursable, 
ARTICm IX - Disposition of Personal Property. Tlie College must deliver per­
sonal property when and as directed by the Commission and render an accounting for 
all supplies, materials, equipment, etc., or the College may purchase such property 
at a price nutually agreeable. 
ATiICLS X - Disposition of P'roperty Altered or Constructed on Premises not 
Covered by Long-Term Lease. After termination of the contract, the College shall 
elect one of the following procedures with respect to any alteration or construotion 
T.'hich has been made in its own buildings or on its premises: 
1. To retain such construction or altération, in which case the College 
shall credit the Government for the amount of its expenditures as 
determined by the records end as determined fuir, or 
2. To have the promises restored to the same condition prior to the 
alteration or construction, in %hich cane the Government will pay 
the cost of restoration. 
All'ICLi: XI - Govermnent Property on Leased Proiises. Appendix B of the contract 
shall apply vith regard to ingress and egress, 'niiintoriunco and repair, furnishing 
utilities, utilities, ultimate disposition, ate., of Covernnent-owned buildings on 
leased property. 
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ARTIOLE XII - Contineenolos, Lltjçations and Cloltna. It la the Intontion of thlo 
contract that all oxpenae le to bo paid by the Government and the College lu to bo 
held harxloss against any loss or damage including pernonal injuriea or death, and any 
expense not compensated for by ineuranoe. Liability is to be determined as if the 
College nere not an agenoy of the State of Iowa. Payments of claims for loss or damage 
must be approved in advanoo by the Commission. The College is required to defend any 
litifution in conneotion with this contract, if requested by the Commission. 
ARTICLE Kill - Records and Accounts Inspootlon and Audit. The College agrees to 
keep records and accounts in a manner mutually agreed upon with the Commission. The 
Commission has the ri[ht to examine and audit all financial records, books, oorres-
pondence, plans, drawings, vouchers, etc., in conneotion th the work done undor 
this contract. The College must preserve all records for five years after termina­
tion of the contract. 
ARTICLE XIV - Drawings and Speoificationa. On termination of the contract, all 
drawings, specifioatione, data, otc., beoono tho property of the Government. 
ARTIC^ XV - Inspection i>nd Rights of Access. Tho Conmlssion has the ri^ht to 
iaspsct all activities, promises and facilitieo of the College utilized in any way 
for the work under this contract. 
ARTICLE XVI - Disputes. All disputes which may a rise under this contract and 
which cannot be settled by mutual agreement, shall bo decided by a representative of 
the Commission who shall reduce his decision to writing and furnish a copy to the Col­
lege. "I'ithin thirty days, the College nay appeal, in writing, to the Commission. 
Upon receiving tho appeal, tho Coram'-ssion shall appoint a board to review the nattor, 
and tho decision of the board is final. Pending decision on a dispute, the College 
wjst continue work on tho contract. 
AHTICIâ' XVII - Termination of Controct by Govornmant. The Government may termi­
nate this contract at any time in whole or in part, whenever the Commission determines 
tiin t it is for the boot interests of ttio Government. Contract provides detailed pro­
cedures to be followed in case a tor.:iinotion order is issued. 
ARTICL j XVIII - Disclosure of Infoniation end Plant Protection. Disolosure of 
infornation to unaubhorized persons or fuilura to guard all rostricted matter may 
subject the College or its ngants, employees, or sub-contractors to criminal liability 
under law of tho United States. The College agrees to conform to all security regu­
lations of tho Commission. ?!o person is pornitted to have access to restricted data 
until cleared by tho FBI. No aliens shall bo employed on the work without written 
consent of tho Ooranission. The College shall maintain such watchmen and guards as 
the Commission dsems necessary, the coot of which is reimbursed by the Government. 
ARTICIJI XVIX - College's Organization, If requested by the Commission, the 
Collogo must submit an organization chart showing the executive and administrative 
organizations connected r.lth tho work under this contract, Xo person shall be as­
signed by the College as Projoct Director, Laboratory Director, Director of Research, 
Business Manajier, or similar position until the Commission approves a statement of tte 
qualifications, experience and salary of tho person proposed. 
A?riCLl 'ZX - Labor. In any sub-controct invol\ln£ employment of labor, the 
Colloj-a must include provisions rngarding the aipht-hour law, the Cope land Act, and 
the Itavis-Sucon Act, Thero is no statomcnt in the contract that the Collogo itself 
must coMiply v.ith tho pro d oions of these acts as to the hours of work, compensation 
Tor overtime, eko,, of its own amployoes. 
ARTICLE XXI - Convict L/ihor. No convict labor may bo employed on tho project, 
but the College is per' tod to pur:haae su;plies or equipment from any prison Industry. 
285 
ARTICIjS XXII - Anbl-dlsorlnlnatlon. No diaorlnilnation tooauso of race, orood, 
color or national origin. In aub-oontraots antorad Into by tha Collage, the standard 
onti-diaorimination clause must be inserted. 
AH'flCLS :^XII1 - Patonta. All patents or patentable diaoovarioo are tha property 
of the Government if dovolopod in connection with thio contract. 
•••.n'.TCIiî XTJV - Safety and Aooidant Prevention. Tha College must comply with all 
roqiiirer.-jnts proaoribad by the Comnission. 
AHTTCLS XXV - AsaianTtant of Claima. This contrast or any claim rolalir.g to this 
contract may not bo asmit^nad or tra ns for red unless prior approval of the Comniaoion 
is received. 
ARiICLtî XXVI - Covanant against Contin|ront Fooa. This is the standard Govorn-
raont clause, [ua rmnkoeins that tho Collojo has not snployod any parson to solicit 
or procure this contract on a conmission or percentage basis. 
A f i T I C L O  X X V T I  - Officials 'Jot to Denafit. This is also a standard Govornr.-.^nt clause, 
proii ding that no .-noTûbsr of Congress, etc., is to bonofit fron this contract. 
A73TICLE yXvlII - Pomoatio Articles. Tho College aj^roos to use only articles and 
materials manufactured or produced in tho United States unloss otherwise authorized 
by the Commission. 
ARTICLE XnX - Definitions. 
AITICLS XXX - Liberal Construction. "This contract is executed under the Atomio 
Energy^Aot of 194^ and nzocutlve Order liunbsr 9316, dated December 31, 1946, in tha 
intorest of the common defense and security, and shall be liberally conatruad to 
carr}' out the purposes and policies"thereof". 
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AFPEMDIX A - Manual of Employer Poll oies and Salary Ratas for Eaiploycea -
Appendix A is drawn up for tho purpose of consolidating various statomonta of 
policy which havo boen established by means of Reinbursoment Orders I/unibers 1 to 12 
inclusive, issued by tho Atomic Energy Coiamlssion. Additional reimbursement orders, 
as requested by tho Collej^e, may be issued from timo to time to Bupplarnent this section. 
I, 'iV'a 8 a;id sal wry schodules - Smployoes are classified as acadomic and 
non-aoadeniic. The first group is made up of professional ond adminis­
trative employees; the second group of business personjiel, olorical, 
r'ysloul pluut and all ether non-teohnioal employees, "age und .salary 
sfîhedules are set up for oaoh classification. No definite v. or king 
hrurc ore established "or uoadomie personnel, but noi'.-asade.Tic parsonnol 
ia scheduled to vork 4A hours per week. Fojanent Per overt! ,is is not 
authorized, but componsotory time off is nllowed to any employoo required 
to vrork overtime. 
II, Viaço and Salary Controls - The totul amount of aalury inoreaooE /ranted 
during a year cannot exouad Ij't of the av-3raj;o r.onthly payroll for tho 
same year. 
III. yacation3 - Acadonic employees nre (granted one month vacation -with pay, 
und in case of such umployees being ptirt-time on Collo£e und part-time 
on the project, a formula io provided for calculation of tho amount of 
vficQtion nharneable to the contract, îîon-acadenic jr.ployoes are cn.nted 
two-T/oeks TOcation, non-e'mulative. 
IV. Sick Leave - Ordinarily two weeks per year for both classes of employees, 
but the Commission may approve sick leave in excess of two v.'ooks to 
academic personnel. 
V. ITolidays - Six official holidays per year are rented in conformity -ivith 
oolloce policy. Clarioal employees also tot two additional days durinj; 
Thanks^iving or Christmas season conforming to oolloj.;o policy. 
71. f.tilitory Bonus Payments - ISilitury Bonus Payraonte are allowed in Dcoord-
ance with Iowa Law. 
TIT. Dttatli in Taraily - Lofive of absence with pay Tor not to exceed one week 
v.ill be allowed. 
Tin. Travel - Travel regulations are set up under this section, and in [;on-
nral conform fairly well to collet;e policy but are sonenliat more liberal. 
Provision is made in this nootion for rei-nbursotient of travel and moving 
ospenses for enrloyoes coning to this project fron other institutions. 
Temporary and permanent employees up to two years will l.'o ollowed moving 
expense both ways. All raiiiiburoemont frr travel and novinj; expanoes must 
have prior approval of the Atomic Energy Commission. Tho provision re-
[0rding r.ovlnt; expenses does not conforn to college policy. Travel ex­
penses are allowed to staff nembers to attend professional woetings, 
but tho CoriUidssion reserves the ri(.ht to cietennine tho number of tho 
stuff per.viitted to attend on this basis. 
IX. netiroment Annui ty  Plan (T.I.A .A. ) - In [eneral th is  confor.-no to tho 
Collefo Mian insofar as ellcibillty, retirement a^^.e, etc., la concerned. 
However, the Conmission will pay o portion of the premium as sot forth 
belcnv: 
On the first (,3000 of annual oolory - employee contribution 2^9» 
employer contribution Ti'iJî 
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On oil salary in oxooss of $3000 - amployos oontrltutlon 5^ 
employer contribution 5/» 
iÎMiployoe luoy contribute noro, but the employer contribution 
cannot oxceod tho amount contributed above. 
Employees who now htive T.I .A.A. policies end contribute lOJî of their 
salaries to the College Retirement Plan are not permitted to reduce 
Dielr contributions when the new plan goes into effect. Pro-ration 
is provided in the ease of exployaaa who ore part-time in other 
College departments. 
Schedule A - This is a schedulo of salary ranf^ee for the vcrioue ; rades of 
employees as followst 
Aoadeiiiic 
Senior Cciontiot» 
Associate Scientist* 
Junior Soiontist» 
Junior Research Assistant 
550 - 1500 per nonth 
350 - 700 per month 
250 - 400 per month 
100 - 250 per nonth 
•The torn "Scientist" is e i^oneric term to indicate such specific 
titles as physicist, ohoTivlats, biolctict, architect, physician, 
enfinoor, etc. Individuals will be given the appropriate spécifié 
title rnthar than tho generic title. 
Non-Academic 
Business Manager 0 320 - 420 per month 
Supervisor of Shops 375 - 450 per month 
Duilding Construction Inspector 335 - 435 per month 
Physical Plant Supervisor 26s 
- 370 per month 
Accountant 2Ï5 _ 269 per month 
Assistant Accountant 177 - 215 per month 
Dookkeepor #1 liiO - 167 per month 
Bookkaop^r 42 130 - 146 per "nonth 
Confidential Secretary 215 - 237 per month 
Dooumaatary Librarian 150 - 200 per nonth 
Secretary 350 - 200 per month 
3tjnocruphùr 140 - 160 por month 
Typist 120 - 140 per month 
Senior Sloatronics Technician 250 _ 450 per month 
Glass Blower 250 - 450 per month 
Ranodroh Technician 225 - 230 per month 
electronics Teolinloian 209 - 253 per month 
7,:edloal Technician 170 - 250 per month 
Rosearch Helper 190 - 225 per month 
Laboratory Laborer 170 - 190 per month 
I.'ursj 166 - 189 per month 
Laboratoi-y Assistant 139 - 162 per month 
Serjeant of Guards 190 - 2I5 per month 
Guard 180 - 205 per month 
Chauffeur 180 - 200 per month 
SCiCDULZ p - This sohcdulo nontoins 0 detailed deacription of each position 
listed in the Salary Ri)nges. 
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A"Piî?>'EIX S - Govartmant Proparty on Leo sod Land 
Tliis appendix providoe tliat if the Conmisslou and the College agree on the con-
Btruotion of bulldinr.s by the Coaimlssion on Colleco property, a ninety-nina year leaoe 
will bo granted, oubjoct to the approval of the Executive Counoil. The College will 
furnish nil utilities for the oporotion of the Governinout-owned building and shall 
inaintain utilities, tha building and the equipment oo directed by the Commission. 
Tlio Hppur.dix duos not ao state, but it is assumed that the oost of suoh raaintenanoe 
and utilities *dll bo roimbursed as a diroot ooat and that suoh reimbursement is not 
a phrt of the cstinatcd ovarheatî payment of $250,000 per year. This point should be 
slsirii'iad in tho uppoadix. Upon expiration of this oontraot, tho 0ovomnent may con-
tinuo to USD its building; however, it nill not bs put to any use T.'hioh oreatas a 
nuisance or prejudices the operation of educational facilities adjacent to it. 
Upon notioo by the Co-iaission that kho CovornKjnt-ovinod buildiag is no lon^or 
ro-iUirod by tha Govoriia'.Jiit, the College s hull xtuinLain it in a atand-by status until 
notified that suoh rnaintananoe is not required. Tho College will be reimbursed for 
all direct costs incurred in soanoetion v.itl. such Kûlntanance, subjoot to tha uvail-
jbility :ipproprlatic.îs ci kho r froa tha Covoranent or from any other souroo. It 
appoaro that the Colloire ni 11 not bo held responsible if it has no funds to provide 
such stend-by sfcintranunce. 
If it is detor.-iinod thnt the Government building is no longar required by the 
Covormient, the Colloce shnll have 100 days froa tho receipt of such notice, to exer-
oiso an option to purchuao the building for an amount mutually agreed upon. If the 
College does not exercise this option witliin 180 days, the Covernment may dispoae of 
the building by sale, loose or reaoval. If sold or leased by the Government to o 
third party, approval of tho College nuot be secured as to the intended use of the 
building by tho prospective buyer or losoe. 
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APPENDIX F. WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Figure Fl. Excerpt from a typical Iowa State College 
health report, January 1943 290 
Figure F2. Report on research studies of Ames 
personnel, June 1, 1944 291 
Figure F3. Typical letter to a person who left 
the project, asking for continued 
testing 293 
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Report of Thelna Bruoa 3. Jan* 4—9# 1943 
Deliosa, Everett 
1/7/43 
Hull, Ji'orris 
1/7/43 
liiller, Robert 
1/7/4:-
Gajmnon, JomeQ 
1/7/43 
Soy, William 
1/7/43 
Fulmer, Robei-t 
1/7/43 
Peterson, . .,rjia 
1/7/43 
Uookeai-au, i'.anley 
1/7/43 
Kàèbax, I^woU 
1/3/43 
Iliff, iJa-j63 
1/8/43 
Dar, Li', 
1/5/43 
Rafdal, iî. T. 
1/8/43 
riper, '7. J. 
1/0/43 
Smith, J. K. 
.l/"/43 
1.023 brace mugar 
1.024 
1.015 
— —— —— —- qpB. trace augar 
fiirt ti'.ic*; n.lbiinin Hioroi few mucuo shreds, 2-^ wbc 1 hpf 
qno. trace ougar 
trace albumin Micro> occ. wbc. Amorjihous material 
1.025 
—— • ' ' •' — 1.020 trace sugar* 
faint trace albui.-JLn. Micro: fen mucus shreds, very occasional w.b.c 
?ilS 4,760,000 11,300 57P 38L Zl 2B IB 1.034 Red. sugar 
94^ 5,480,000 9,400 66? 341 
nicro: few -v.b.c. f/. r.b.c. 
faint trace albumin Uicroi v. occ. w.b.c. 
1.022 
1.029 sugar reduction 
1.021 albumin 
1.020 
84^ 4,580,000 10,550 66? 26L 61Î IE IB 1.021 trace sugar 
Figure Fl. Excerpt from a typical Iowa State College health report, 
January 1943. 
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Xflnipersltig of Chicago 
/Cetatluî^lcal Xabocatotc 
OUTTCRFICLD aOOO 
June Ist, 1944 
TO: DR. GRANT 
SUBJECT: REPORT CF STUDIES CF PIRSONNEL AT MIES, IOWA 
On April 27 four mtmbers of our group visited the Tuballoy Production 
Plant at Ames, Iowa. Blood and urine specimens were obtained on 
19 workers in the ^ûant. Urine specimens only were obtained on an 
additional four individuals. 
Studies on these specimens included tests for liver and kidney 
function as well as other non-specific tests which may be correlated 
with dearranged metabolism. The results of these studies are given 
in the table belov/. For purposes of comparison the personnel has 
been divided into three groups depending upon their exposure to 
Tuballoy, chiefly as the fluoride. This classification is based on 
information given us by Mr.GEbsdrow&cbhersand confirmed by personal 
interviews with the individuals concerned. 
1. HEAVY EXPOSraE 
Name 
1. Lane, Sidney 
BLOOD STUDIES 
Sulfur cc* eg** Proto 
URINE STUDIES 
C opro,Pigment s* **, 
Urinalys 
0 0—0—2— 
2. Lanning, P. qns 0 1 4 0 0-0-0-0 1 
3. Mock, K. 4 0 0 4 4 2-1—1-0 0 
4. Morrell, C. 3 0 1 0 3 0—1—0—0 0 
2. MODERATE EXPOSURE 
1. Allen, Clarence 4 1 1 1 2 1-0-1-1 0 
a. 'A'enget 2 0 0 1 3 0-1—1-1 0 
3. Turner, J.N. 2 0 1 1 4 0-1-1-0 0 
4. Stevenson,Robert 2 0 1 2 0 0-0-1-0 0 
5. Harding, H. 1 2 1 1 0 0-0-0-0 0 
6. Coughewnov;er ,B. 0 0 0 1 0 1-0-0-0 0 
7. Carver, Roy 3 0 1 0 0 0—0—1—0 0 
8. Anderson, Hugh 2 2 1 0 0 0-0-0-0 0 
9. Fisher, Park qns 0 1 1 0 0-0—0-0 0 
suga 
Figure F2. Figure F2. Report on research studies of Ames personnel, 
June 1,1944 
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3. RELATIVELY SLIGHT EXPOSURE URINE STUDIES 
BLOOD STUDIES 
Sulfur 00* og** Proto Copro,Pigments,*** 
_ Urinalysis 
1. Storkey,B. 2 0 1 0 1 0-1-2-1 0 
2. Orr, John 0 0 0 0 0 0-0-0-0 , 0 
3. Smith, Lowell 0 0 1 0 0 0-0-0-0 0 
4. Anderson,Edward 1 0 1 0 1 0-0-0-0 0 
Kent, Arthur ***** 0 2 1 0 0 0-1-0-0 0 
* Oephalin cholesterol ** Colloidal gold *** Absorption at 400 mu >• 
and 520 mu Urorosein 
band and 510 mu band 
**** Heavy exposure until about 4 months ago, practically none since. 
***** Works away from plant. Radiation chief exposure. 
The above scoring system may be interpreted as follows: 
0= normal range 
1 plus r border line range 
2 plus to 4 plus r increasingly positive reaction 
CCNCLUSICNS: 
In general, fortunately, the tests indicate less abnormality thaû I 
would have expected from the amount of exposure these men are getting. 
The one exception to this statement is the almost consistent elevatioi 
of serum sulfur which is indicative of probably slight kidney dis­
function. Liver; function tents are almost uniformally normal. In 
only the heaviest exposure group is there significant change in 
porphyrin metabolism. 
Sincerely yours, 
3S:SS SALÎUEL SCHWARTZ,M.D. 
Figure F2. (Continued). 
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March 26, 1945 
Mr. David U. lAnning 
112 East Avenus 
Ames, Iowa 
Dear tlr. Lannlng: 
As you know, the Health Division of the Chemistry Project WEB 
interested in checking up on your health while you were work­
ing at the plant. Even though you have left, we would Ilka 
to continue with this, iVe were wondering if you would be 
willing to give ua semi-weekly urine eamples for the following 
month. The bottles would be left for you at your house, and 
would be picked up by our driver. 
If you are willing to cooperate would you either call me at 
extension 381 or fill out the enclosed card and mail it to 
me. It is of importance to us here on the project that you 
cooperate. 
Sincerely yours, 
Elroy M, Gladrow 
By authority of F. PI. Speddlng 
EG/esp 
Figure F3. Typical letter to a person who has left the projcct, asking for 
continued testing. 
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APPENDIX G. THE IMPACT OF THE AMES PROJECT UPON 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE 
Figure Gl. Organization chart proposed for the Institute of 
Atomic Research at Iowa State College, 
October 1945 295 
Figure G2. Policy on negotiation and acceptance 
of research contracts, approved 
by the Iowa State Board of Education, 
March 16,1950 296 
Figure G3. Policy on disposition of overhead funds at 
Iowa State College, approved by the 
State Board of Education, 
March 16,1950 298 
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PRKSIDFUT 
N. 
Eean, Veterinarj}. Engl-j [Dean, Horae") 5ean, Soïonc^ Pireotora, f.—GcânT Âprl-! 
L r_ 1 Ln«2ï^_l L.E^02lÇ8J | I fe«_Sias.j |_ ÇU-ituro j 
\ \ 
\ \ 
Policy 
Advisory 
CoDnitboe 
1 
Institute of Atonic 
Research 
Spodding, Director 
Technical 
|Veterli>BX7) 
Uedidne 
Research Professor 
on Institute Budeet pkgineorin 
Research Professor 
front Txs, Sta. UgrlculturW 
ilome 
Economics 
Figure Gl. Organization chart proposed for the Institute of Atomic 
Research at Iowa State College, October 1945. 
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The Iowa State Collece 
STATEiiENT OF PRINCIPLES REL/iTING TO 
THE NEGOTIATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF RESEARCH CONTRACTS 
1. Research contracts will be accepted by Iowa State College only in fields 
of activity where the College is (a) authorized by the laws of Iowa and 
policies of the Iowa State Board of Education and (b) is competent by 
reason of qualified staff and facilities to perform the desired work. 
2. Research contracts will be accepted only when the research contemplated 
thereby vdll be of benefit to the College, to the State of Iowa and/or 
' to the public in general. 
3. Prior to negotiating a research contract the administrative official 
under whose division the work will be performed shall advise the Presi­
dent that such a project has benn offered, and shall submit a recommenda­
tion that such a project is desirable and that it conforms to the prin­
ciples outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. Individual staff members 
shall not enter into preliminary negotiations relative to research con­
tracts unless and until authorized to do so. This is not intended to pro­
hibit preliminary discussions, but is intended to apply to all fiscal and 
legal matters. 
ll. Upon authorization by the President, negotiations may be entered into 
with the agency desiring to initiate such a project by designated admin­
istrative officials and the Business Wanager. Only such authorized in­
dividuals may represent the College in these negotiations. 
5. The matter of rei:nbursement of costs and method and terms of payment 
involved in such contracts are of utmost importance in order that the 
College may follow a unifona policy v;ith respect to the various con­
tracting agencies. 
6.' In negotiating for the performance of research contracts Iowa State 
College will follow the following principles: 
(a) Prior to execution of any contract, the authorized officials 
shall prepare for filing with the contract a budget estimate, 
insofar as is practicable, of the cost of performing the 
contract which shall itemize in detail (l) cost of direct 
labor and services, (2) cost of materials which must be 
purchased or used, (3) description of college buildings and 
property to be used and term required, (h) allowance for 
direct charges against the project for utilities, travelling 
expenses, medical expenses, (5) indirect or overhead expenses, 
(6) all other expense items. Sources from which the re­
quired funds are to bo secured - i.e., from appropriated State 
funds or other funds available to the College, and from funds 
due under the contract. 
(b) 'Vhere a portion of the costs required to perform a contract 
is to be paid by the College from its funds instead of being 
collected from the other party to the contract, complete 
Figure G2. Policy on negotiation and acceptance of research contracts, 
approved by the Iowa State Board of Education, March 16,1950. 
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justification shall be submitted to the President of the 
ColleRe for approval, and such approved justification shall 
be filed with the contract in the College records. WTiere the 
College subsidizes a contract project, the relation of the 
contract to the work of the College shall be defined clearly. 
(c) Indirect and overhead costs shall be computed in accordance 
v/ith uniform policies and cost studies prepared from time to 
time by the Business Manager of the College. 
7. The Collece should retain patent rights on all patentable materials or 
processes. In cases of contracts with agencies of the United States 
Government, hov/ever, waiver of patent rights will be permitted. If 
patent rights are relinquished a loss may accrue to the College, the 
value of which is difficult to determine. Such loss should be taken 
into account in all contracts in whicli patent rights are relinquished. 
8. Authority to enter into contracts is granted solely by the Board of 
Education, through its Finance Committee and the President of the College, 
All contracts must be cleared with the Business Office for a check of 
thi? details of payment, conformity v/ith fiscal policies of the College, 
and for inclusion on Board of Education or Finance Committee dockets 
for official approval. Contracts shall provide for the signature of the 
director of the appropriate Research Institute or Experiment Station and 
the President of the College. 
9. The President of the College shall be authorized to consult legal coun­
sel designated by the Finance Committee of the Board of Education in 
consultation v/itli the Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Board 
in connection vdth'research contracts as to provisions required in said 
contracts and rights and obligations of the College thereunder, 
10. All contracts between the Collece and the United States Atomic Energy 
Cotiimission or other agency of the United States operating under transfer 
of funds from the Atomic Energy Commission shall be administered within 
the College by the Advisor)- Coiiumittee of the Institute for Atomic 
Research. The Advisory Committee shall assign the performance of the 
research provided for in such contracts to the appropriate College divi­
sion or Experiment Station. The College divisions and Experiment Sta­
tions shall cooperate w)iere necessary in the execution of such projects. 
Other contracts with the United States shall be administered by the 
President through the Division or Experiment Station designated by the 
President, and other agencies of the College shall cooperate v/here nece­
ssary in the execution of s\ich projects. In all contracts where radio­
active elements are involved, the Institute for Atomic Research shall be 
consulted and is charged with responsibility for recommendations as to 
safety of personnel and the public. Costs incurred in such consulta­
tion:; and in providing monitoring service arc chargeable by the Institute 
for /vtoinic Research to the contracts in which radioactive elements are 
used. 
Figure G2. (Continued). 
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The lo'.ïa State College 
STaTEilEÎIT 0? POLICY HEGviUDIIJG 
DISPOSITION OF OVERHEAD FUNDS 
The matter of overhead funds has become increasingly im­
portant in rocent years, both as to amount and as to final 
disposition. After careful consideration of the issues involved, 
it has been decided that the following regulations will govern 
overhead accounts in the future: 
1. Overhead receipts are not profit. They are intended 
primarily to reimburse the institution for general 
costs not directly chargeable to the contracts. 
They are institutional funds and not departmental. 
2. C'/i'rhead funds when received will be credited to tho 
General Fund of the College, segregated in an Over­
head Account or Accounts, with proper identification 
as to source. 
3. Overhead should be taken into account in negotiating 
the contract paj-nient under a lump sum or prant type 
of contract. The right is reserved to transfer from 
such contract payments to the Overhead Account a 
proper charge for overhead. 
L. Overhead funds may be made available to further the 
activities of the college agency or division to which 
tr.e original contract is assigned; hov/ever, the College 
rerervec the right to utilize funds from the Overhead 
Account for other purposes consistent with the general 
College program. 
5. iiequest.*! for allocations from the Overhead Account 
should bo subi.-.itted to the President's Office through 
budget transfers, indicating the specific activity to 
which the funds arc to apply. Such requests will be 
given careful consideration and if approved will be 
presented to the Finance Committee for approval, then 
foMardud to the Business Office for iir.plementation. 
Figure G3. Policy on disposition of overhead funds at Iowa State College, 
approved by the State Board of Education, March 16,1950. 
